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SUMMARY
Rotorcraft possess unique flight capabilities which make them well suited for a variety
of challenging missions, including operations in hazardous conditions and under signifi-
cant time constraints. Unfortunately, the safety record of helicopter operations is an order
of magnitude worse than that of commercial airlines, which has prompted the rotorcraft
industry to investigate strategies for safety improvement. Among the safety approaches
taken in industry, Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) stands out as an effective
means of identifying and mitigating emerging safety concerns before the trend results in
an accident. Unlike traditional post-accident analyses of flight data, HFDM and similar
monitoring systems operate by accessing, analyzing and acting on flight data recorded dur-
ing regular flight operations. By comparing flight data to a set of condition indicators,
known as safety events or exceedances, HFDM systems have demonstrated the ability to
alert operators of unsafe occurrences, and provide objective data in support of mitigation
strategies. However, when safety events are poorly defined or based on incomplete knowl-
edge, the ability of HFDM systems to detect safety hazards is diminished, with reduced
potential to help prevent avoidable accidents. As a consequence, the condition indicators
used in HFDM require continuous refinement to achieve adequate detection performance.
Additionally, the detection of any adverse condition can only be achieved if pertinent safety
events have been defined beforehand. Mitigating this dependence on pre-defined notions
of deteriorating safety has been the focus of several recent studies on the use of flight data
for safety enhancements in aviation.
This work demonstrated the use of several modeling approaches, with different method-
ological components that enable a systematic analysis of operating conditions for the pur-
pose of assessing the risk experienced at those conditions. The model-based approach is
demonstrated with both static performance models and a nonlinear dynamic simulation. In
the case of performance models, improved detection performance was shown compared to
xx
existing safety events used in practice. These types of models may be readily employed in
existing monitoring systems, at the expense of limited applicability within a narrow seg-
ment of the full flight envelope. The full methodology therefore makes use of the flight
simulation software FLIGHTLAB, with the goal of establishing a process where the ve-
hicle can be virtually flown to a critical state and the resulting information can be used in
consequent monitoring of the hazard identified in simulation. The methodology is further
supported by regression methods for implementation of the complicated simulation results
in a monitoring system.
The present methodology complements typical HFDM systems through the use of
physics-based modeling of the helicopter in flight. The main objective of the proposed
approach is improved understanding of conditions that contribute to current accident rates
through the use of physics-based helicopter modeling. By utilizing knowledge of the phys-
ical characteristics of the monitored rotorcraft in addition to the gathered data, a much
richer set of derived information becomes available for analysis. Further, physics-based
models may be used in a predictive fashion to identify safety events for a particular vehicle
in simulation, prior to their use in an HFDM system. These benefits are demonstrated for
several flight conditions known to contribute to negative safety trends in helicopter oper-
ations, with the overall goal being eventual improvements in the rotorcraft safety records





The ability to hover and maneuver at low speed, carry external loads, and airlift victims of
medical emergencies, have made helicopters an invaluable part of a modern transportation
system. At the same time, the unorthodox operations and frequently challenging conditions
in which helicopters operate have undoubtedly contributed to the perception of helicopters
as more dangerous than other forms of aviation. While the helicopter accident rate can be
compared to that of General Aviation (GA), the accident rate for helicopter operations is
an order of magnitude more severe than that of commercial airlines [1] as shown in Figure
1.1.
Because of the unacceptable helicopter accident rate, there has been a growing interest
in improving the rotorcraft safety record. In 2005, the International Helicopter Safety Team
(IHST) was established [2] with the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating rotorcraft
accidents. The IHST coordinates the efforts of national (Canadian, U.S., European) Heli-






























































Figure 1.1: Helicopter accident rate compared to commercial airlines [1]
1
Figure 1.2: Rate of safety improvement for helicopter operations1
copter Safety Teams and works closely with industry, academia and government entities to
achieve this goal. The high level of interest is confirmed by the NTSB’s Most Wanted list
of critical improvements to the transportation system, which has included improvements to
helicopter safety for both 2014 and 2015 [3, 4]. The initial efforts of the IHST and similar
organizations seem to have produced a significant decrease in accident rates, with the ob-
servation that following a period of continuous improvement, the rate at which helicopter
safety is being improved has stagnated, as shown in Fig. 1.2. During the same period, the
gap between helicopter accident rates and the results achieved by the commercial airlines
has increased due to further improvements in commercial airline safety[5].
Figure 1.3 shows a categorization of helicopter accidents that occurred in the US during
the years 2001, 2002 and 2006. It is evident that pilot action has been found to contribute
to the majority of helicopter accidents. Another reason for the high proportion of accidents
related to pilot error is the fact that over time, manufacturers have improved the reliability
of their products to the point where mechanical failures are quite rare[6]. Therefore the
overall number of accidents has dropped and reached a plateau where continuous improve-
ment must be increasingly focused on human factors. An NTSB study of civil rotorcraft
1image from http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/2014%20US%20Accident%20Rate%20MEDIA.pdf
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Table 1.1: Percentage of accidents related to pilot judgment
Source % Pilot % Data Year(s) No. of
Action issues Accidents
Iseler & Mayo[1] 70 NA 1990-1996 7562
US JHSAT[8] 84 NA 2001,2002 & 2006 523
Canadian JHSAT[9] 73 52 2000 52
NTSB[10] 69 NA 2007-2009 262
EHEST[11] 70 40 2000-2005 311
Harris,Franklin
& Kasper[7] 64 NA 1963-1998 76183
accidents between 1963 and 1998 found pilot error to be responsible for loss of control,
collisions with objects/ground, and the direct cause for more than 50% of engine power
loss accidents (through the improper use of fuel/air mixture)[7]. Over the years, several
researchers surveyed large numbers of helicopter accidents with the goal of understand-
ing causal factors and recommending solutions that can improve the stagnating helicopter
safety trend [1, 8, 9, 10, 11].
In addition to pilot error, the studies agree that accident analyses tend to produce lim-
ited results when key pieces of information are missing or unavailable. The cause of the
accident can be difficult to determine without a record of the actions performed by the pi-
lots, which complicates investigations, especially when the physical evidence do not point
to a mechanical failure. The studies conclude that lack of information is a major hurdle
in performing accident analyses, and methods to obtain richer data from flight operations
should be sought. Previous safety efforts in the fixed-wing domain concluded that objec-
tivity through the use of data-driven methods is necessary for meaningful safety analysis
and improvement in safety levels[12]. Because of the experiences in fixed wing safety, the
use of objective data has been adopted as a basic tenet in IHST’s activities.
Both the general lack of information, and the fact that most accidents are somehow
related to the actions performed by the crew in the cockpit, can be addressed via on-board
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Figure 1.3: Pilot judgment is associated with the majority of accidents [8]
recording of flight data. Modern recording hardware has enabled much simpler download
and analysis of data, so that daily analysis is possible, as opposed to only post-accident
analyses using traditional flight data recorders. Thus in addition to accident investigations,
the flight data can be used for daily evaluations of normal operations, with the potential of
detecting negative trends before safety deteriorates toward an accident.
The systematic collection and analysis of flight data from routine operations for proac-
tive safety improvements in aviation is known as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) [13].
FDM systems have been successfully demonstrated by airlines over the past several decades
[14], with measurable decreases in accident rates. Because of the safety benefits associ-
ated with FDM, rotorcraft operators have begun implementing their own versions of FDM,
called Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM).
Recently, a study by the European Helicopter Safety Team placed FDM technologies
on its list of most promising technological means of achieving improvements in helicopter
safety[15]. The NTSB Most Wanted List explicitly names FDM as a means to achieving
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the needed reduction in rotorcraft accident rates. For all the above reasons, HFDM is
becoming a more prominent component in safety systems employed by rotorcraft operators
and regulators alike. Proper application of HFDM techniques holds the promise of proac-
tive prevention of accidents and the potential to reduce fatalities in the helicopter industry.
On the other hand, the set-up of an HFDM system requires extensive subject matter exper-
tise and long periods of fine-tuning, which can result in decreased performance and thus
reduced safety before the system is brought to full operational capability.
This section introduces the concept of HFDM through several representative sources
of information and describes a generic version of an HFDM system which will provide
context for further discussion.
1.2 Flight Data Monitoring
Operational data obtained from on-board measurements are important for a variety of ac-
tivities from early development to operational service. During development, designers use
flight data to assess aircraft performance and determine agreement between predicted and
measured values. Toward the end of the design cycle, a thorough flight test program is
conducted, in order to uncover the extent of the aircraft’s flight envelope, identify any re-
maining deficiencies and provide data for certification purposes. In parallel, these flight
data are used for system identification, where a model is created based on the relation-
ship between control inputs, flight conditions, and vehicle responses. Such models are
frequently used alongside pilot reports for handling qualities evaluations [16, 17, 18].
Flight data is of equal importance to the operators and regulators that are concerned
with the safety of the aircraft after entering service. When flight data are not available,
accident investigations have to rely on analysis of the crash site and physical evidence, wit-
ness reports and known facts about the aircraft/flight prior to the accident. As evidenced by
2NTSB reports accident numbers per vehicle category - light single engine vehicles are reported here
3Only light (single engine) helicopters are included here, but they account for over 90% of accidents in
the period 1963-98.
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Table 1.2: Increase in Flight Data Recorder capabilities [22]
Aircraft Year entered Number of FDR FDR data
Type into service parameters type capacity
Boeing 707 1958 5 Analog Mechanical limit
of 5 parameters
Airbus 330 1993 280 Digital 128 wps1 serial
Embraer 180 2004 774 Digital 256 wps1 serial
Airbus A380 2007 >1000 Digital 1024 wps1 serial
Boeing 787 2009 >1000 Digital Ethernet
many cases throughout the history of aviation, these sources often lack enough information
to uncover the reasons for an accident, especially when the accident is particularly severe
or occurs in a remote area. In many cases, the only conclusive evidence in an accident
investigation is derived from the readout of flight data and cockpit voice recorders. For this
purpose, aviation authorities make the recording of on-board data using FDRs and CVRs
a requirement on all airlines and in many other commercial operations[19, 20, 21]. Table
1.2 shows the progression of flight data recording on commercial airliners over a period
of decades. As new aircraft enter service, the capabilities of the on-board recorders have
grown in terms of number of parameters and quantity of data stored, as well as the sophis-
tication of the storage medium. As capabilities of recording hardware have improved, so
has the ease with which flight data can be accessed and downloaded for analysis. Quick
Access Recorders (QARs) are a type of device that have contributed to this increase in
data proliferation. QARs are similar in performance to FDRs, with the distinction of being
mounted in an easily reachable location on the aircraft and having removable media that
makes them ideal for frequent data downloads. Some of the more recent models can even
transfer data wirelessly, further reducing the effort required to perform regular data analy-
ses. This ability to frequently access and analyze data pertaining to regular flight operations
1Words per second, refers to the number of (usually) 4-bit data packets recorded each second. Multiple
words can be combined to record parameters with greater resolution.
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is one of the key enablers for widespread implementation of FDM systems[22]. By ana-
lyzing a much larger sample set, it is believed that a carefully designed FDM system can
detect trends that indicate the potential for an accident to occur, but do so before the trend
results in an actual accident. Thus the data-driven approach in FDM is focused primarily
on proactive safety through timely response to any indications of eroding safely levels.
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has published the CAP 739 Flight Data Mon-
itoring guidance document, designed to help operators establish and utilize an FDM pro-
gram. The document contains a wealth of information regarding the set-up and operation of
FDM. In this document, the CAA defines FDM as ”the pro-active and non-punitive use
of digital flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety[13]”. In the
United States, FDM is known as FOQA - Flight Operational Quality Assurance, which the
FAA defines FOQA as ”a voluntary safety program that is designed to make commercial
aviation safer by allowing commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified aggre-
gate information with the FAA so that the FAA can monitor national trends in aircraft
operations and target its resources to address operational risk issues (e.g., flight opera-
tions, air traffic control (ATC), airports)[23].” The FAA further states that primary focus
of FOQA is ”to identify and reduce or eliminate safety risks, as well as minimize deviations
from the regulations[23].”
FDM programs are referred to using a variety of terms, including Flight Data Anal-
ysis[24], Line Activity Monitoring Program[25], Flight Data Management[26], Military
Flight Operational Quality Assurance[27, 28] and other names. Despite the different names,
most of these programs operate under very similar principles, which are oriented toward
proactive safety through timely detection of conditions that indicate the potential for an ac-
cident. Most FDM literature references the Heinrich Pyramid, shown in Figure 1.4, which
is meant to convey the much higher frequency of low-consequence events relative to seri-
ous incidents and accidents. Thus a data-based safety approach such as FDM can improve
the available safety information by detecting and tracking these events. Any safety initia-
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tives can then utilize and act upon a much broader knowledge than what is available from
accident analyses alone.
Figure 1.4: Heinrich pyramid of proactive safety[28]
Unlike the regulations pertaining to FDRs, national aviation authorities display a wider
variety in their approach to FDM. The CAA requires commercial operators to maintain
a functional FDM program if their aircraft meet certain criteria of size and passenger ca-
pacity. In the US, FOQA programs are voluntary, but can go through an approval process
that helps ensure proper operation and affords certain legal protections. Overall there is
less regulation surrounding FDM, but the acceptance level is high among airlines and is
steadily growing among other types of operators.
To illustrate the operation of an FDM system, it is helpful to look at the flow of in-
formation through a representative FDM system as shown in Figure 1.5. The data are
first imported into the analysis facility, either through physical movement of the storage
medium or through wireless data transfer. These data are routinely analyzed by the down-
stream analysis system, and can sometimes be the subject of directed investigations, such
as when a crew issues a request for feedback regarding some operational aspect.
Once the flight data are loaded onto the system, the flight recording is compared against
a pre-defined set of conditions known as ”safety events”. In Figure 1.5 the analysis is per-
formed within the box titled ”FDM analysis”, and a database of ”safety events” is usually
8












FDM review team review
events and trended data
Make recommendations
to Training and Safety
Depts to improve
procedures
If appropriate, comminicate deidentified data to ATC, 
airport, clients or aircraft manufacturers to initiate 
or inform investigations
FDM analysis











Initiate crew contact to
discuss & review event
and refine assessment
Communicate event to crew,
no response required
Event definition database
Figure 1.5: A typical diagram describing the flow of information in FDM
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Table 1.3: Sample of basic operational safety events[13]
Event Group Description
Flight Manual Speed Limits Vmo exceedence
Mmo exceedence
Gear down speed exceedence
Gear up/down selected speed exceedence
Flight Manual Altitude Limits Exceedence of flap/slat altitude
Exceedence of maximum operating altitude
High approach speed Approach speed high within 90s of touchdown
Approach speed high below 500ft AAL
Approach speed high below 50ft AGL
Low approach speed Approach speed low within 2 minutes
of touchdown
maintained by the operator to enable the analysis. A safety event is a threshold or a set of
thresholds on several parameters that is used to generate an alert when the parameters ex-
ceed acceptable levels, which would indicate that the level of safety has deteriorated[13].
For example, flight beyond the maximum allowable airspeed or exceeding a bank angle
that is deemed excessive will result in an alert by the system. In addition to events, oper-
ators sometimes choose to record snapshot-type summaries of their operations, so condi-
tions that are not necessarily related to safety are also tracked. An example would be the
takeoff and landing times, or the indicated airspeed at the point when an aircraft passes
through 10000ft, which could be used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory policies
concerning noise procedures (CFR Title 14 91.117 [29]). CAA’s CAP 739 [13] document
and similar guidance publications frequently contain sample events, of which an excerpt is
shown in Table 1.3. The full table also groups safety events according to phase of flight.
When setting up a new FDM program, a large portion of the effort goes to the definition
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and fine-tuning of safety events. Subject matter experts are typically responsible for defin-
ing safety events before the FDM system can perform automated analyses, which makes the
examples published in guidance documents especially useful to operators with new FDM
programs. Safety events are usually created to correspond to the flight envelope, standard
operating procedures, regulations and previous experience. The flight envelope is typically
prescribed by the manufacturer of the vehicle[30], and is defined for each vehicle based on
the manufacturer’s analysis and experimentation during the vehicle’s development. When
operating the vehicle within the prescribed envelope, the level of safety should be rea-
sonably high, so ”safety events” are defined to correspond to cases when the envelope is
breached[13, 23, 31]. The operator may choose to alter these limits to reflect their own
SOPs, which are based on a combination of regulatory limits, the type of mission flown,
and other operator-specific considerations. For example, an operator can limit the speed
of an aircraft to less than the operating handbook value in order to extend the life of a
particular component, i.e. for maintenance purposes[32]. Alternatively, if a limit specified
in the pilot operating handbook is deemed too conservative, an operator might allow flight
beyond the prescribed envelope. In this case, an FDM safety event would be set up to de-
tect a parameter level that is already beyond the published envelope. For both situations,
the FDM safety events reflect the operator’s SOPs which are based on the flight envelope,
but tailored by the operator to suit the level of risk acceptance, maintenance considerations,
experience with the vehicle and the perception of conservatism already incorporated in the
pilot handbook. Another reason safety events are defined is to prevent future occurrences
of an unexpected/improbable accident that is encountered during operation. Operators keep
adding new events as their experience with the FDM program grows, and operational oc-
currences point to potential dangers that can be monitored using flight data and analysis
based on safety events.
Detected events pass through a validity check performed by a skilled analyst. The
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Figure 1.6: Example Risk Tolerability Matrix [13]
alert or is indeed an unsafe occurrence. Valid events are then categorized according to
their severity so that the downstream mitigation efforts can be prioritized and address the
high risk safety deficiencies first. This assessment is performed using a combination of
frequency of occurrence and the potential for damage/loss of life, which results in a risk
matrix as shown in Figure 1.6.
In Figure 1.5, safety events of different risk levels are shown to feed into downstream
portions of the FDM system where the operator decides on a course of action in response
to the perceived risks. All safety events are recorded for long term analysis, but medium
and high risk events usually necessitate more immediate reaction by the operator. This can
be in the form of a bulletin or other communication, or direct engagement with the crew
in cases where serious risks are identified or negligence is suspected[13, 23, 31, 33, 32].
FDM systems form the analysis portion of a larger Safety Management System (SMS) as
outlined in ICAO’s Safety Management Manual [34]. In the SMS there should exist safety
support mechanisms to evaluate and manage risks, and a feedback channel that communi-
cates findings back to the crews. Thus in Figure 1.5, the lower portion of the figure outlines
some of the ways in which the results from the FDM analysis can be utilized, which is usu-
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ally handled through organizational structure that is already in place with the operator[13],
in the form of an SMS.
1.2.1 Results from FDM analyses
FDM analyses are usually done using software designed for the purpose of processing
flight data [13], where the main capability of the software is the detection and reporting of
instances where pre-defined events have been detected in the data, which consists of com-
paring incoming flight data against the event database. Most FDM systems go beyond mere
detection and perform additional manipulations on the output of the event-based analyses,
so that more informative results can be presented to the operator and a meaningful conclu-
sion can be drawn regarding the safety/performance of the flight operations. A common
example of such additional functionality are historical trending and statistical analyses per-
formed using the rates at which events occur over a period of time, including time series
representation, histograms, box plots and other statistical techniques. Another feature that
is common across most FDM vendors is the ability to replay the flight using the position,
attitude and accelerations from the flight data, along with any other useful information that
can help create a detailed representation of the conditions that were experienced in flight.
Further analyses using FDM events designed to record ”snapshots” of typical operations
are also performed, in order to present a high-level summary which the operator can use to
evaluate the state of their operational performance and safety[31]. Monitoring such event-
based summaries of their operations allows operators to objectively evaluate the adherence
to SOPs, detect deviations before they grow to pose serious concern, and take measures to
prevent accidents from happening in the future. These benign events can also serve as an
indicator that a condition exists that should be tracked using safety events. For example,
if an operator experiences a runway overrun, the history of touchdown speeds recorded
through these ”snapshots” can be examined for a correlation between the landing speed and
the incident. If a correlation exists, the operator can establish a safety event with different
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Figure 1.7: Reduction in hull losses following FDM introduction at British Airways[35]
severities corresponding to ranges of touchdown speed - thereby reducing the potential
for future overruns. This is an example where typical aviation safety metrics, such as the
number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours, are complemented by intermediate metrics
in the form of FDM safety events, so that the operator can make safety corrections based
on a much more detailed picture of their operations.
One of the earliest validations of the safety benefits achievable through FDM was the
program implemented by British Airways during the latter portion of the 1970’s[14]. Fol-
lowing the adoption of an FDM program, British Airways experienced a significant reduc-
tion of hull losses [35], as shown in Figure 1.7. It is results such as those demonstrated
by British Airways that have prompted other airlines to set up their own FDM programs,
which has contributed to the high level of safety experienced by modern airlines (Figure
1.8).
More recently, there has been increased interest in data-sharing due to the safety bene-
fits of being able to perform analyses on large and varied sets of data from many operators.
The FAA has helped set up a data sharing network called the Aviation Safety Informa-
tion Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System[36]. This system allows regulators (the FAA)
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Figure 1.8: Rising number of operators with flight data monitoring[35]
and operators to analyze safety information from participating airlines, combine multiple
and disparate sources of information (flight data from airlines, incident reports, weather
and traffic data, etc.)[37] and to generate and disseminate safety information to individ-
ual operator and to the industry as a whole. The system is administered by MITRE, who
performs the analyses on the aggregate data and generates guidance regarding common
issues. For example, an operational issue detected within one operator can be examined
across the entire base of participants, which has the potential to reveal the presence of sim-
ilar issues among other operators much earlier than if the analyses had been performed in
isolation[37]. For this reason, most US commercial carriers participate in the ASIAS pro-
gram, and various efforts have been established to extend the benefits of ASIAS to General
Aviation (GA) aircraft[38, 39], as well as to rotorcraft[33, 40].
FDM summary
The overview of a typical FDM system showed how the data flows from line operations (the
aircraft) into the analysis system, where event-based analysis is performed, and showcased
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some typical results and how they are used. The following observations can be made from
the above reveiw:
• Modern commercial airliners have significant on-board flight data recording capabil-
ity
• FDM systems analyze flight data from regular operations and have demonstrated
safety improvements in airline operations. The analyzed set of data encompasses
routine operations and can help detect negative safety trends before a catastrophic
failure occurs.
• The primary analysis method used in FDM systems is ”safety event”-based detection
of adverse safety conditions. Flight data are compared against a safety event database
for any matches with known unsafe conditions. Benign ”snapshot” events are also
used to provide a high-level summary of flight operations and for long-term trending.
• Creating a database of relevant safety events is a labor-intensive task, during which
analysts translate system limitations, SOPs and general rules of flight into a set of
algorithmic descriptions (safety event definitions) which can be used by the FDM
system.
• Detected safety events are assessed and trended over time using traditional statistical
techniques. Therefore it is important to have relevant events that have a meaningful
correlation to the safety state of the system under observation.
• FDM is considered to be an essential aviation safety tool, with wide adoption and
demonstrated safety benefits among airline operators. FDM regulation is specific to
national aviation authorities, but the level of adoption generally exceeds the mini-
mum regulatory standard.
• Data-sharing has been established primarily between commercial airlines, and efforts
to include GA aircraft and rotorcraft are currently underway.
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1.3 FDM in the helicopter domain
1.3.1 Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)
Whereas manufacturers have improved the mechanical reliability of more modern heli-
copters[6], a significant portion of the increased safety can be attributed to the timely main-
tenance and early warning provided by Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)
[41]. These systems monitor the vibration levels and other signals coming from dynamic
drive system components and alert operators to any unsafe increases in the monitored pa-
rameters that might signal deterioration of the component. The traditional approach to pre-
ventive maintenance is to assign schedules for replacement based on some initial testing,
such as the number of hours that a component can be used before it needs to be inspected
or replaced. By directly monitoring the state of the component, maintenance can be sched-
uled to coincide with actual deterioration of the part and eliminate premature replacement.
Figure 1.9 shows the compromise required of traditional component life assessment, and
the inefficiency when actual operations incur different life expenditure than the conditions
used to assess a baseline component lifespan[42].
In addition to the cost benefits of maximizing part utilization, HUMS provides an added
safety layer by alerting the operator to any premature failures, which has already been at-
tributed to the safe conclusion of several potentially deadly incidents. In the 1980s the CAA
performed an investigation of techniques to prevent catastrophic failures of dynamic com-
ponents on helicopters operating in the North Sea’s Oil and Gas industry, which resulted in
quick adoption and widespread use of Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) on
rotorcraft. In 1999 HUMS/FDR systems were made mandatory on UK transport helicopters
carrying more than 9 passengers[33]. The CAA refers to HUMS as Helicopter Vibration
Health Monitoring (VHM) and has published extensive guidance on the topic[43].
HUMS has been researched and implemented in practice for several decades, and many

























Figure 1.9: Traditional vs. HUMS based part life assessment[42]
for nuclear plant and rocket engine monitoring[44]. One of the fundamental HUMS tech-
niques in practical use is Statistical Process Control (SPC). Once a system is in operation,
SPC establishes nominal levels of variance in the monitored signals and generates and alert
when the levels are exceeded. This gives rise to the term exceedance, which is sometimes
also used to describe safety events in the context of FDM. The principle is very similar
for both, in that they are condition indicators, with the primary difference being the type
of parameters tracked and the level of expert judgment needed to establish baseline values
for the safety event thresholds. In HUMS, most of the focus is on tracking the deteriora-
tion of dynamic components such as the rotor [42], rotating shafts, engines[45], gears and
bearings[46]. For such components there are frequently well-specified limits on allowable
vibration or noise spectrum, or the limits can be specified during the initial phase of sys-
tem operation, and selected in a way that balances false detection and missed alarms[47].
For components that aren’t directly monitored using sensors, regime recognition is used to
detect the current operational state, and correlate the damage incurred in flight based on a
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priori experimental evaluation of the damage profile for each flight regime[48].
Most HUMS systems, however, are only available on large and advanced helicopters
that have digital engine controls, or otherwise have the on-board capability to monitor and
record data from sensors mounted to the dynamic components. As such, HUMS typically
serve the high-end of the rotorcraft industry. However, Iseler and De Maio[1] noted that
large helicopters involved in commercial operations have a relatively lower accident rate,
much closer to that of commercial airlines. Therefore any safety improvement effort must
consider the light helicopters operated by small operators.
1.3.2 Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring
The Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Toolkit published by the IHST [49] defines HFDM
as ”A systematic method of accessing, analyzing and acting upon information ob-
tained from flight data to identify and address operational risks before they can lead
to incidents and accidents.” Compared to fixed wing FDM, HFDM systems have to ad-
dress rotorcraft-specific considerations in order to be an effective safety tool, which is
accomplished primarily through re-defining safety events to reflect the limits of safe he-
licopter flight[13, 50]. The helicopter flight envelope, the region in which safe flight can
be expected, tends to be quite complex and exhibit variations with flight and environmen-
tal conditions, which makes it more difficult for pilots to maintain safe flight. A common
definition of Loss of Control states that it occurs ”because the aircraft enters a flight regime
which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always at a high rate, thereby intro-
ducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved[51].” For example, helicopters
can be subject to hazards even while stationary (with rotor turning), if the pilots inadver-
tently move the main rotor controls to an extreme position, which could result in excessive
rotor flapping and a rotor blade strike. The same control input in a fixed-wing aircraft
that is stationary is fairly inconsequential. For the operator, regulator, or any other entity
concerned with monitoring the safety of helicopter operation through HFDM, this com-
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plexity translates into added difficulty when defining the safety events which are used by
an HFDM system. This difficulty was reflected in the experience of early HFDM inves-
tigators. In particular, the CAA cooperated with North Sea operators to understand the
challenges surrounding FDM use on helicopters. These studies are described below.
1.3.3 The Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP) Trials
Around the same time that HUMS became required in the North Sea, the CAA and Shell
Aircraft sponsored a project to investigate the feasibility of using routine flight data for
safety purposes, in addition to maintenance scheduling and accident investigation. This
trial is known as the Helicopter Operations Monitoring Program (HOMP)[33]. The initial
study involved a single AS 332 Super Puma helicopter used for data collection over a
period of one year, and leveraged techniques developed by British Airways during their
own early work on FDM. The HOMP trial demonstrated the extraction of meaningful safety
information from data gathered on a flexible aircraft platform such as the helicopter, and
provided mitigation strategies to issues detected through the use of HFDM. Figure 1.10
shows the basic concept of HOMP.
A second study was later performed [32] which evaluated the challenges and benefits
of applying HFDM to different operators and helicopter types. The analysis was extended
to a second operator of the same helicopter type (Super Puma), and the study revealed
common operational risks which were recognized by both operators but received different
treatment due to the operators’ approach to risk. A second type of helicopter, the Sikorsky
S76, was also added and evaluated. Initially, the S76 did not have GPS (Global Positioning
System) data available which hindered the HOMP analysis. The importance of these data
were quickly recognized and the requisite recording capability was installed[32].
Unlike HUMS, the safety events used in HFDM are based on more varied sources of
operating limits (pilot handbook, SOPs, airmanship and experience) and the SPC approach
to establishing nominal parameter values is less effective at creating valid safety event
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Figure 1.10: The HOMP system[32]
limits, particularly because of the wide range of values the parameters could exhibit while
staying within safe boundaries of flight. The HOMP trials showed that following the initial
set-up of a safety event database, continuous fine tuning is required until satisfactory levels
of system performance are achieved. This performance is usually measured by the analysis
team in terms of the number of false detections and missed alerts. False alerts occur when a
safety event is triggered, and the detection is erroneous or the analyst deems the operation
to be safe. Because analysts validate safety events through inspection of triggered alerts,
such false detection presents a nuisance and increased workload, which in turn reduces the
performance of the HFDM system. Because the focus is on safety, false alerts are preferred
21
to missed detection, and the parameter levels that make up safety event definitions are set
to minimize or eliminate missed detection at the expense of increased numbers of false
alerts. During the HOMP trial, 21 out of a total of 85 event definitions were reconfigured to
reduce the number of false alarms or help the detection of certain events. The original rate
for false alarms was around 99.95%, down to 90% toward the end of the program through
the use of bad data detection and correction processes [33]. Considering that not all flights
produced safety event triggers, the 90% rate equates to about 2-3 false alarms per flight.
False events were removed manually through inspection, and later on employing logical
tests when possible (multiple events strung together if occurring in quick succession). The
researchers recommended that further work should be done to achieve a balance between
false/nuisance alerts and detection performance [33, 32].
Some of the benefits reported by the researchers involved in the HOMP trials are im-
mediate reductions in the incidence of particular events. One example given by the inves-
tigators cited the observation that helicopter crews flying the Sikorsky S76 were operating
at high speed with the landing gear extended. The gear doors on the S76 have a structural
limitation that could be exceeded at high speeds, so care must be taken to either retract the
gear or limit the forward speed. After a number of safety events of the ”high-speed with
gear down” type were detected, the operator communicated the importance of avoiding
exceeding the gear limits to the crews. In the period immediately following this communi-
cation, the number of such events dropped for a period of time, before detection rates of this
particular event type began creeping up. This experience demonstrated the effectiveness of
having an objective view of the operations, as well as the need to monitor and communicate
findings continuously for best results.
Conclusions from the HOMP trials were incorporated into data monitoring guidance
materials, particularly in later revisions of the CAP 739 document[13]. The HOMP tri-
als’ experience with the definition of helicopter-specific safety events resulted in a list of
example safety events that can be used by new HFDM programs to populate their safety
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event database and provide the initial functionality of the HFDM system. These example
events can be found in the appendix of the HOMP documents and CAP 739[13, 33, 32]. It
is understood that operators and the analysts charged with the task of defining and main-
taining events would modify the sample events in a way that reflects the specifics of their
own operation and desired safety level, as well as define any additional events that may be
required.
The two HOMP trials were limited to just two helicopter types that had on-board data
recording capability already installed in the form of HUMS. In the case of the S76, ad-
ditional GPS recording capability was added, but a general analysis of various on-board
recording hardware options was beyond the scope of the study. In practice, the differences
between helicopters and their on-board recording capabilities need to be understood before
the lessons learned in one program can be applied to the next.
1.3.4 The Small Helicopter Operational Monitoring Programme (Small HOMP)
In 2010, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) reported on a project that evaluated
HFDM intended specifically for operators of small fleets of light helicopters[52]. The study
had a mandate to ”evaluate the potential safety benefit of applying HOMP to light helicopter
operations and then to recommend a suitable FDM specification”. To accomplish this task,
the EASA researchers cooperated with helicopter operators that performed training, VIP
transport, aerial work and personal flying mission types.
Part of the study was aimed at understanding the hardware requirements for HFDM
on helicopters that otherwise do not have a data recording capability. Light helicopters
present unique challenges for HFDM as a direct result of their small size. The weight
penalty and packaging constraints mean that recording hardware must be light and small.
The recorders that are suitable for applications on airliners and on heavy helicopters, may
be exceedingly heavy for application in light helicopters, and may provide limited utility if
the helicopter does not already have the requisite on-board sensors. In addition to weight,
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Table 1.4: Small HOMP parameter set recommendation[52]
Set Parameters
GMT date and time; GPS latitude, longitude, elevation,
Minimal ground and vertical speed; heading and yaw rate; roll attitude
and rate; pitch attitude and rate; X Y Z accelerations
Minimal + Engine temperature, torque; Oil temperature and pressure;
Recommended Rotor RPM; Air Data (airspeed, OAT, vertical
speed);WOW, Fuel level and rate; particle detection
Desirable Recommended + Radar altimeter
many of the sensors and hardware available on larger helicopters are not cost-effective on
smaller and less expensive helicopters. The EASA team reviewed a number of light data
recorders for small helicopters, that either interface with on-board data sources or function
in a standalone fashion to provide data for HFDM analysis. The report [52] contains a de-
tailed comparison of the recorders available on the market at the time of writing, including
an evaluation of the parameters available on each recorder device. Another useful source
of information on helicopter flight data recorders that are suitable for HFDM, as well as
software and HFDM services, can be found on the Global HFDM Steering Group web-
site where a list of vendors is kept and periodically updated[53]. Based on the surveyed
hardware and the flight parameters available across those devices, the researchers devel-
oped three sets of parameters. These parameter sets, in order of increasing utility to HFDM
programs are shown in Table 1.4.
The Small HOMP study used the sample events defined during the original HOMP tri-
als as a starting point, and modified them for the different missions and helicopters used.
The report notes that due to the absence of certain parameters, not all of the original safety
events could be implemented, but that the remaining safety events were useful in creat-
ing an effective HFDM system. Again, safety events were fine-tuned and continuously
adjusted throughout the length of the study to achieve the best balance between detection
performance and false alerts. In contrast to airlines and other large operators, the Small
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HOMP trial found that the limited engineering resources available to a small operator can
reduce the amount of fine-tuning possible, and affect the performance of the overall system
for a longer period of time while the definitions of safety events are optimized. Assign-
ing severities to each event and periodic review and evaluation of the results are tasks that
also require significant human involvement. The Small HOMP report contains a detailed
description of all the safety events developed during the project, coupled with an excellent
analysis of the safety context for each event, and examples of how HFDM is applied to
missions with different safety requirements[52].
Overall, the Small HOMP study produced positive results, especially considering the
increased difficulty faced by smaller operators. A list of benefits is given in the report, pri-
marily pertaining to training, safety, and maintenance improvements, but also for schedul-
ing and leasing/contracts. The positive results are especially relevant in light of recent de-
velopments that promise to increase the number of small helicopters equipped with record-
ing equipment of some sort. Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter) pledged to install
recording hardware as standard on all its products, beginning in the year 2015[54].
1.4 Observations
1.4.1 Challenges
Some issues faced by FDM programs are cultural, such as the guarded acceptance of FDM
in the helicopter arena. There are even reports of operators that use safety as competitive
market advantage, but fortunately this trend is subsiding[55]. Other problems arise due to
the issue of implementation cost and fears of regulatory oversight. As researchers inter-
ested in the technical/implementation aspects of HFDM systems, we cannot directly affect
cultural or cost issues. However, by focusing on improving the capability of HFDM sys-
tems we hope to generate a positive interference loop where increased performance leads
to improved safety and a better justification for the costs involved, ultimately resulting in
wider acceptance of HFDM systems. Below are some of the specific issues that limit the
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capabilities of current HFDM systems in practice.
• A priori safety event definitions
The vast majority of FDM systems operate by comparing flight data against a set of
pre-defined conditions known as “safety events”. If a condition has not been defined
and is present in the system’s database, then the operator is not protected against such
occurrences. For this purpose, expert input is required early on to establish a usable
database of safety events that can provide basic functionality that can be extended
over time.
• Variability in the level of data content and quality
Some data sets contain only vehicle position, velocity, while other more advanced
recorders collect everything from pilot input, to air data to engine performance pa-
rameters. There are regulations that specify minimum parameters and therefore the
lowest acceptable level of content in the data, but these types of regulations do not
apply to most helicopter operators and especially to small operators. At the same
time, committed operators frequently surpass those requirements, recording many
more parameters than actually required. This variability in data content presents a
difficulty in developing a HFDM methodology that performs with the same level of
detail and accuracy for the operators with incomplete data, as it does for the opera-
tors with rich data. Because the content of the data is directly related to the recorders
used, the type of helicopter and available sensors, and the willingness of the opera-
tors to invest in more advanced on-board data acquisition, the typical HFDM system
is dependent on and constrained by the quality of the incoming data. HFDM systems
have to be adapted and make the best use of the available data without the ability to
affect the quality of on-board recording, at least not directly or immediately.
• Lack of traceability in event definition process
Safety event definitions come from several sources, including the manufacturer (flight
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manual), regulators (speed, altitude and airspace limits), the operator (SOPs), and
good airmanship. However, most HFDM programs begin by setting operational lim-
its that stem from the flight manual supplied by the manufacturer of the vehicle in
question.
The manufacturer envelope is created before a vehicle enters operations, and is based
on a subset of the conditions that the vehicle can encounter in real life. The flight test
programs that are conducted to explore the flight envelope and create the guidance
that is found in flight manuals seek to be as exhaustive as possible, but they simply
cannot explore every possible condition in which the vehicle might be used. One
reason for this limitation is that the flight test program has a finite budget and has
limited time to perform the investigation.
• Unobserved safety deficiencies
More importantly, some conditions are so unusual and seem so improbable that a
flight test program fails to identify them as parts of the flight envelope to be ex-
plored. Hence there is a potential for dangerous conditions to remain unidentified
until they are encountered by the operators. When such conditions lead to a notable
incident or accident, guidance is implemented in the form of airworthiness direc-
tives (AD), and in the case of HFDM, new safety events that track the incidents of
such conditions in the future are defined. This means that while HFDM and other
data monitoring systems seek to proactively prevent future incidents, they have an
inherently retrospective nature.
• Continuous fine tuning of safety events
Event limits are frequently updated throughout the program as more knowledge be-
comes available about the conditions they are intended to detect. This need for
constant rework limits the usefulness of past results as well as requires significant
resources to perform the changes, which can be a detriment for potential HFDM
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operators, especially smaller operators with limited human resources.
• Retrospective nature of FDM
One of the main shortcomings of the current practice is the inherently retrospective
nature of most FDM systems. While the goal of the FDM systems is to enable a
proactive identification, FDM can only react to things that are in the data. The current
state of the art identifies new safety risks through a series of unfortunate events.
Creating a predictive capability that can identify risk areas before major incidents
or accidents occur can enable truly proactive safety management FDM-type analysis
could have identified the incipient issues in the Columbia SS accident, but only if the
appropriate condition indicators had been put in place[56].
• Smaller operators and vehicles
Because helicopter operators tend to be smaller in terms of number of aircraft and
size of operation, as well as operate with lighter/smaller vehicles, the cost of HFDM
systems can be too high for the operators on the small end of the spectrum. Further,
the type of recorders and data acquisition units used by small operators may be less
advanced than those used by the most fixed-wing operators and larger helicopter op-
erators, which results in a reduced set of parameters that can be recorded. Since there
is no defined standard for the type of recorders used on the majority of helicopters
involved in HFDM, operators have to modify and re-define safety events to fit their
hardware constraints. At the same time, many of the accidents are experienced par-
ticularly by the new/small operators[1].
1.4.2 Gaps
The challenges outlined in the previous section present a practical constraint on the suc-
cessful operation of any FDM system, and HFDM in particular. “Safety events” form the
basis for most algorithmic HFDM hazard detection, and the present review indicated that
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Figure 1.11: Notional process of developing an H-V safety event
a critical issue in HFDM systems today is the manner in which savety events are concep-
tualized, defined and implemented in practice. To illustrate the problem with the current
process, consider the notional graph in Fig. 1.11 describing the progression of an event
from manufacturer flight test through to implementation in an HFDM system. On the far
left is a plot where a few points are shown, indicating the flight test points that had been
investigated by the manufacturer for the vehicle in question. The manufacturer may run
several iterations of this test, but the main point of this depiction is that after the tests had
been conducted, the manufacturer obtains an estimate of where the safety envelope is lo-
cated with a limited number of experimental runs. In this case, the notional graph depicts
the H-V diagram, a critical limit for rotorcraft safety. This envelope is then published in a
simplified form in the flight manual and other sources.
The safety events that are implemented within an HFDM system are further simplifica-
tions of this envelope. On the far right in fig. 1.11, the rectangular regions correspond to
safety events defined using simple ”if-then” rules. The low speed ”avoid” region is defined
by fixed thresholds on the height and speed parameters. Usually, multiple levels of severity
are defined, so that the region in the far right image marked in red is more severe than the
orange boundary. Overall, simplifications occur as the information passes from the flight
test, through the manufacturer’s review and publication process, and finally through the op-
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Figure 1.12: Safety event implemented following an observed accident[57]
erator’s own SOPs and subjective HFDM safety event definition. The result is that HFDM
events differ from the true boundary in the following ways:
1. HFDM events are defined in fewer dimensions, usually defined on a single parameter.
2. HFDM events are static whereas the original flight envelope varies with vehicle con-
figuration and external influences.
3. HFDM events are not well established for improbable conditions
The final gap is a result of insufficient knowledge and lack of objective data surrounding
rarely observed conditions. In HFDM, there is a tendency to neglect improbable scenarios
because they had not been observed in the past, or by the specific operator. In such cases,
an HFDM system offers no protection with the current system of event-driven detection.
Yet such examples exist in practice, such as the often cited G-TIGT[57] accident shown in
Figure 1.12. The helicopter belonged to an operator with an established HFDM system,
and the only reason no detection was possible is the fact that an event had not been defined
for this condition prior to the accident. Following this accident, a careful review by the
manufacturer created new ”avoid” zones for this particular helicopter model.
To remedy this deficiency, an improvement to the current state of the art is needed.
Specifically, the new approach must address the differences between the true envelope and
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the implemented limits. Further, a predictive capability that can identify limit boundaries
based on the physics involved will help minimize false alerts and make the limit setting
more objective. Such a capability could reduce the effort in finding and defining new
safety events, as well as enable simpler transition of the established event set to different
helicopters. The development of such a capability is the focus of this research, with a par-
ticular focus on techniques that operate within the constraints of a typical HFDM system,
for the purpose of easing transition to an implemented solution.
Research objective: Develop a methodology that will improve HFDM detection
capability through predictive and objective identification of safety limits while account-
ing for changes in operating conditions, characteristics of the monitored vehicle, and




This chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on flight data monitoring, where re-
searchers have sought to reduce the limitations of the expert-driven approach through var-
ious means. Primarily, the surveyed research can be divided into data-based and model-
based methods based on their use of the available data and the representation of the physical
characteristics of the monitored system within the method. The following sections describe
an overview of existing methods with the intent of identifying pertinent characteristics that
might point to a clear avenue for the development of enhancements for HFDM.
2.1 Statistical learning approaches in flight data monitoring
With the increased availability of large data sets from various sources, the tasks of ana-
lyzing and extracting useful knowledge from these data has become a vary active research
area. This process is known as Knowledge Discovery in Databases[58] and can be de-
fined as ”...applying data analysis and discovery algorithms that, under acceptable com-
putational efficiency limitations, produce a particular enumeration of patterns (or models)
over the data.” In the literature the terms data mining, anomaly detection[59], machine
learning[60], pattern recognition[60] and others seem to be used interchangeably. Because
of the vastness and active nature of this field, it is quite challenging to obtain a concise
statement of the boundaries that define it, as well as arrive at a conclusive taxonomy of its
methods. Moreover, researchers tend to give new names to slight modifications of existing
techniques after adapting them to their particular application, complicating the assessment
of candidate methods for application with flight data[61]. For a fairly complete introduc-
tion, the reader is referred to some of the more comprehensive sources on the subject [62,
63, 64].
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One of the most well-agreed upon distinction within the broad knowledge discovery
field is that between supervised and unsupervised techniques. The distinction arises from
the fact that certain datasets contain input-output pairs of values, while others only contain
output data. In the context of HFDM, the inputs can be considered to be the flight condi-
tions observed in the data, while the output would be the presence of an HFDM event. If
such a dataset were to exist, and span the entire operational space, then supervised tech-
niques could be used. In theory, once an HFDM analysis has been performed on a set of
flight data records, a supervised technique could be used to ”learn” the relationship between
the flight data and the detected events, but there does not seem to be significant benefit to
such an approach. A far more powerful application would be to use the raw data in order to
identify natural structures within the data which could indicate the presence of anomalies.
Therefore, most of the applications that use KDD techniques with flight data favor the un-
supervised approach, which is reflected in the following review of representative anomaly
detection studies.
Amidan[65] described the Aviation Performance Measurement System (APMS) project
and an approach for anomaly detection based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD).
Two approaches were used, based on the features constructed: Routine Event (RE) and
Time Interval (TI) methods. In the first approach, predefined conditions were used to cre-
ate snapshots of flight data (the REs). The principal components of the normalized REs
were used to identify outliers that would signal an anomaly. The second approach cre-
ated features by fitting regression models to intervals within separate flight phases. The
coefficients of those models were summarized and used as features on which principal
component analysis is performed, as in the RE approach.
Mugtussidis[66] implemented a classification to differentiate between typical and atyp-
ical flight data, and used the Flight Data Clustering (FDC) algorithm for fast sequential
data clustering. Instead of the direct Bayesian classification approach, which seeks to iden-
tify anomalous flights, he used a Bayesian classifier that identified a flight from which a
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particular data point was obtained. A decision cost function allowed for the automation
of the classification procedure and reduced human interaction. The FDC algorithm used
a sequential clustering scheme to form compact spherical clusters. The method identifies
samples that are close to each other and represent them with a center and a weight.
Iverson[67] developed the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) for real time monitoring
of complex systems. IMS used nominal data sets to extract general classes that represented
typical system behavior, and later real-world data were compared with these classes to point
out abnormal behavior.
Budalakoti et al.[68] implemented CLARA in the development of SequenceMiner - a
tool used to detect anomalies in discrete symbol sequences based on the Longest Common
Subsequence (LCS) measure. Their algorithm used both clustering methods and a Bayesian
model. They applied the algorithm to 2200 flights consisting of the landing phase-sequence
information. Some of the important discoveries made by SequenceMiner included inappro-
priate activation of the engine igniter switch, and mode confusion – a situation in which the
pilot is not fully aware of the configuration of the autopilot.
Das et al.[69, 70, 71] developed a technique called Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection
(MKAD) for detecting abnormal instances within a large set of flight data records. MKAD
allows the processing of both discrete and continuous data. Kernel functions are user-
defined functions whose output represents the similarity between two objects. For each
type of data, a single kernel function is defined, and all the kernel functions are combined
to a single multiple kernel function, which makes it possible to deal with heterogeneous
data simultaneously. This single function is optimized using One Class Support Vector
Machine (OCSVM). The OCSVM uses a training set of nominal examples (in this case,
flights) and evaluates test examples to determine if they are anomalous or not. After com-
pleting this analysis the algorithm reports the anomalous examples and determines whether
there is a contribution from either or both continuous and discrete elements. A detailed
discussion of the above work was reported by Das et al.[69]. They review several of the
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previous works and conclude with comments regarding the use of data-driven algorithms in
anomaly detection for aviation. One of the main conclusions reported by the authors is the
importance of appropriate data pre-processing, transformation and normalization. Also, the
techniques they reviewed make strong use of the fact that the analysis is being performed
on a fleet of very similar systems, which is one of the primary assumptions in most of the
reported techniques.
Other recently developed anomaly detection techniques for use with flight data are those
by Li[72] and Smart[73]. Li et al.[72, 74] developed Cluster-based Anomaly Detection
(Cluster-AD) to identify unknown issues from FDR data of routine commercial flights.
This work considered only well-defined phases of flight, such as the takeoff and landing.
For the landing phase, the final part of the flight was discretized at uniformly distributed
distances from the landing field. The touchdown point was used as an anchoring point
for the descent profile, with a radius of 6 nautical miles around the landing point used to
define the initiation of the descent. This approach was justified by the fact that most airlines
have descent profiles specified in terms of distance from the airport, and allowed a relevant
metric for comparison to be created. Specifically, the vehicle height at the different distance
points represented a feature vector which were then clustered using DBSCAN. Any outliers
from the initial data set, and any abnormal data from new records, can be flagged as an
anomaly and passed on for further analysis.
Smart[73] also used a data-mining approach to identify anomalies during the descent
phase of an airliners flight. In his review of existing methods and the current FDM paradigm,
the event-based detection was found to be deficient in that it only captures known issues
for which definitions have been created. To extract more information from the available
data, Smart used k-means, Mixture of Gaussians, and Support Vector Machine (SVM)
techniques for outlier detection, using features created based on Subject Matter Expert
(SME) input. The proposed method is a two-phase approach. In the first phase, the data
are partitioned into training and test sets and features are constructed by taking snapshots
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at pre-defined heights along the descent profile. For each height a classifier is trained, and
for each altitude snapshot the distance to the classifier threshold is recorded. This distance
is used to generate a Descent Abnormality Profile (DAP), using the distances to the clas-
sification boundary at each altitude for every flight. In the second phase, the DAPs from
the training set are used to create another classifier, which is used to identify anomalies.
Finally the anomalies are ranked in terms of distance from the classifier threshold (and in
turn, in terms of severity).
2.1.1 Observations on statistical models
Statistical approaches include both traditional techniques, based on the review and analysis
of accident reports, as well as more recently developed knowledge discovery algorithms.
The former has been in use for a long time and forms the standard approach to monitoring
safety over time, through various representations of accident and incident rates. The benefit
of the traditional approach is that it does not require significant computational effort, flight
data, or operator participation. The drawback is, of course, the completely retrospective
nature of the analysis and reduced ability to generate timely indication of emerging safety
concerns.
There is a number of studies that employ more advanced techniques for data analysis,
such as data-mining and anomaly detection. Most of the research cites the problem of
improperly defined apriori safety events as the primary cause for investigating purely data-
driven alternatives.
A common assumption across most of the reported literature is that the data origi-
nates from a very uniform fleet of vehicles, with a similar operational profile. In some
cases[73], the analysis was performed on a single aircraft type, during a particular phase
of flight(landing), and at a specific landing location. It is unclear how well this type of
analysis generalizes and allows comparison between flights conducted at different loca-
tions and with different aircraft, but the results reported when the uniform fleet assumption
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holds seem to support the application of anomaly detection techniques to flight data analy-
sis. However, the operational spectrum encountered in helicopter operations is much more
varied compared to that of commercial airlines, and operators tend to have smaller and less
uniform fleets of aircraft.
The anomaly-detection techniques generate alerts and prompt the system operator to
investigate the anomaly. Thus a human expert is required within the analysis loop, but the
set of automatically flagged conditions is a very small subset of the overall dataset. The
benefit of the knowledge discovery techniques, especially the unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion algorithms frequently reported in aviation applications, is to generate this small subset
and focus attention on potentially dangerous conditions, thereby improving the ability of
the operator to detect and mitigate safety concerns.
A common aspect across most of the statistical approaches is that the techniques used
operate on some derivative based on raw flight data, called features. Frequently, the tem-
poral nature of the data can be used to relate parts of the data in a logical manner[68, 75].
The literature seems to agree in the observation that including domain-specific knowledge
in the data-mining task improves the chances of identifying truly anomalous conditions.
2.2 Physics-based safety analysis
This section discusses physics-based approaches to helicopter safety analysis. More pre-
cisely, the review seeks to provide an answer to the question of how to reduce the reliance
on expert-defined safety events. Physics based approaches are a common alternative to the
purely data-driven techniques used in the field of system monitoring and fault diagnosis[76,
77]. Some of the advantages of including the physics of the problem into the monitoring
task include:
• Ability to relate measurements to unobserved quantities which could be better suited
as a detection signal
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• Allow comparison between simulated and measured output
• Predictive ability to assess system states outside the collected data, but within the
domain represented by the modeled physics
The two primary paths to creating a physics model of a helicopter are through system
identification and through first-principles modeling, depending on the available information
and the desired use of the model. Below is a brief review of relevant work in both directions,
starting with a discussion of the purpose for which the models used in this method are being
developed.
2.2.1 Model requirements
The previous chapter introduced HFDM and discussed the limitations in current practice. It
was shown that the main cause for reduced HFDM capability, and in turn reduced safety, is
the reliance on apriori safety event definitions. This chapter introduces related research into
techniques that can mitigate the problem posed by inaccurate or non-existent safety events.
The reviewed literature can be grouped into statistical learning approaches and physics-
based modeling techniques. Physics-based modeling techniques are further divided into
system identification and first principles techniques. It is shown that due to the constraints
inherent in HFDM data streams, the first principles modeling approach is a natural first step
to resolving the knowledge gap that hinders current HFDM-based safety efforts.
Safety conditions of interest
During the course of the preceding literature review, it became apparent that any of the po-
tential approaches to circumventing existing HFDM events would require some degree of
physics-based modeling. For these models to accurately represent the vehicle in a safety-
related situation, the effects which contribute to safety degradation must be captured. This
section first discusses relevant limits on a typical helicopter, and presents potential can-
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didate techniques for consistent evaluation of rotorcraft operations near these undesirable
conditions.
Known limits and hazards in helicopter operations
A good source of limit boundaries is the flight manual for a particular helicopter[30] and the
FAA Helicopter Pilot Handbook[50] for general helicopter hazards. Within these sources
flight envelopes are usually specified in using the following quantities:
• Attitude and airspeed limits
• Speed and load-factor boundaries
• CG limits
• Height-velocity curves
• Component limits (main rotor RPM, torque)
The limits documented in operating manuals are usually a simplified subset of the ac-
tual boundaries experienced in flight, and frequently contain some (potentially subjective)
margin between the values determined by the manufacturer, and those contained in the
manual and communicated to the operator. Whalley et al.[78] conducted a survey of the
limits that pilots must avoid during operation and found upwards of 40 different limits, in-
cluding limits on the ground, in the air and during takeoff. Most of these limits are related
to component loads, Loss of Control - breaches of manufacturer envelope, and ”handbook
limits” like the H-V curve which only manifest themselves during engine failure or other
malfunctions. Most of the limits mentioned in this study vary with flight condition and ve-
hicle configuration, which complicates the pilot’s task. Consequently, pilots tend to adopt
either a conservative attitude and under-utilize the capability of the helicopter or expose the
flight to potential dangers with frequent excursions beyond the ”handbook” limits [79].
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There are also limits which are difficult to define prior to an accident or well-documented
condition that reveals the mechanism in which the limit affects safety. A frequently dis-
cussed example in HFDM materials is the rollover during taxi - where an event was de-
fined to capture ”near rollover” conditions only after an accident resulting in damage hap-
pened[80, 57]. After a safety event was defined and implemented, the analysis revealed
that the occurrence was not an isolated incident and that many more instances of similar
conditions have happened both before and after the rollover. This points to the fact that
even for known types of failures, an unexpected combination of conditions can lead to a
previously unobserved accident.
It is apparent that helicopter limits arise from a wide range of effects and capturing
them all would require a full dynamic model with a complicated structure. As a means of
managing the development burden, it is desirable to obtain a reduced set of limits which are
known, but still result in a large number of accidents. In the survey of U.S. helicopter ac-
cidents, it was found that over 70% of all LOC-type of accidents were due to performance
mismanagement and dynamic rollover[81, 8]. Of the performance mismanagement acci-
dents, the primary cause was found to be improper autorotation technique in both forced
and practice situations. Rao et al.[82] performed an examination on a more recent set of
accident reports. Their findings reflect similar trends as to the criticality of the dynamic
rollover and autorotation to safety, with most accidents deemed ”unrecoverable”.
In this work, we consider several conditions which have contributed to many helicopter
accidents, particularly loss of control accidents. Studies of helicopter accidents[81, 83]
have revealed the main categories of accidents to be related to the pilot’s operation of the
vehicle. The goal is to address the more significant areas of concern first, and the measure
of the significance of an accident type has historically been the number of such occurrences
over a period of time. As discussed in [84], the accident rate as a metric is not ideal but
provides a direction for the focusing of development efforts on more proactive metrics.
The industry is in general agreement about the types of safety concerns that helicopters are
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most commonly exposed to, and these known hazards provide the starting point for this
investigation.
Of particular interest is the management of performance during normal operation and
during emergency procedures such as autorotation, dynamic rollover, loss of trail rotor ef-
fectiveness and entry into the vortex ring state, among others. These hazards are frequently
discussed in rotorcraft literature, such as the Helicopter Flying Handbook [50]. Below are
brief summaries of the conditions considered in this work, and for more details the reader
is referred to the handbook and similar literature. Autorotation is a flight regime in which
the rotor is powered by the airflow through the rotor disk. Portions of the rotor produce
driving torque which maintains the rpm, and keeping the helicopter at the proper attitude
requires deliberate input by the pilot. Since pilots have only one opportunity to execute a
safe landing, extensive practice is needed to master this maneuver. This fact exposes pilots
to the hazards associated with improperly executed autorotation both during practice and
actual emergencies.
The Vortex Ring State (VRS) is a well-known aerodynamic condition that is encoun-
tered at moderate forward velocities and descent rates that are roughly 0.5 to 1.5 times the
value of the hover induced velocity through the rotor disk. In VRS, the flow enters a recir-
culating pattern, which has the effect of reducing thrust and causing an increase in descent
rate. This condition is especially hazardous close to the ground while operating at high
altitudes above sea level. Another concern with VRS is that the typical response of the
helicopter is reversed, such that collective application may increase the descent rate. The
primary recovery method is to fly away from the recirculating flow.
Dynamic rollover is another hazard of interest, where the helicopter rolls over while
on the ground due to the combined action of the main and tail rotors with a pivot point
established by the landing gear. While dynamic rollover is a well-known hazard, its name
hides the fact that there are several possible ways to encounter a rollover, both dynamic
and static. In dynamic, the vehicle is translating or lifting off, while the landing gear
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provides a pivot point when it is prevented from moving. A static rollover is primarily
experienced on helicopters with a high-mounted tail rotor, where the increased moment
about the ground contact point can cause a tipover. In either case the recovery requires
pilot inputs that may be counter-intuitive, as cyclic control alone is usually not sufficient
to prevent a rollover. Further, during normal flight an increase in collective input also
increases the control moments possible through cyclic input. While in contact with the
ground, the increase in the moment about the pivot point far outweighs any gains in control
forces and moments at the rotor, so this typical pilot response can be counterproductive in
rollover prevention.
Thus the present investigation will use these hazardous conditions to focus the develop-
ment of the methodology, with the goal of identifying models which can provide additional
information and make relevant predictions for the conditions described in this section.
2.2.2 System Identification approaches
Most of the approaches described in the section on knowledge discovery techniques make
extensive use of the flight data in order to detect anomalous conditions. In most cases,
the researchers agree that some transformation of the raw data is required to enhance the
analysis (feature generation/extraction). In some cases these features are constructed in a
way that uncovers salient properties of the system, in effect incorporating physical char-
acteristics of the aircraft into the analysis. For example, Gorinevsky[85] used flight data
from a fleet of commercial airliners to train a performance model with a known structure
for each vehicle represented in the fleet. The study made use of a half million flight records
during the initial investigation, and was applied to the cruise segment of the flights. The
researchers cite three forms of monitoring in their approach:
1. Residuals between fleet-model generated output and incoming data for individual
flight.
2. Residuals between fleet-model and long-term measurements on a particular aircraft
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tail number.
3. Mismatch between fleet-model parameters and model fit using data from single air-
craft.
The type of work conducted by Gorinevsky is traditionally the realm of System Identifica-
tion[16], though only the performance aspects were considered.
In their broad review of System Identification (SysID) techniques for aircraft, Klein and
Morelli[16] define SysID as ”. . . the determination, on the basis of observation of input and
output, of a system within a specified class of systems to which the system under test is
equivalent.” They explain several key aspects of SysID implicit in this definition:
• Mathematical models generated through SyID are not unique.
• SysID is based on observations of both inputs and outputs to the system.
• In practice, measurements of inputs and outputs are corrupted by noise, requiring the
application of statistical methods
• The equivalency between the observed system and its mathematical representation
must be defined, for which there are multiple approaches.
Though most of the techniques for SysID require the implementation of statistical esti-
mation theory, SysID is discussed here as separate from the purely data-driven approaches
of section 2.1 due to the explicit consideration usually given to the physical characteristics
of the system, such as kinematics used for consistency checking. The techniques employed
in SysID can be executed in both the time-domain and the frequency-domain, depending
on the problem under consideration. Another important reference on system identifica-
tion techniques, with a particular focus on rotorcraft, can be found in the work by Tischler
et al.[17]. In an early paper[86], Tischler describes the general frequency-domain iden-
tification and time-domain validation methodology. It is shown that valid models can be
extracted with excellent accuracy from flight experiments with rotorcraft. Similar work is
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reported in Hamel et al.[87]. For a broad review of the development of SysID techniques
over a period spanning over three decades, see Gevers[88]. The application of SysID meth-
ods with HFDM data is attractive for its potential to create a model from recorded data.
The identified model is usually considered a local approximation, and has some predictive
capability that diminishes away from the condition used in the identification. Within the
region of validity, a model developed using SysID could be used to gain additional under-
standing of the behavior observed in new incoming data, potentially allowing unobserved
quantities to be estimated and used in the safety analysis.
The system identification approach relies on the availability of adequate input-output
data for the system that is being modeled. Some desirable features of the data are high sam-
pling rate, sufficient content at the frequencies of interest, and samples from a broad range
of operating conditions. In structured system identification trials for aircraft, a necessary
step is the definition of the maneuvers to be performed. Some of the most common ma-
neuver types used in aircraft system identification tests are doublets, chirps and frequency
sweep inputs. Figure 2.1 shows a representative frequency sweep input. During this type
of maneuver, a control axis is chosen and the input is manipulated as shown in the upper
portion of the figure. The goal of this type of maneuver is to excite a wide range of dy-
namic response frequencies, which increases the information content of the data and aids
the subsequent identification.
However, the flight data commonly recorded in HFDM systems presents some chal-
lenges which complicate the application. Specifically, the recording rate and frequency
content is very different between instrumented flight tests for the purpose of generating
usable system identification data, and the HFDM data generated during regular operations.
The low sampling rate creates the possibility for problematic aliasing, and the low fre-
quency content of the flight data limits its application to largely steady-state conditions.
An alleviating condition is that for most applications, a model form can be postulated
and then the problem reduces to the estimation of the parameters within the model. Pa-
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Figure 2.1: Power spectrum of frequency sweep input[16]
Table 2.1: Flight data requirements for SysID vs. HFDM data properties
Characteristic SysID HFDM
Recording Frequency >50Hz 1-4Hz
Maneuver type Sweeps, chirps, doublets Mostly steady
Data type Input-output, highly instrumented Usually output only
rameter estimation is a subset of the overall SysId framework, and reduces the burden of
obtaining high-quality data. Some of the more common approaches are the equation-error
and the output-error methods. In theory, both should be applicable with FDM-type data,
provided the data contain input-output pairs and contain sufficient information, though the
output-error seems to be preferred in practical applications[89]. Sembiring showed an ap-
plication where Bayesian inference was used with the data to estimate model parameters
of a simplified aircraft deceleration model[90]. The identification focused on three model
parameters, specifically the CL,CD and T (lift and drag coefficients, thrust), during the ap-
proach and landing phase of an airliner. The input data contained control deflections for
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thrust and flaps, which were included in the model and accounted for changes in the lift
and drag coefficients. The analysis was performed by first separating the flight into phases
which facilitated parameter estimation of individual models. The optimized model shows
much improved correlation with the measured data.
In addition to the problems arising from the low sampling frequency and dynamic con-
tent in typical HFDM data, the flight data records usually contain very few records of the
conditions at the boundary between safe operation and unsafe occurrences.
2.2.3 First principles models
The alternative to system identification methods is to construct a model from first princi-
ples, where the vehicle is modeled with explicit formulations for every relevant component.
This section describes some of the possible approaches to developing a helicopter model
without flight data requirements. First, steady state performance models are discussed.
Dynamic models are reviewed next, with consideration of the fidelity as a function of the
application.
An operating assumption when creating models from first principles is that sufficient
information about the vehicle is available to create the model. In the context of HFDM, the
models represent helicopters currently in service, with extensive documentation available.
For simple evaluations an energy-based method may be used, such as the momentum
theory model described in many well-known helicopter references[91, 92, 93]. The power
required in hover is given as a function of the thrust T and the inflow vi =
√
T/2ρA. In









where FM is the figure of merit, an empirical correction to account for profile losses not
considered in the derivation of momentum theory results. A is the rotor disk area calculated
using the rotor radius πR2.
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The momentum theory provides good first estimates of the energy balance at the rotor
and is useful for performance calculations, and even some basic consideration of steady-
state maneuvers[91]. A common assumption at this stage is uniform inflow through the
rotor disc. The derivation of uniform inflow neglects any rotation imparted on the flow by
the rotor, and assumes a well-defined stream tube where the wake is localized in order to
apply the conservation of momentum principle. This approach can be applied in forward
flight if the inflow calculation is extended to include the flow through the disk due to the
forward velocity of the helicopter and the tilt of the rotor. Accounting for fuselage drag,
additional profile losses in forward flight, the contribution of the tail rotor as well as any
















µ3 + CPTR + λcCT (2.2)
This equation is the basis for many performance analyses, and can be utilized in sim-
plified steady maneuver analyses. In initial analyses, the above equation can be rearranged
to yield the descent velocity required in autorotation. Thus it lends itself to investigations
of this flight condition, though only as a first estimate. For non-steady maneuvering, a dy-
namic model is necessary. The literature on dynamic models used in helicopter evaluations
contains a wide range of models, from point mass models through to full non-linear mod-
els with rigid 6-DOF fuselage motions (with additional degrees of freedom for the rotor,
inflow, and any other components). This type of model corresponds roughly to the Level
1 model as described in [94] and is further detailed in the description of the proposed ap-
proach. Models that capture higher-frequency motions also exist, but are not frequently
used when the global helicopter motions are of interest.
The construction of a helicopter H-V diagram has been investigated using dynamic
models due to the fact that the flight testing required to generate the necessary data re-
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Figure 2.2: Typical single-engine helicopter H-V diagram[95]
quires the pilots to approach conditions which are inherently dangerous and may result in
significant damage. The H-V diagram defines the boundaries of a critical region where
autorotation cannot be performed safely, and is approached by performing autorotations
from outside the region. Each consecutive flight test is started closer to the boundary until
the pilots determine the boundary has been reached[95, 96, 97, 98]. Simulating the same
maneuvers as the pilots would perform in flight reduces the burden on flight test and could
provide information about the H-V of a particular design before it is even flown. This
usually requires a fairly detailed model, but since the entry into autorotation is primarily a
longitudinal maneuver, the number of degrees of freedom can be reduced to only include
the relevant motions, thereby simplifying the analysis. This approach was taken by Okuno
et al. [99, 100] in their analysis of engine-out landings using a 4-DOF model (translation
and rotation, and rotor speed). Bibik analyzed the autorotational performance of a PZL
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Mi-2 using an 8-DOF model with rigid-fuselage, rotor and engine dynamics. Deresz[101]
used the proprietary flight dynamic simulator FlyRT to evaluate the H-V diagram of an at-
tack helicopter under a variety of conditions. These studies usually rely on optimal control
methods in conjunction with the dynamical model to investigate the suitability of various
flight conditions from a safety perspective. Their results are in general agreement with
prior published results, in terms of identifying the shape and size of a H-V diagram or an
autorotative boundary given a description of the helicopter.
In addition to the mathematical model of the vehicle under investigation, these studies
rely on the definition of an appropriate cost function which is minimized in the optimal
control framework. Bottasso et al.[102] showed the potential for solutions to differ when a
reduced number of degrees of freedom are considered. The difference found in the study
was relatively small and may in fact point to the benefit of using limited models if the
computational and analytic effort is significantly reduced. A full model is still preferable if
the scope of the study allows the additional burden of model development, or if a model is
readily available.
2.2.4 Observations on vehicle models
The review of physics based methods included system identification and first principle
methods. System identification methods were found to require properties which the HFDM
data presently available to this research do not posses. Specifically, the absence of control
inputs in the data make it problematic to apply a system identification technique.
In the case that input data become available, the system identification sub-task of pa-
rameter estimation seems to have the highest probability for success when applied in an
HFDM setting. This will be revisited if such data become available.
For the modeling aspect, the choice of model depends on the types of characteristics and
the physics of interest, and the types of conditions that contribute significantly to accident
rates. It was found that autorotation and dynamic rollover are responsible for a high propor-
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tion of all LOC-type accidents. To study the basic aspects of these conditions, simplified
models can be used to capture the relevant physics and yield an improved understanding
of the actual safety limits. In steady state, performance point models may be a valuable
addition to the current HFDM state of practice. If dynamic conditions are of interest, again
simplified models with a reduced number of degrees of freedom and fewer effects may still
offer an improvement over the current trial-and-test approaches in HFDM.
To capture most of the effects important to a safety analysis that is not limited to a
particular maneuver of flight condition type, a full dynamic model is required, with an
appropriate level of detail in terms of physical effects. Since the majority of the conditions
of interest pertain to LOC, such a model would correspond to the type described as Level
1/2 by [94], depending on the formulation of the rotor flapping dynamics and inflow.
In this work, the application of several models is investigated, progressing to a nonlinear
dynamic model that can be expected to provide reasonable results at the conditions inves-
tigated in simulation. In particular, FLIGHTLAB R© will be used as a general “black-box”
model in addition to any models developed specifically for a narrow operating condition.
2.3 Detecting the proximity to a limit parameter
If the limits associated with reduced safety are to be related to an observed flight condition,
some measure of the distance that is relevant to the immediate safety of the vehicle is
needed. In the simplest form, this can be the proximity of the current flight condition to the
published flight envelope, which would indicate a potential for LOC. Belcastro et al.[103]
identified these type of LOC metrics as highly dynamic, dependent on the vehicle physics,
and arising out of effects that are not encountered in most of the flight envelope. Based
on this information, the limit metrics which are of particular interest in this research are
those which could be used alongside a physics-based model to detect when the known
flight envelope is approached, or otherwise have a way to detect/estimate the proximity of
a physical limit to the current state of the helicopter.
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Figure 2.3: Limit envelopes for commercial transport[104]
Wilborn[104] introduced five limit metrics for a transport aircraft related to flight dy-
namics, aerodynamics, structural integrity, and flight control use. Two of the five envelopes
contain a dynamic formulation, while the rest are normalized versions of flight manual
limits or FAA regulations. The normalization was important in order to allow compar-
isons between different aircraft (that are trimmed at different attitudes). Plotting flight data
against these envelopes allows one to detect when the flight condition lies outside what is
considered safe. This approach is the currently used approach in HFDM, though the im-
plementation is static and does not allow safety events to be applied to data from different
helicopters. Angular position was also used in the investigation of rollover conditions by
Fox[105].
Control-based metrics have been developed in the envelope protection and carefree
maneuvering community. Envelope protection methods either implement the protection
into the control signal, or alert the pilot of the impending breach[106, 107, 108]. The
latter is known as limit cueing. A signal is generated that alerts the pilot of an impending
limit parameter, giving the pilot time to respond to the situation. Another approach is to
implement the alert through tactile cues, where the control stick is vibrated or the force
feedback is modified to give the pilot a sense of the proximity to the limit. In these cases,
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the limit is fairly well known, and is mapped to control inputs through the equations of
motion for the system and the evolution of the limiting parameter. The mapping is quite
complex and is frequently accomplished using a neural network model. Once available, the
mapping can be used to relate the future breach of the limit parameter to the instantaneous
control inputs, whether to modify the control inputs or to provide an alert to the pilot.
Figure 2.4: Limit detection and cueing[107]
Energy based metrics have been investigated in the past for fixed-wing and rotor-
craft[91]. In fixed wing aircraft, the energy state creates a relationship between the cur-
rent altitude and the ability to ”zoom” to a higher altitude by trading kinetic energy for
potential energy in the case of an engine failure. For rotorcraft, a distinctive difference is
that a portion of the total energy is stored in the rotor and the relationship between kinetic
and potential energy is not as straightforward. In rotorcraft applications, it is important to
know or estimate the amount of energy stored in the rotor to assess safety using this type
of metric.
In the fault diagnostics and prognostics community, the focus is on detecting when an
undesirable condition has been achieved by the system under observation. For example, in
a rotating machine part, excessive vibration or noise may signal a malfunction, and a model
of the fault can be used to estimate the progression of the fault and the ultimate failure of
the component[44, 109]. One of the common metrics used in this field is the Remaining
Useful Life (RUL), or the likely length of time before failure occurs.
For the conditions that will be investigated in the initial development effort, the energy
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metric for autorotation and an angle-based limit parameter for rollover are appropriate as
instantaneous limits. The known value of these limit parameters will be used to assess the
merit of a general limit parameter which can be defined for most LOC-type limit variables.
In the preceding review, a temporal component is implicitly or explicitly incorporated in
most of the safety metrics. The energy-based metrics can be formulated as the rate of
change of the energy state to detect the time required to reach a prescribed level. For the
H-V boundary, a time-delay is specified to account for pilot action time[50]. In rollover
detection schemes for ground vehicles, time-to-rollover is a frequently used metric[110,
111]. Most of the envelope protection field uses a receding time horizon estimation to
predict future breaches of a limit parameter.
Time-based limit formulation naturally considers the dynamics properties of the sys-
tem. In the case of helicopter simulation for safety analysis, this means that the vehicle can
be excited arbitrarily and the response can be monitored for failure conditions. Additional
benefits to this formulation is that the result will retain the temporal component. One of the
main benefits of using the time-based formulation is that the results could be transcribed
into a limit boundary for a given time-to-condition, thus forming an objective means to





The review of Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring state of practice illustrated the early-
warning ability of such data-driven system. The helicopter industry is placing increasing
pressure on operators to improve safety, and HFDM is a key enabler for that improvement.
The review also uncovered several aspects of HFDM which currently limit the performance
of such systems. Of the identified issues, the retrospective nature of HFDM due to static,
inaccurate or undefined events was determined to be largest detriment to HFDM detection
capability.
Research objective: Develop a methodology that will improve HFDM detection
capability through predictive and objective identification of safety limits while account-
ing for changes in operating conditions, characteristics of the monitored vehicle, and
under constraints of typical HFDM data.
The development of such a methodology should take into account the characteristics
of the problem domain and make use of all available information. The following can be
assumed about the HFDM problem domain:
• Flight data are available - Onboard recorded flight data are available for use in
the development/application of the methodology. To keep the application domain as
broad as possible, the minimum recommended set of parameters is assumed: GPS
positions and velocities, orientation and accelerations data, recorded at frequencies
typical of stand-alone HFDM recorders.
54
• The helicopter model is known - The type and characteristics of the helicopter being
monitored can be obtained either within the data record or through other means.
Thus published information about the particular helicopter type can be utilized in the
development/implementation of the method.
• HFDM performance is measured in terms of false alerts and missed detections -
The performance of the baseline system is known in these terms and will be used to
evaluate the developed methodology for the improvement increment.
3.2 Research questions
Research Question 1: How can the available information in the HFDM problem
be leveraged to avoid the pitfalls associated with static, a priori, simplified thresholds?
The literature revealed two potential approaches to reducing the reliance on typical HFDM
events. The first approach is comprised of statistical learning techniques that operate on
the flight data. There is a need in HFDM and other related monitoring systems (FDM,
HUMS, etc.) to have established exceedance thresholds for the system to perform its task.
Without these events, the typical HFDM system can not detect known safety issues and
alert the operator, which means that any assessment of the level of safety of the recorded
flight would be performed manually. For this reason, there has been some recent research
into reducing the need for apriori event definitions and instead use the properties of the data
themselves to identify unusual flight conditions, which may indicate a lack of safety.
A fundamental assumption in many data mining approaches is the existence of a large
number of flight records, collected from a uniform fleet with a well defined operational
profile. This allows the method to establish a baseline and detect any deviations from it. In
helicopter operations, this may not be the case. Another caveat of the statistical learning
approaches is that they output results which are physically meaningless, unless reviewed
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and made sense of by an expert. Normalizations, transformations, and other numerical
manipulations have a great effect on the results. In fact, the need to construct features on
which the data mining algorithms operate have restricted the use of data mining to a few
flight conditions, such as take off and landing, for which well-defined profiles exist (at least
for airliners, which have been the focus of these studies).
These problems with data-mining approaches are exacerbated in the context of heli-
copter operators that can have a much more varied operational profile, with the associated
lack of a well-defined baseline. Further, the data mining approaches do very little about
conditions which have not been observed in the data.
To create a capability that can predict the response of the system (the helicopter) away
from points observed in flight, it is necessary to move to a more physics based formula-
tion, which will take into account all available knowledge and allow improved use of the
data. Helicopter models have been used for many applications, and if an appropriate model
is used in this methodology, the conditions of interest can be examined in detail and the
appropriate limits set for use in HFDM.
Research Question 2: What are possible modeling approaches that can be used to
create a predictive capability to investigate the envelope and revisit conditions experi-
enced in flight?
The physics of the helicopter when operating near dangerous conditions needs to be
captured for this method to enhance the detection ability of HFDM systems. The model
needs to provide an accurate representation for the helicopter response, especially if the
conditions of interest are in an unusual or poorly modeled region. The literature review
in the prior section revealed two main approaches that are usually used to create a physics
model of a system. System Identification is the first paradigm. It requires input-output
data of various fidelity, depending on the purpose of the identification and the degree to
which the physics of the vehicle in question have been specified. The second approach
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is to generate the majority of the model through a component-wise build up and explicit
formulation of physical effects. Of all the modeling approaches, this one is the most labor-
intensive, but has the highest potential for generalization and is the only choice for the
present research due to the constraints on the available data. The SysId and statistical
learning approaches are still potential answers, but in order to make them successful, a
representation of additional knowledge of the vehicle is needed. Pursuing the application
of a first-principle model is seen as a necessary first step if the parameter estimation and
statistical learning techniques are to be revisited.
The review and summary of the first research questions points to the direction that will
be taken in this work. Since physics-based modeling and simulation is a clear direction
given the constraints and needs of the typical HFDM system, the next chapter deals directly
with the development of a methodology for physically relevant definition and detection
of safety events in flight data from helicopter flights. The ultimate test for the proposed
methodology will be a direct comparison with current HFDM safety event detection. The
overarching hypothesis can thus be stated as follows:
Overarching Hypothesis: The model-based method of evaluating safety events
would provide complementary information for traditional HFDM detection and aid in
the reduction of false alerts and missed detections through better approximation of the
true limit boundary.
This translates to improved performance from an HFDM system. One particular as-
pect that should be enhanced is the agreement between the monitored condition and the
associated detection threshold. Another is the fact that most HFDM events are defined af-
ter an accident or high-risk situation is observed - so an approach that could identify the
monitoring limits either in a predictive fashion or at least with reduced need for rework is
preferred. If these capabilities are enhanced, the resulting system would rely less on ana-
lysts and their effort to create and maintain detection thresholds, and would consequently
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increase the potential of correctly identifying hazards in real operations. The following
chapter will describe additional questions and formulate hypothesis regarding the method-






The primary purpose of this work is to devise an approach for the identification of safety
critical flight conditions in rotorcraft operations and for the consequent definition of mon-
itoring thresholds or events for implementation in an HFDM system. The requirements
are that the physical mechanisms responsible for safety-critical events can be modeled and
simulated, that the model/simulation can be executed in a manner that reveals these safety
hazards, and that the output provides some measure of proximity to the undesirable state
so that occurrences with higher risk can be communicated as such to the operator. The
review of existing approaches pointed toward the need for physics-based models as a po-
tential means of addressing the gaps in current HFDM practice and developing the missing
capabilities. Two main uses of models of the vehicle physics are envisioned. One is a
direct addition to the monitoring apparatus in the form of derived parameters that capture
additional aspects of a particular monitored condition. If these models can improve the ap-
proximation of the true boundary, then the false alarm rates and missed detections should be
reduced. A less straightforward but potentially more powerful approach is to not limit the
investigation by devising condition-specific model, but use a generally applicable model
which will yield a measure of the risk at a broad spectrum of applicable conditions.
The proposed methodology is coined DEMMoS - Definition of Events for Monitoring
through Modeling and Simulation. Figure 4.1 shows a conceptual overview of DEMMoS
as it relates to existing HFDM systems. The leftmost portion of the figure is a simplified
representation of how HFDM systems operate presently. To operate, an HFDM system









































































































































































































































































the analysis portion of the system. When the data contain adverse flight conditions as de-
fined in an expert-generated event database, a detection is indicated and the user can pursue
further mitigating actions. The system then continues monitoring the operational improve-
ment resulting from any such action. The model-based approach would complement the
existing approach by providing both detection ability and the potential to proactively in-
vestigate underrepresented areas of the operational envelope. The DEMMoS methodology
uses the physics of the vehicle in flight to derive “events” in order to help detect adverse
flight conditions. The steps of the methodology that would allow such indicators to be
defined are as follows:
1. Determine model parameters
2. Define model for condition(s) of interest
The first two steps make up the modeling portion of the method where the physics
of the vehicle are represented mathematically. This portion is repeated whenever the
model is extended or implemented for new flight conditions if they warrant the for-
mulation of additional physical phenomena. Depending on the extent and evaluation
type of the model, two possible paths are possible. If the model is defined in such a
way that its evaluation would directly result in a parameter which can be included in
the HFDM analysis system, the parameter is included as an additional metric in the
event database. On the other hand, if the model requires longer evaluation or cannot
be executed in a single pass, such as is typically the case with a dynamic model, then
the method requires separate simulation and other additional steps.
3. Select input conditions and simulation variables
The selection of the input condition and simulation variables determines which con-
ditions, and over what range, will the derived metric be applicable.
4. Run simulations
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A simulation is run for every combination of input parameters, and the result is saved
for later post-processing. Over time, repetition of the simulation at numerous flight
conditions would yield a rich set of simulated data which would allow analyses to be
performed in regions of the operational space that are otherwise poorly represented.
5. Post-processing of simulation results
The simulation results are rarely in a form that can be immediately implemented,
and some post-processing is required. Specifically, a relationship between the input
domain and the safety observed in simulation is established in this step. This step
can be performed as more data becomes available from steps 3 and 4, creating the
dataset which would be used in the final step of the method
6. Representation of analysis results
After assembling all the simulated data, a derived metric suitable for implementation
in the HFDM database is required. The model might require time-consuming simu-
lation, but the need to integrate the simulation results into the detection scheme mean
that they must be recast in a form suitable for use within an HFDM database.
The following sections detail the pertinent methodology choices which ultimately en-
able a model-based definition of monitoring threshold and can contribute to the capability
of HFDM system to enhance operational safety. The modeling choices are made in accor-
dance with the need to provide additional information for the definition and implementation
of key safety metric used in the rotorcraft industry. The choice of these metrics was based
on the initial literature survey and the understanding that the primary contributor to rotor-
craft accidents is the manner in which the pilots fly the vehicle and those instances when
their full control over the vehicle’s operation is diminished. LOC-type events make up
the majority of accidents, which generates a requirement that the present method can pro-
vide results targeted at these conditions. Flight into autorotation, VRS, and rollover on
the ground make a large proportion of all LOC events. The goal for this methodology is
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therefore to directly benefit the monitoring of this subset of conditions, while considering
natural extensions to other operational scenarios.
4.2 Components of a typical nonlinear helicopter model
In creating a physics model from first principles, one of the first tasks is establishing the
boundary between the modeled system and the real world[112]. Deciding which effects
need modeling and what can be left out is needed to reduce the complexity of the resulting
model. Therefore the modeling effort begins with the following research question:
Research Question 3: What physical effects and phenomena must be captured in
the helicopter model to make it useful for proactive safety assessments and monitoring
purposes?
Based on the insights developed in 2.2.3, a helicopter simulation model similar to the
type described by Padfield[94] and Talbot[113] is selected for use in the proposed method-
ology. A very useful and complete description of the various components that make up
such a model is given in Dreier[112], which formed the basis for most of this model’s







• Aerodynamic surface modeling
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• Engine/drivetrain representation
• Landing gear model
• Atmosphere and ground reference
The present research is concerned with the type of phenomena that affect the heli-
copter’s performance and handling capabilities throughout the entire flight envelope, but
not necessarily beyond. In combination with a review of the most common accidents, a
judicious choice can be made as to the type of model which will provide an acceptable
compromise between modeling burden and the type of insights which the model will en-
able. If the desire is to investigate a specific condition, only the effects relevant to that
condition need be included. If a more general model is sought, then a wider spectrum of
effects must be incorporated. This research makes use of simple models in the initial devel-
opment effort, and then transitions to a higher-fidelity model that includes the effects of the
simpler models in a unified formulation. The remainder of this section details the complete
model which should include most of the effects relevant for the initial safety analyses.
4.2.1 Fuselage model
The fuselage is modeled as a rigid body with mass and inertia properties. All forces and
moments developed by the rotors, other aerodynamic surfaces and any additional compo-
nents of the helicopter are applied to the fuselage CG, expressed in the body frame.
The most commonly used earth frame in flight dynamics is the North East Down (NED)
frame. The NED frame follows the vehicle cg and has the x-axis pointing north,the y-axis
is oriented toward east of the vehicle, and the z-axis is pointed down toward the center
of the Earth. A common and valid approximation is to assume a flat earth model, which
means the curvature and rotation of the earth is neglected. Local variations in terrain can
still be included, however.
It is far more convenient to express most of the forces and moments acting on the
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fuselage in the body-frame, which has its origin at the vehicle CG and is aligned with the
vehicle’s primary dimensions. The x-axis points toward the front, the y-axis is oriented
toward the right, and the z-axis is perpendicular to both and pointed downwards. The body
translational and rotational rates are expressed in this frame. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are the













In the above equations, the * superscript denotes quantities expressed in the body-frame.
Fuselage rotational rates are the pitch rate p, roll rate q, and yaw rate r.
To evaluate the transient motion of the helicopter as it reacts to pilot inputs, the deriva-
tives of the translational and angular rates are needed, which yield the translational and














 = I−1(−ω∗body × Iω∗body +Mcg∗) (4.4)
where m is the mass of the helicopter and I is the moment of inertia tensor expressed in





the forces and moments generated through the rotor, aerodynamic surfaces, fuselage drag
and any other component, such as the landing gear. The above equations are numerically
integrated for to yield the body-frame values for translational and rotational rates of the
helicopter as shown in eq.4.1 and 4.2. To obtain the vehicle position in the earth frame,
with respect to some origin, another transformation is required to bring the body-frame
values to the earth NED frame. The transformation of quantities between the earth, body,
and any other reference frame used by the model is facilitated through the use of a rotation
















− sin(θ) 0 cos(θ)
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The rotation matrix is orthonormal and its inverse and transpose are equivalent. The trans-







 = RTV ∗body (4.6)
Calculating of the fuselage orientation in the earth frame is done by transforming the body
rotational rates into the earth frame and integrating. The following Euler-angle transfor-




1 0 − sin(θ)
0 cos(φ) cos(θ) sin(φ)
0 − sin(φ) cos(φ) cos(θ)
 (4.7)
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The body-frame and earth-frame quantities describing the motion of the vehicle can be












Ẋ Ẏ Ż U̇ V̇ Ẇ φ̇ θ̇ ψ̇ ṗ q̇ ṙ
]T
(4.9)
Integration of Ẋ is then performed using an appropriate method (commonly a 4th order
Runge-Kutta integration scheme) which results in the following state vector:
X = [X Y Z U V W φ θ ψ p q r]T (4.10)
4.2.2 Rotor model
The rotor model is the most complex component of the helicopter model and is responsible
for the vast majority of the simulated helicopter’s response.
If a more detailed analysis of the helicopter is desired, a higher-fidelity approach such as
the Blade Element Theory (BET) is needed. The BET allows nonuniform loads to be calcu-
lated for blades of arbitrary planform, and the resulting motion to be calculated with regard
to the geometric characteristics of the rotor. This allows direct consideration of characteris-
tics which are unique to rotorcraft, such as velocity differences between the advancing and
retreating side of the rotor that give rise to asymmetric lift, radial and azimuthal variations
in angle of attack of the blades, inflow non-uniformity and the change in lift due to control
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of a flapping blade
inputs. All of these effects give rise to blade flapping which is essential for accurate mod-
eling of the helicopter response to control inputs. Figure 4.2 shows a schematic view of
a flapping blade, attached with at a hinge offset e. This is representative of an articulated
rotor hub, but most rotor types can be represented with the addition of a hinge spring and
varying the hinge offset. In this figure, Ω is the rotational speed of the rotor hub, β is the
flapping angle, and r is the location of the blade element from the hinge. In a typical blade
element application, the aerodynamic and inertial forces at the element are numerically
integrated over the blade, which result in forcing terms that cause the blade to flap up or
down.
The motion of the individual blade is most conveniently expressed in axis of the blade,
so it is important to note which axis is being used. Literature seems to favor one of two
frames. Talbot[113] sets the x-axis along the blade, the y-axis toward the the advancing
side of a clockwise rotor, and z-axis pointing up when the blade is not flapped. Dreier[112]
uses another convention, with x,y,z axes aligned with the body frame when the blade az-
imuthal station is at ψ = 0, which the convention dictates to be straight over the back of
the fuselage, pointing at the tail. The selection of blade reference frame has little bearing
on the results of the analysis, but the different conventions may be a source of confusion
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if not managed appropriately. Another convention that departs from typical definition of
angles and angular rates is the definition of the blade flapping direction, which is defined
to be positive in the flap-up sense, but due to the orientation of the blade frames, describes
a negative rotation about the y axis.
The following equations describe the construction of the blade equation of motion.
Evaluating the rotational motion of the blade about the hinge equates the change in angular
momentum to the applied moments:
dH
dt
= G−mbrb × ao (4.11)
whereH = Ibωb is the angular momentum of the blade expressed in the blade frame, ao is
the acceleration of the hinge, rb the position vector of the blade center of mass,Ib the blade
moment of inertia tensor, and mb the weight of the blade. The derivative of the angular
momentum in the rotating blade frame is
dH
dt
= Ḣ + ωb ×H (4.12)
Substituting the above result into eq 4.11 yields an expression for the blade motion, con-
tained in the Ḣ term. The G term represents all external moments, G = [L MA N ]T ,
applied to the blade. The flapping component of this equation can be expressed in the
form, if a stationary hub is assumed:
MA = Bβ̈ + Ω
2(B cos β +mbexgR
2) sin β (4.13)
where MA is the applied aerodynamic moment in the positive flapping direction, and B is
the component of the mass moment if inertia matrix Ib corresponding to rotations about the
y-axis. In reality the hub can translate and rotate which complicates the flapping equation.
For flight dynamics simulation and handling-qualities type models, it is common to neglect
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Figure 4.3: Blade section[114]
high-frequency responses of the blade and retain only the first harmonic. This is known
as the quasi-steady assumption. With the general form of equations (4.11) and (4.12),
any hub motion can also be included into the simulation, so the present approach will use
an appropriate level of simplification for the conditions at which the simulation will be
executed. For example, the blade angular velocity, in the blade frame, when considering
body pitch rates and a constant rotor rotational speed can be shown to be (using Dreier’s




p cos(β) cos(ψ) + sin(β) (Ω + r) + q cos(β) sin(ψ)
−β̇ + q cos(ψ)− p sin(ψ)
cos(β) (Ω + r)− q sin(β) sin(ψ)− p cos(ψ) sin(β)
 (4.14)
This expression is inserted into (4.12) and solved, in this case for the flapping component.
With appropriate simplifications, such as the quasi steady assumption, small flapping an-
gles, and constant rotor rotational speed, it is possible to derive analytical expressions of
the flapping equation. This periodic equation can be split into constant, sinψ and cosψ
components, which is a form frequently used in flight dynamics applications[114].
The next component that must be evaluated is the aerodynamic moment MA, which
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can be determined by calculating the lift on each blade segment and summing the moment
about the hinge due to each element. A section of the blade is shown in 4.3. The blade
section sees the incoming airflow due to the blade around the hub, Ωr and the component
of vehicle velocity in the direction of the blade section. The pitch of the blade is set by a
mechanical linkage that varies the pitch of the blade as it goes around the azimuth, but the
instantaneous angle of attack is different due to the wind velocity in the vertical direction.
The climb velocity VC and the induced inflow velocity vi serve to reduce the blade angle
of attack by angle φ, called the inflow angle. Thus the blade section sees an angle of attack








ρW 2Cd c dr (4.16)
The moment MA is obtained by resolving the thrust and drag forces in the direction of
the flapping motion, and apply the resultant force with a moment arm equal to the radial
distance.
dT = cosφdL− sinφdD (4.17)
dQ = r (cosφdD + sinφdL) (4.18)
In a numerical scheme, this is performed for each blade section and the sum of the indi-
vidual contributions gives MA. At this point, corrections can be applied to account for root
cutout and tip losses[91, 92]. A similar calculation in the planar direction is used to obtain
the rotor torque, which must be balanced by the tail rotor and is related to the rotor power
by the relationship Protor = ΩQ, where Q is the rotor torque. The forces, moments, and
torque/power for the tail rotor are obtained in a similar fashion, though frequently flapping
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motions are neglected to reduce the computational burden.
4.2.3 Inflow
One of the most important aspects of rotor modeling is calculating the airloads, which de-
pend primarily on the inflow through the rotor disk, or else the airflow experienced by the
rotor. There are many choices available in the helicopter literature [115, 116], with varying
degree of fidelity and ease of implementation. For the purpose of this effort, the inflow
model should consider flight into the VRS regime, since this condition is a known safety
hazard. Several model have been proposed that consider VRS in particular, such as the
Wolkovitch [117], Peters[118], ONERA[119] and Johnson [120] models. Most of these
models provide an expression for the boundary of the VRS region based on a physically
relevant criterion, such as vortex convection speeds, stability, Vz drop and similar. This
type of boundary is ideal for immediate online application for monitoring or limit protec-
tion[119]. Several of these models also provide an extended inflow model that is valid up
to and within the VRS region. Further, Johnson shows a good agreement for dynamic sim-
ulation of entry into VRS, and for this reason, this model was implemented in the current
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(4.19)





In Eq.4.20 a is usually taken to be zero, which allows the exact fitting to two points
and a derivative at one of the points. ONERA performs a similar procedure for their inflow
model, with the exception that the a term is retained. Equation 4.20 is valid for a constant
forward velocity, which is the reason it only contains Vz terms. To include the fit in the
flight dynamics simulation and in the VRS boundary, a non-dimensional lookup table is
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Figure 4.4: Inflow model extension to include the VRS regime [120].
created, with the values multiplied by the hover induced velocity to obtain dimensional
quantities. A further development shown in [120] is the extension of the VRS model to
time-domain simulation by casting the result as a first order differential equation witht the









Since the same approach is taken for both main rotor and tail rotor inflow, two additional
states are added to the simulation and integrated in time.
The above calculation is relatively straightforward, but depends on an expression for
the inflow vi. This has been the focus of much research and there is a continuous effort
to improve the prediction of inflow across the rotor. The simplest form is the one used in
Eq. (2.1), derived for hover and under the assumption of uniform distribution across the
rotor. This momentum-theory model can be extended for forward flight, which is the form
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Figure 4.5: Inflow model in forward flight.
required in Eq. (2.2). The normalized equation for inflow in forward flight is:






As can be seen from this equation, it is a recursive equation with the inflow depending on
the denominator and varying with forward flight speed, captured in the advance ratio µ. A
Newton-Raphson iteration is frequently used to calculate this equation within a few steps,
though numerical instabilities are possible at low thrust settings. This form of the equation
has been used for many flight dynamic analyses, but is known to be a gross simplification
of the flow through the rotor, especially at conditions away from hover[91]. For example,
in descending flight the equation breaks down and is no longer valid when the helicopter
enters vortex ring state (VRS). Thus for maneuvering flight, a more accurate representation
is usually needed and the present model will require such a representation to allow more
accurate analysis of descending flight conditions such as autorotation.
Improvements to the standard uniform inflow model are possible by introducing az-
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imuthal and radial variation, so that the inflow expression takes the form v = v(r, ψ) =
v0 + vcr cosψ + vsr sinψ. If the model is to account for the effects of descending flight
and transient maneuvering imparted by the interaction of the rotor wake, then wake mod-
els or dynamic inflow models is required[121], such as Pitt-Peters and Peters-He inflow
model[118, 122]. These models use the concept of apparent mass of the volume of air af-
fected by the rotor to derive a differential equation that can be used to calculate the transient



















where v0, vc and vs are the uniform, lateral, and longitudinal inflow. CT , CMY and CMX
are the coefficient of thrust and the aerodynamic moments at the rotor (neglecting inertial
hub forces). [M ] and [L] are the apparent mass and gain matrices which are derived from
vortex theory. A model of this type can be included with the rest of the vehicle states and
be integrated within the same routine to provide a relationship between the blade loads,
rotor flapping response, and inflow. Another possible approach to account for the inflow
variation with flight condition is the Ring Vortex Model[123]. This model represents the
wake of the rotor with discrete rings whose effect on the flow is calculated using the Biot-
Savart law. By manipulating the relative position of the rings to account for forward or
descending flight, good agreement with experiments can be achieved.
The final output of the rotor model are the forces and moments which act at the hub.
There are three force components, namely the thrust, H-force and Y-force, and three mo-
ments that represent the pitching and rolling moment and torque. The application of rotor
forces away from the fuselage cg creates additional moments, as does the reaction at the
blade hinges when in rotors with hinge offset or in hingeless rotors.
75















Angle of Attack [deg]
C
D
Figure 4.6: CL and CD variation with angle of attack[92]
4.2.4 Aerodynamic surfaces
In addition to the aerodynamic forces generated by the blades, helicopters typically have
vertical and horizontal aerodynamic surfaces at the tail. The forces on these surfaces can be
defined if the overall wind speed is reoriented in expressed in the local frame of reference,
aligned to the aerodynamic surface. Then the aerodynamic angle of attack can be obtained
and the lift, drag and moment coefficients can be estimated. For both the blades and the
aerodynamic surfaces, the model will use a 360-degree approximation to the steady lift and
drag curves as developed by [92].
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4.2.5 Landing gear
In addition to the typical flying responses, a helicopter simulation with a safety perspec-
tive should also capture the ground-based behavior of the helicopter. However, in most
dynamic helicopter simulations, the landing gear are either entirely omitted or receive min-
imal attention[91, 94, 113, 124]. Landing gear are understandably left out from most flight
simulation analyses, as the behavior of the aircraft while on the ground is rarely of in-
terest. However, since many helicopter accidents occur on the ground as a consequence
of dynamic or static rollover [81, 80], it is important that a vehicle model used for safety
assessments contains a representative landing gear model.
Most of the landing gear models for aircraft simulation have been developed to assess
the longitudinal dynamics of fixed-wing aircraft for the purpose of evaluating their landing
performance [125, 126, 127]. In these cases, only the vertical response of the landing
gear compression and the friction due to the tires and brakes are needed, with the friction
being the dominating effect [128]. For helicopters, the longitudinal response of the landing
gear is important, but is a relatively small effect when compared to the lateral effects.
Whereas a stationary fixed-wing aircraft has little opportunity to generate lateral forces, a
stationary helicopter can indeed generate large lateral forces and rolling moments, leading
to potentially dangerous conditions. For this purpose, several researchers have investigated
landing gear models and the ground-based dynamic response of rotorcraft, especially with
regard to the ship-helicopter interface.
One of the early investigations in this area is the one by Blackwell and Feik, who
conducted a very relevant study of on-deck helicopter dynamics using a simple fuselage
and landing gear model [129]. Their model consisted of a rigid fuselage with oleo struts
represented by nonlinear springs and dampers, and a spring/damper tire model. This model
facilitated an investigation into the response of a helicopter on a moving helideck. Another
set of studies has been performed by Langlois and colleagues[130, 131]. Their model is
depicted in figure 4.7, and consists of three tires attached to nonlinear oleo struts, along
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Figure 4.7: On-deck helicopter model[131]
with a castering nosewheel. They considered lateral forces and obtained good correlation
with test data. A more recent analysis was conducted by Leveille[132], who used a similar
approach to investigate the ground handling and securing of a helicopter on a ship deck.
Both Leveille[132] and Linn and Langlois[131] used the tire models contained in the
report by Smiley and Horne[133]. The Smiley and Horne report is a seminal work con-
cerning tire dynamics for aircraft, and includes many test results along with simplified
empirical models of tire behavior[133]. This type of empirical model gives the lateral and
longitudinal force due to the tire, for various tire inflation pressures, temperatures, ground
friction properties and other parameters. Another popular empirical model is the Pacejka
series of Magic Formula tire models, which can contain upwards of 70 model parameters
that account for a wide range of operating condition variations[134, 135]. However, heli-
copters might not be a good candidate for such empirical representations for two reasons.
First, the concept of the ”relaxation length” seems problematic, as is the undefined value of
the tire sideslip when the tire is stationary. The relaxation length means that the tire must
roll a certain distance for the lateral deflection of the tire to return to the resting value. In
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reality, it seems as though the vehicle/fuselage would be forced to acquire a position such
that the tire lateral deflection returns to zero, rather than the tire remaining deflected when
no additional forcing is applied to the fuselage. The second aspect which may limit the ap-
plicability of existing empirical formulas is the representation of tire lateral force in terms
of tire sideslip. It is believed that this representation is due to the nature of the experiments
conducted to evaluate tire behavior, but the effect is that at low speeds or at rest, the exist-
ing empirical models break down and are not suited for safety assessments using dynamic
models at these conditions.
Of the non-empirical tire models, the brush and string models stand out as potential
candidates[136, 137]. However, as in the case of the empirical models, the increased num-
ber of parameters may unnecessarily complicate any future model calibration efforts, with
a comparatively small payoff in terms of model accuracy. In addition to their ability to rep-
resent longitudinal and lateral tire dynamics down to the resting condition, these types of
models are well suited for investigations of high-frequency and high-speed tire phenomena,
which are very important for vehicles that derive most of their dynamic response from the
tires. For helicopters in ground operations, the forces and moments generated by the tires
are primarily in the form of forces applied at the contact point, and any moments about the
strut itself can be neglected due to their small size.
For this investigation, the model by Blackwell and Feik[129] was chosen as a starting
point. They used a simple representation of the vehicle with three landing gear struts, and
used discrete deflections of a in-plane spring at the ground contact point to represent tire de-
formations - which are ultimately equivalent to the force applied to the strut. In the current
implementation, a small modification was made to improve the ”rolling” characteristics of
the Blackwell model, specifically in the form of the lateral deflection of the ”tire” that is
related to the immediate orientation of the strut x-axis in the ground plane. By allowing
the tire contact patch to travel in the instantaneous body x-direction, while the fuselage is
undergoing arbitrary motion, a deflection is allowed to develop, which results in a force
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Figure 4.8: On-deck helicopter model by Blackwell and Feik[129]
being applied to the strut. With this modification, the landing gear is able to develop cor-
nering forces as a result of the vehicle yaw angle with respect to the velocity vector, as
well as generate lateral forces when the vehicle is stationary. The maximum force that can
be developed in this manner depends on the friction coefficient between the tire and the
ground, as well as the normal force at the contact point. If exceeded, the tire is allowed to
slide, while maintaining the maximum deflection and force.
4.2.6 Environment
The environment model is used to set the global conditions where the model will be oper-
ated. The primary elements of an environment model are representations of the atmosphere
and the ground. A comprehensive simulation should include some provision to represent
variations in wind and potentially turbulence, such as the Dryden model. The ground can
be similarly represented using a global model where every coordinate position is associated
with an elevation. The ground model can be further enhanced with gradient information
for the local ground plane, surface characteristics and obstacle locations. The use of these
”environment” models can also be thought of as a placeholder for future extensions of the
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method, such as the inclusion of input from databases that store ground obstacle infor-
mation, helipad locations and descriptions, and databases of hazards such as power lines.
The consideration of such potential data sources will allow the method to operate on real-
world information, if such information becomes available during the term of the present
investigation.
4.2.7 Summary of helicopter dynamic modeling
The proposed method depends on the availability of a helicopter model that contains the
appropriate effects and is valid at the conditions of interest. The effects and model compo-
nents described above should provide such a model, though much of the capability can be
obtained using far simpler models. The following hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis to RQ3: An appropriately detailed physics based model can be used
to identify potential accident conditions, without the need for direct observation, if the
physics responsible for the accident mechanism are included and well represented in
the model.
The challenge implicit in the above hypothesis is that a model will never fully represent
the real system and at all possible conditions, and the only truth model is the system itself.
However, for the conditions of interest, it can be reasonably assumed that the physical
effects are known and can be included in the model. The consequence of this hypothesis
being justified is that accident conditions identified using the model are representative of
the real helicopter’s safe boundary.
In an effort to manage development risk, and with a view toward established compre-
hensive codes for helicopter analysis, the modeling will proceed in a two phase progres-
sion. In the first phase, a low-fidelity model will be developed that will be used within
a narrowly-defined operational scope. This model should also facilitate the development
and evaluation of the other methodological components. The second phase should see the
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implementation of a high-fidelity model within the method in order to extend the analysis
to additional flight conditions and capture any relevant effects that had been omitted in the
simpler model. The method itself is being developed with the consideration of allowing
other models to be used within the general framework, so that the appropriate model for
a given flight condition under investigation can be used. The next section discusses dis-
tinction between online and offline uses based on the evaluation time of the math model
(roughly corresponding to static and dynamic models), but any model capable of taking in
inputs in the form of a state vector and generating either a derived parameter or a range of
related trajectories would be applicable within the DEMMoS method.
4.3 Selection and propagation of analysis scenarios
Online use of models for monitoring
In the case when a mathematical model can be evaluated in a single pass or with minimal
iteration, the inputs to the model can be taken directly from the flight data in the monitoring
database. At present, the intended use of these faster models is in an off-board monitoring
system, so that the entire model evaluation and condition detection is performed on the
ground, post flight, without the more stringent requirements of real-time evaluations. In
a real-time environment, there are usually known hardware and software limitations that
allow a certain number of model iterations per unit time, with fewer iterations possible
when the model is of higher complexity and requires longer evaluation time. For off-
board and post-flight data analysis, there is no requirement for real-time calculation, but
quick model execution is still preferred given the potentially large amounts of data being
processed. In this context, online monitoring refers to the fact that these model-derived
metrics are calculated at the time of evaluation of the flight data concurrently with any other
regular events which are monitored in the HFDM database. These models make some key
assumptions regarding the vehicle and its operation that enable their application:
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1. Quasi steady-state operation
2. Nominal rotor RPM
3. Primarily longitudinal motions
4. Control inputs are as required to maintain the instantaneous flight condition
This approach is based on the notion that a model-derived parameter can be more phys-
ically relevant to a particular flight condition than the raw data, especially in cases when
the available data do not include control, engine, or air data parameters. Aside from the
calculation of the derived parameter, the operation of the model-based safety events is iden-
tical to that of existing HFDM events. The ability to implement model-derived monitoring
parameters in an identical fashion to existing HFDM events is the primary criterion that de-
termines their applicability in an online sense. If a model evaluation requires significantly
more iterations than a comparable HFDM event, then it would not be suitable for online
use and an alternative is required. One such alternative is to run an extensive set of simula-
tions separately from the flight data monitoring database, and pre-compute derived metrics
which can be evaluated quickly within the constraints of the database, which is discussed
next.
Offline simulation for monitoring indicator development
The offline portion of the method is to pre-calculate model derived parameters in advance
of their use within the online detection scheme using a dynamic model of the helicopter
in flight. This approach can be thought of as a generalization of the condition-specific
monitoring using static models since a more complete model of the vehicle is used, which
can be evaluated at a variety of flight conditions, potentially uncovering combinations of
flight states, control inputs and vehicle configuration parameters which are not immediately
known to be related to an accident. In this manner, the physics contained in the model yield
the indication of unsafe flight states, and this result is then used to relate the flight state to
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the risk encountered given a particular control input. Starting at some initial condition,
the model will have to be manipulated in some way to elicit behavior that results in either
a safe or an unsafe outcome. The manner in which this is accomplished has a bearing
on the general applicability of the method. Therefore the following research question is
formulated:
Research Question 4: Starting from a relevant initial state and vehicle configura-
tion, how should the model be controlled throughout the simulation?
It is important to note that the use of simulation can only identify adverse conditions
that arise out of the modeled physics. The true limits limits of the vehicle might arise from
complex interactions of various subsystems, and a detailed model which contains these
effects could provide the means of determining situations when critical subsystem states
manifest them as operational limitations. At present, the primary interest is in the gross
motions of the vehicle, so the limits encountered in simulation stem from dynamic con-
straints such as contact with the ground. At the same time, any of the modeled parameters
could represent a limit if they reach a physically impossible state (eg. flapping beyond flap
stops, exceeding structural strength), so the capability of the approach would only increase
when more detailed models are used.
4.3.1 Prescribed maneuvers and scenarios
In the following, several alternatives are presented which pertain to the methodological
requirement to operate the model during simulation and allow conclusions to be made
regarding the safety and risk of the operation.
One possible way to fulfill this requirement is to prescribe both scenarios and trajecto-
ries over the course of a simulation run. A well-known source of prescribed maneuvers for
helicopters is the ADS-33E-PRF document, which describes maneuver sequences known
as Mission Task Elements (MTEs)[138, 139]. This type of analysis is frequently performed
84
during design or handling qualities assessments, since the prescribed maneuvers are used
as standards against which different designs are compared, or shown to satisfy design re-
quirements. Often the desired maneuver is not specified directly, but is expressed in terms
of a cost function that is used in an optimal control framework. Bottasso used this approach
in analyzing ADS-33 maneuvers, as well as in evaluating critical trajectories[102, 140] us-
ing a dynamic model and an optimal control function for each maneuver. Several other
optimal-control approaches have been demonstrated in literature, especially in the study of
the helicopter H-V diagram[99, 100, 101, 141].
Evaluation of longer flight segments can also be accomplished by arranging pre-defined
maneuvers in sequence. The AIRSAFE concept, created by Burdun et al.[142] used a cus-
tomized structure to represent complex accident scenarios, spanning a portion of the flight
deemed relevant to the accident. For example, a takeoff accident would include a set of seg-
ments with discrete transitions, propagated through to an accident outcome. Rearranging
and perturbing the segments was used to investigate the ”neighborhood” of the pre-defined
accident scenario. For this analysis, Burdun et al. used real accident data to develop each
scenario, identified key decision points during the flight and assigned probabilities to alter-
native actions.
Figure 4.9: Suggested layout of slalom course[138]
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4.3.2 Exploratory analysis of flight conditions
A more exploratory approach would be to set a starting point only, but allow the vehicle to
be maneuvered arbitrarily during the simulation. This type of propagation of the controls
during simulation is attractive for establishing the envelope around a trim point or point
recorded in the data. Ansari[143] used an approach where dynamic trim was first achieved
at various points in the flight envelope, and then the simulated aircraft was commanded to
reach a different trim point. The boundary between achievable trim points and flight states
where the vehicle could not trim was established as the envelope. Figure 4.10 shows a
result from this exploration of the flight envelope using the dynamic trim concept.
Figure 4.10: Envelope determination[143]
The techniques discussed so far assume a starting point, and either prescribe a starting
point and a trajectory or a trim point and a control input/new trim. For the type of safety
assessment planned in this research, the second approach seems like a good candidate for
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exploring the envelope around conditions with known proximity to failure because a wide
range of possible trajectories are investigated by manipulating the inputs.
Monte Carlo approaches
A potential criticism for an approach using control input and parameter sweeps might be
that in reality the inputs are not likely to remain constant. There are several domains where
the evolution of a dynamical time-dependent system is of concern, with a special interest in
eliciting a broad range of outcomes. This type of “exploratory” approach is well suited to
the present application. In the field of nuclear powerplant engineering and telecommunica-
tions, researchers often deal with highly reliable systems whose simulation requires either
a large number of evaluations or a special technique to efficiently provoke the behaviors
which are relevant from a safety perspective. These techniques frequently employ a Monte
Carlo approach as the basis for their development. The additional components are almost
always aimed at reducing the computational burden while steering the simulation towards
types of operation where failures can be identified.
The steering of a system toward unknown path evolutions to a new and potentially
unobserved state is similar to path planning, where the system is not propagated through
the physical space but throughout the simulated domain. One of these approaches is the
particle filter (PF)[144, 145].
Studies indicate that in the limit, the PF approximates the Kalman Filter solution, which
is known to be optimal for linear systems with Gaussian noise characteristics. One of the
benefits of using a particle filter is the ability to capture arbitrary distributions of the out-
come. The particle filter framework is a potential candidate to allow control inputs variabil-
ity to be taken into account with the use of random system inputs. In addition, the particle
filtering framework introduces the concept of importance sampling, which represents the
distribution of the output through the position and weight of the particles. A similar ap-
proach is the particleRRT[146] (rapidly exploring random tree). Both of these methods
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have been explored extensively in literature from path planning to the simulation of rare
events in highly reliable systems.
At the root of the particle filter simulation approach is stochastic propagation of a sys-
tem model to a future state using multiple concurrently evolving trajectories, with the sim-
ulation time horizon divided into intervals or segments. Each trajectory (“particle”) rep-
resents one possible way the system can evolve from the start state at the beginning of a
simulation segment to the end state at the end of the same segment. At the end of any given
segment, the distribution of end states describes the set of possible outcomes, given the
input variables and their ranges. In a filtering set up, the segments are set up to coincide
with the arrival of new measurements, which are combined with the simulated trajectories
using Importance sampling techniques. Another approach used in both path planning and
rare event simulation is Importance splitting. A particularly interesting technique is that
suggested by Pradlwarter[147], where a dynamical system is steered toward regions in the
response domain that of particular interest, as defined via an importance function which
determines the trajectories to be split.
Most particle filtering techniques are defined for discrete-time systems and use some
recursive formulation to propagate the state. These models are frequently formulated as
variations of Hidden Markov Models or similar state transition machines, and researchers
have noted the challenges of applying the probabilistic framework to a continuous sys-
tem or a system with a large domain of possible trajectories[148]. In the present case, the
equations of motion are integrated to approximate continuous states, so modification to the
original algorithm would have to be made[149]. The alternative is to discretize the simu-
lation runs into smaller segments that create the effect of a discrete-time system, which is
compatible with the iterative nature of algorithms such as the particle filter. If no measure-
ments are available, the particles can still be propagated to establish a pseudo-distribution
of outputs.
This brief review suggests that several approaches may be applied in a simulation sce-
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nario for the purpose of eliciting safety hazards. Overall, the Monte Carlo approach is of
particular interest as it reduces the need to define pre-conceived targets or assumed forms
of the vehicle trajectory during simulations for safety analysis. To answer the question at
the beginning of this section several candidate alternatives are proposed in the remainder
of this section and are later assessed in section 5.2.
4.3.3 Simulation propagation in DEMMoS
This subsection discusses several approaches used to initialize and propagate the simula-
tion through time in a manner that would be useful for safety analyses. The control inputs
are of crucial importance to making any conclusions about the future states of the vehicle,
except in extreme conditions where any control input would result in a crash or other fail-
ure. The goal of the appropriate input strategy is two-fold: to elicit the types of behavior
which result in increased risk, and to enable monitoring for the identified risk by mapping
the information generated during simulation to the pilot’s inputs and any other relevant
parameter.
Discrete sweep
The first approach is to determine an intial condition and select a control input which is
applied at a particular instant in time, maintaining the same command throughout the re-
mainder of the simulation. This approach has the advantage of being conceptually simple,
and allows a direct mapping between the outcome and the inputs, as was done in [150]
using the 2-D tipover model described in section 5.3.1. During a discrete sweep of control
inputs, the simulation is repeatedly executed using a constant control input and the response
of the vehicle is tracked. Given a set of limit parameters, the time history of the vehicle
response can be evaluated for any excursions beyond the specified threshold. The discrete
sweep is analogous to the DOE approach in computational experiments, where a range of
simulation inputs are used. DOE techniques for efficient sampling of the input space exist,
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but in a nonlinear simulation this may cause important effects to be missed. Therefore the
approach taken here is to simulate all combinations of input parameters, given a finite set
of discretizations of each input variable’s range. Another important note is that in many
cases, the results of a simulation study must be mapped to the input space, which in most
cases is the set of control inputs that are used to operate the vehicle. If the control inputs are
trajectories, as opposed to fixed values, then this mapping is complicated and a straightfor-
ward relationship does not exist. For this reason, the discrete sweep approach is preferable
if the goal is the development of criteria for monitoring adverse conditions, expressed in
terms of the variables defining the input space. The mapping of simulation results to a fixed
value in the input space is also used in some more online limit protection systems, where
the assumption is that the limit would be repeatedly computed at consecutive instants in
time, thereby mitigating the concerns of mapping dynamic trajectories to a fixed value in
the input space.
Other approaches
The simple sweep analysis would often represent the worst-case scenario, since in many
cases it is the extremal control inputs which bring the vehicle to a critical flight state in the
shortest amount of time[150, 151, 107]. Over longer prediction horizons, the simulation
may be repeated using a initial condition chosen from some intermediate set of results. In
this fashion, trajectories are generated that originate at a common starting point, and evolve
in response to the entire admissible range of control inputs (quantized into a finite number
of levels). Each of these trajectories can then produce additional branches which evolve
independently as a result of the control inputs applied to the system. The ability to perform
a simulation of this sort requires the simulated system to approximate a Markov process,
which means that at any time step the system state depends only on the previous step and
not on the entire time history up to that instant in time. The dynamical systems and simu-
lation integration schemes used in this work have this property, enabling the time domain
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of interest to be split into smaller segments, and to assign different control inputs to the
individual trajectories during each segment. Each trajectory can be considered a separate
”particle”, even with the overlap during the initial segments. This approach is termed ”se-
quential sweep” and is investigated as an alternative in the experimentation section. Yet
another approach is to use fully randomized inputs, which creates a large number of in-
dependently evolving trajectories over the prediction horizon. This ”randomized input”
approach to simulating a dynamical system should in the limit visit every possible path
and capture the full variability of potential system responses. The following hypothesis is
stated and evaluated through experimentation in a later section:
Hypothesis to RQ4: Starting with the same initial condition as the baseline sce-
nario propagation, a particle-type approach using randomized inputs can identify the
outcome derived using the baseline approach.
The consequence of this hypothesis being confirmed is that the method can identify
hazards without explicit specification of the maneuvers to be performed. Further, by ap-
proximating variable pilot inputs, a more realistic representation over longer prediction
horizons can be achieved than is achieved by the steady control input method.
4.4 Representation of simulation outputs
In the case of condition-specific and static models, the evaluation of incoming flight data
would be instantaneous based on flight data alone in an online detection scheme. In order
to eliminate some of the assumptions of the simpler condition-specific models, a more de-
tailed model may be used, which is frequently accomplished in an offline setting. In the
case of dynamic simulation using nonlinear models, the simulation produces a sequence of
simulated vehicle states, both relating to the motion of the vehicle and any additional sim-
ulation parameters which are available. Section 4.2 described the components that would
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make up a nonlinear helicopter model with the appropriate fidelity for application within
DEMMoS. A comparatively long evaluation time and a need to map the simulation outputs
to the flight condition of interest necessitate the ability to propagate the simulation through
time, as described in section 4.3.
The literature reports various metrics that have a relationship to safety, including control
margin, limit margin, energy based and time based metrics. Of these, the first-hitting-time
metric was selected for its general applicability and high-level view of safety. There does
not seem to be a straightforward way to formulate and test a hypothesis regarding this
choice, but the present experience suggests that the metric will provide adequate distinction
between safe and unsafe conditions. Additionally, a time-based threshold could be specified
by the operator to establish acceptable margins of safety which can be related to the separate
limits on individual parameters. Another reason the time based metric is deemed adequate
is the prevalence of similar representations of safety and reliability in other fields.
In particular, the temporal aspect of the output allows one to determine the instant when
a limit parameter is exceeded and relate that result to an earlier instant. This aspect of the
offline approach allows the use of a first-hitting-time metric, which is the defined as the
first sample from the limit parameter that has exceeded a pre-specified value. Once a limit
is observed in simulation, and the time to critical conditions is determined, the outputs
would have to be summarized in a manner that allows implementation in a monitoring
database. In addition to the time-based metric, it is expected that the simulations will
generate large amounts of information which will have to be efficiently integrated in a
monitoring environment in order to make the results from the simulation experiments useful
for actual safety monitoring schemes.
One option is to use the results directly to help identify traditional HFDM events,
though it is desirable to reduce the burden on the analyst in defining safety events. One
potential approach to implementing these results in practice would be to generate thresh-
olds on parameters such as control inputs, based on a particular value of the time to a
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critical condition. This type of application would result in a static boundary, but could be
useful for the analysts defining the detection boundaries and as training material.
A second approach would be to provide the data directly and compare against these data
using interpolation. There are a variety of interpolation algorithms available, but the practi-
cal concern is that interpolating a high-dimensional lookup table for every data point might
be problematic in a real-world HFDM application given the intent to continue populating
the repository of simulated results over time.
The alternative is to provide a regression model which has been fitted to the data and
can be rapidly evaluated at any point where the regression is valid. There are a number of
techniques which perform regression on data of various complexity, so it is reasonable to
hypothesize that a technique that extracts this knowledge and represents it in a functional
form can be identified and potentially used for implementation of identified safety limits.
Therefore an approach to represent this relationship using some form of a surrogate or
supervised learning technique is needed, which leads to the following question:
Research Question 5: How can the time-history output of the simulation be inter-
preted in a general framework and be implemented as a monitoring boundary?
Specifically, the results of interest are the time to reach a critical value of any limit
parameter given a flight state as specified by the incoming data stream. This functional-
ity of speeding up the analysis of incoming flight data and providing a representation of
simulation-based metrics can be achieved using a number of statistical learning or surro-
gate modeling techniques, though the nature of the response would dictate the appropriate
choice.
The response surface methodology (RSM) is one common choice when generating sur-
rogate models as a result of a large number of computer experiments[152]. The most
frequently used approach to generate the relationship between input variables and out-
comes is multi-dimensional linear regression. However, as will be seen during this work,
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the response of dynamic experiments using helicopter models is not linear, and contains
additional complications which make the application of linear model less straightforward.
Since the multi-dimensional surface of the simulation response can contain highly non-
linear regions, truncation, and otherwise be of a type that is not conducive to linear rep-
resentations. One way to achieve an improved regression is to transform the original data
such that it becomes linear in the transformed domain. Given the unknown and potentially
complicated form of the response, the transformation approach could require a large num-
ber of operations before the data could be used, without any indication whether new data
would require yet another transformation.
Yet another approach is to separate the original domain into smaller sub-domains where
the response is approximately linear. Qiu investigated methods to fit regression models to
discontinuous surfaces[153] using a three stage approach of separating the domain at the
discontinuity locations and fitting separate models in each sub-domain.
In addition to these options, there is an extensive body of literature of potential alter-
natives, especially if supervised learning techniques are considered. There an innumerable
variations and customization of these methods and algorithms, and a full investigation is
beyond the scope of this work. Section 2.1 regarding statistical approaches in flight data
monitoring mentioned several techniques which have been used in aviation, and in partic-
ular, neural networks stand out as a very flexible and powerful learning approach[62, 63].
There are numerous applications of neural networks in related fields, and there is a renewed
interest in their applications in part due to recent demonstrations of very promising results
in the area of deep learning[60, 154]. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis to RQ 5: An appropriate neural network technique will enable accurate
and efficient representation of the outputs suitable for evaluation in large databases,
while preserving all relevant characteristics of the simulation analysis results.
If this hypothesized model is successful, the result will be a detection boundary that
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will not suffer from the type of simplification that typical “safety events” require before
implementation is practical. This component of the methodology aims to bring the results
of a complicated analysis closer to the operator and enable actionable detections of flight
hazards. In addition, in order to provide flexibility to the operator in deciding where this
threshold is set, the entire set of output data should be made available to the operator/HFDM
system.
4.5 Methodology summary
The methodology described in this chapter is expected to provide an overall capability
which has not been reported in HFDM use, and has the potential to help reduce risk through
detection and mitigation. The methodology relies primarily on a modeling and simulation
component which can be evaluated to yield enhanced and predictive measures of the risk
associated with a particular type of operation. These metrics are to be implemented in an
online fashion within the HFDM system as an additional set of events to the ones already
in place. Such model-derived events can be defined for a variety of conditions for which
mathematical formulations exist or can be developed. The method also provides for the use
of more complicated and computationally expensive models through the use of a structured
simulation and analysis set of components which take a model through a range of possible
trajectories in order to identify the presence of unsafe flight states. It is envisioned that
the simulation portion of the method would be evaluated off-line and generate a number
of simulated trajectories ahead of the use of the results for monitoring. The simulations
would expose hazards within a region around the initial condition used in the simulation ,
and would be repeated at other conditions in a continuous fashion while populating a repos-
itory of simulated flight data. DEMMoS is intended to combine the results of many such
simulation analyses in order to enable online monitoring using a supervised learning tech-
nique, enabling the detection of safety hazards that stem from the physical mechanisms
which have been captured in the model. It is important to note that the structure of the
95
method was intended to be model-agnostic, as long as the model is an accurate represen-
tation of the physical system that is the vehicle, and can be evaluated using the proposed
scheme.
Figure 4.11 shows the expected use of the DEMMoS method as an addition to exist-
ing HFDM system, with the primary result being the improved detection of adverse flight
conditions through the definition of model-based safety events. Such events have the po-
tential to be defined accurately and early in the operation of an HFDM system, increasing
the opportunities to detect and mitigate unwanted trends in helicopter operations. The fol-
lowing chapter provides support to the methodology choices and shows the application of
DEMMoS on several relevant flight conditions, with the goal of enabling and improving the
detection of safety hazards in helicopter operation. A final demonstration is also performed
to showcase an how the method is to be initialized and operated to the point of generating



































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter describes the experiments performed in support of the development of the
model-based methodology and the definition of safety metrics based on physical principles.
The first part of this chapter pertains to condition-specific models which have been shown
to improve HFDM detection ability. The approach is extended to a more general dynamic
modeling approach in the later sections.
5.1 Condition-specific models
5.1.1 Vortex Ring State Model use in HFDM
In HFDM implementations using simplified models for condition detection, the model is
used in the same manner as regular safety events, with the exception that the monitoring
levels (condition indicators) are physically meaningful quantities output by the model in-
stead of pre-defined thresholds established by experts and fine-tuned over a period of time.
This principle was applied to the detection of flight near the Vortex Ring State regime.
The VRS boundary is usually expressed in terms of the horizontal and vertical velocities
Vx and Vz [120], and many researchers are in general agreement on the location of this
region. Figure 5.1 shows this boundary for a simulated flight data record, defined based
the inflow model described above. The boundary is defined as the point of vertical descent
rate where the inflow gradient changes, seen as a “bump” in fig.4.4. The helicopter was
intentionally flown into the VRS region several times, and at each time step the flight state
of the vehicle was checked against the boundary valid at that flight state. In this case
the detection is based on a logical test against the VRS boundary, which is identical to
the approach broadly used in HFDM. The primary difference is that the VRS boundary
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shown here is scaled with the hover induced velocity, so vehicle size and weight as well
as atmospheric conditions are taken into account. In Figure 5.1, the boundary shown is
drawn for the nominal flight condition, and several points where VRS is indicated appear
just outside of this nominal boundary. If the boundary is re-drawn for the instantaneous
flight condition at the particular flight data point, then all detected points would be within
the boundary, as expected. Figure 5.2 shows the altitude profile of the same simulated flight
over time, with ground height shown. The data were generated using the X-Plane R© flight
simulator for the purpose of evaluating the operation of the VRS detection, since this type
of occurrence has not been observed in the data available during this work. This type of
graph is more commonly found in HFDM, and it clearly shows the portions of the flight
where VRS was experienced. In this flight, VRS was deliberately approached and entered 3
times, with a resulting increase in vertical descent rate. The recoveries was performed using
both the traditional procedure and the newly popularized “Vuichard” technique, which uses
tail rotor thrust to help exit the influence of the vortex.
As an example of how this result may be used in typical HFDM, the flight’s trajectory
is shown on a Google Earth map (fig.5.3), which is one the ways operators analyze flights
and assess any hazards encountered during the flight. The trajectory is a clear indication
of the rapid and nearly vertical descent during vortex ring state encounter. Though this
example uses a simulated set of flight data, the analysis is nearly identical in the real-world
case. The primary difference would be related to issues with noise and other artifacts in
the data, though most of the hardware used for this purpose is very reliable and performs
sufficient conditioning of the data before the data upload is completed.
Because the detected condition is related to the properties of the flow through the rotor,
the same principles can be applied to any rotorcraft, conceivably allowing the same model
to be applied across a range of vehicles with minor modifications. This is a direct benefit
for HFDM operation, since the manual safety event definition can be aided by physically
meaningful values for boundary parameters. A further benefit is that the boundary shown
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Figure 5.1: Detection of VRS using boundary from Johnson[120].























Figure 5.2: Flight profile of simulated flight with VRS encounter.
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VRS
Figure 5.3: Flight track of simulated flight with VRS encounters.
in Figure 5.2 is not static, but changes according to the vehicle configuration, as well as the
instantaneous flight conditions such as load factor. In this limited case, all three occurrences
of VRS were detected, which points to the feasibility of using the parametric VRS boundary
for this type of detection in an on-line HFDM system.
5.1.2 Autorotation monitoring
During the course of this study, flight data recorded by a helicopter operator became avail-
able. Most of the flight data were collected during uneventful routine flights, but a single
flight was identified where large vertical speed deviations had been detected. It was deter-
mined that this flight represented practice autorotations. This was confirmed by the fact that
the flight data contained associated safety event definitions used by the operator to assess
the aircrews performance during training. The purpose of monitoring autorotation practice
is to detect any instances when the trainee pilots perform deviate from standard procedures
and place the helicopter at an increased risk of low RPM and consequently increase the
risk of a hard landing or crash. A further point of interest was the indication that in this
particular instance the events have been tagged as nuisance alerts, since the meta-data for
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the flight data record contained a note from the analysts regarding pilot comments and the
fact that the detected events had been triggered unnecessarily. This is a prime example of
situations where the analyst would either modify the event and associated detection limit
or disregard the flight data record.
Specifically, the limits set by the operator were crisp logical rules defined on flight
parameters relevant in autorotation. A threshold vertical speed of 1000 feet per minute
was assumed, and three values for horizontal velocity Vh were specified to correspond to
different severity levels.
Vh < 40kts(low) (5.1)
Vh < 35kts(medium) (5.2)
Vh < 30kts(high) (5.3)
In [91], a practical approach to estimating the descent velocity in autorotation is presented
where the power requirements of the vehicle are equated to the descent velocity through
the exchange of potential energy for the energy consumed by the rotor and expended on
overcoming air drag. When the exchange of potential energy is sufficient to cover the power
required by the vehicle at a particular flight speed, the calculated power required becomes
negative. This point of transition is the descent speed in autorotation, and this boundary
can be defined for a particular vehicle and a range of forward velocities.
In Figure 5.4, the flight data from the autorotation training flight is shown in terms
of forward speed (GPS measurement) and vertical speed. The limits in Equations 5.1-5.3
are shown through the color-coding of the flight data points which lie below the 1000ft
threshold. The points progressively to the left of the figure are more “severe” because the
rotor requires more power at low forward velocities than at intermediate velocities close to
the point of minimum power.
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Figure 5.4: Monitoring of autorotation practice
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A model-based analysis of the same data set was performed using the expression for
power required in forward flight in 5.4, expressed in terms of ideal descent velocity given
the instantaneous flight conditions.













µ3 + λcCT + CPTR (5.4)
The detection thresholds in this case were related to the power requirement, with low
severity events being triggered at -5% power. In autorotation, the calculated power should
be slightly negative to account for tail rotor, transmission, and any other losses. This es-
timate can certainly be refined, but the results in Figure 5.5 show an improved correlation
between the ideal autorotation boundary and the flight data points marked as low or high
severity autorotation events. Only two detection thresholds were used due to the arbitrary
nature of the 5% level, and any flight data points with a power more negative than 5% were
deemed acceptable.
The results show that it may be possible to establish monitoring events using even a sim-
ple model of a performance condition. While the 1000 fpm threshold was retained, inside
the prescribed autorotation region the model-based method shows improved correlation to
the detection boundary. Additional analysis on this particular data record revealed that sig-
nificant atmospheric winds were present during the flight, which was partly responsible for
the false alarms.
However, after accounting for the wind component, it was shown that the original
thresholds would still yield false alarms, whereas the model-based approach shown here
in conjunction with the wind estimate eliminated false alarms of data points that are clearly
within the autorotation regime. These results are highly encouraging an point to the benefit
of using physics-based models in HFDM. It is important to note that this is a limited test
case and further flight data records would be required for additional validation. At present,
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Figure 5.5: Model-based monitoring of autorotation practice
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this model has been validated as effective by subject matter experts in the helicopter domain
[84].
The results shown in the two cases of VRS detection and autorotation monitoring con-
firm the potential for the model-based approach to provide benefits over the current state of
the art in Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring. Providing operators with an effective means to
detect hazardous flight conditions though model-based detection thresholds could reduce
the false alarm rates and missed detection, as demonstrated by the improved agreement
between the detection boundary and the autorotation boundary. This result supports the
hypothesis to Research Question 3, which is that an appropriately detailed model can ad-
equately identify hazardous conditions. These two models were defined explicitly for the
conditions where they are applied, so the second part of the hypothesis requires further
support. To move away from condition-specific models, are more general formulation is
needed in the form of dynamic models, which are evaluated next.
5.2 Analysis of simulation input strategies
This section deals with the evaluation of several approaches for their applicability in DEM-
MoS as a means to manipulate the simulation in a way that uncovers potential hazards.
In the review of applicable techniques, Monte Carlo approaches in various particle-based
forms were identified, and two variations are compared in this set of experiments. The
“truth model” is an optimal control solution for a simple dynamical system described in
the next subsection. The goal is to determine an approach that can balance the needs to
explore the operational space while enabling monitoring of conditions that have been iden-




One potential criticism of the discrete sweep approach may be that it doesn’t represent the
real operation of the vehicle over long prediction horizons. This is a reasonable concern, as
pilots are not likely to maintain a fixed control input over an extended period of time. An
optimal framework[107, 106, 100], a realistic pilot model[155, 156], or both[102], can be
a much closer approximation to the expected manner of operating the vehicle in reality. In
order to evaluate different approaches based on the open-loop control input scheme used
in this work, a 1-D linear spring-mass-damper example from [107] is implemented. The
damping coefficient is ζ = 0.7 and the frequency ωn = 2.0 rad/sec, with the following













The calculation of an optimal input control time history depends on the choice of cost
function, which is minimized with respect to the control input. In the present case, the cost
function is constructed in a way that penalizes time and excessive control effort. Many other
functions may be applicable, including ones that contain the constraint to reach X = 5m,
which is the limit parameter critical value. In the present case and in [107], the cost function
in Equation 5.6 is used. The W parameter is a weight assigned to the control inputs. In the
case when W is zero, the maximal control input is given (in this case the upper bound was
set to 30 m/s2), and with progressively higher weight the control input is penalized so that




(1 + 0.5Wu2p)dt (5.6)
For the purpose of calculating the integral in Equation 5.6, the control input time series
was discretized at fixed intervals, resulting in segments of constant control input. The
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Figure 5.6: Optimal control solution for 1-D example
control values were weighted according to the segment duration and summed. The value
of the control input during each segment thus becomes a design variable for constrained
nonlinear optimization problem. Figure 5.7 shows the convergence performance of several
individual optimizations of the spring-mass-damper control problem. As the number of
control segments is increased, the optimal solution is rapidly approached and increasing
the number of segments has little additional benefit. The conclusion is that as long as
the number of segments allow the resulting (stepped) control trajectory to approximate the
form of the true optimal control input, it will be possible for the optimization to converge
to optimal solution. In the case of the spring-mass-damper, the solution does not improve
significantly beyond 10-15 segments.
Once an optimal control is computed, it is common to map this control time history to
the initial condition using a fixed surrogate value [107], and re-compute the solution at later
instants in time. It is this notion of repeated evaluation that allows the use of fixed input
108







Number of control points







Figure 5.7: Convergence of optimal solution for range of collocation points
instead of the optimal solution, by changing the value of the fixed input at each intermediate
condition where the solution is recomputed. The same approach can be applied without the
optimization aspect, but through the use of the DOE approach in a sequential manner.
Below is the evaluation of two candidate techniques to extend the discrete sweep using
fixed inputs to a more exploratory approach.
5.2.2 Sequential sweep of control inputs
The essence of the sequential sweep approach is to allow the simulation to investigate as
many paths as possible, which is true in the limit. Allowing every realization of the simu-
lation to “go anywhere” and from there to proceed to “everywhere else” in the state space
should in principle visit every possible trajectory realization. While this is not practical
in the sense that such an investigation would require unlimited computational resources,
it is interesting to compare this approach against the optimal solution. Unlike the opti-
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mal solution, the sequential sweep does not assume any cost function or form of control
input, though the number of quantization levels (the values the control input can be set
to) and the number of segments or discretizations of the time horizon have to be deter-
mined. This is similar to the discretization of a continuous time domain in some of the
approaches reviewed in Section 4.3. Figure 5.8 shows one such simulation of the spring-
mass-damper system described by Equation 5.5, where the simulation was performed in
two stages. During the first stage, trajectories were generated for each of the three control
input quantization levels. During the second segment, starting at t = 1.5, each trajectory
from the first segment was allowed to propagate in 3 more instances, one for each control
input level. In the cases where the control input remained the same as that which was used
during the previous segment, the trajectories follow the same path as those generated in
the discrete sweep case. It is interesting to note that if the limit parameter Xlim = 5 is the
only metric of interest, the steady inputs reach the limit fastest. In addition to these tra-
jectories, the solution contains trajectories where the control input is changed to one of the
other possible values. In terms of the output X , these additional input cause every possible
path to be explored. This first example is primarily used to demonstrate the concept of the
sequential sweep, but it is clear from Figure 5.8 that none of the trajectories are particu-
larly close to the optimal path shown in Figure 5.6. The optimal path, shown in red, was
generated by a time-varying control input which results in a path with more variation than







The sequential sweep is in essence a sequence of Monte Carlo-type analyses that prop-
agate the simulation throughout a wide range of states. While a solution of a particular
form is not sought out expressly, the sequential application of all possible input allow the
simulation to approximate many different types of scenarios which would otherwise have
to be defined explicitly. In Figure 5.11, the distance calculated in Equation 5.7 is plotted
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Figure 5.8: Sequential sweep (3 levels, 2 segments)
Figure 5.9: Sequential sweep (7 levels, 6 segments)
111
(a) 2 segment, 3 levels (b) 3 segment, 3 levels
(c) 3 segment, 5 levels (d) 4 segment, 5 levels
(e) 4 segment, 6 levels (f) 6 segment, 7 levels
Figure 5.10: Trajectories from sequential input sweeps
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against the number of segments and the number of control input quantization levels. It
can be clearly seen that increasing both yields ever increasing approximation of the opti-
mal trajectory. This result is not an indication of the “optimality” of the obtained paths, but
rather points to the fact that the trajectories generated using sequential control input sweeps
approach the case where every possible path is visited.
Figure 5.11: Average minimum distance to optimal trajectory
The sequential sweep approach suffers from the curse of dimensionality, which may
limit its application for real-world investigations. Even in the 1-D case investigated here,
the number of trajectory realizations increases as the number of quantization levels to the
power of number of segments - which can grow very quickly in any practical application.
In higher dimensions, each additional control channel would raise the number of quanti-
zation levels to the power of the number of control channels, so that this number would
be exceedingly large in a case with several control input channels. However, the results
from this investigation reveal that it is possible to approach an optimal solution, while also
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traversing many sub-optimal paths including those resulting from realizations with fixed
control inputs across segments. Assuming the computational budget exists to perform a
full sequential sweep simulation, any optimal solution should be captured within the gen-
erated trajectories. However, if optimality is not a concern, then the fixed control input
trajectories still arrive at the limit in the shortest time, which make the simple input sweep
an acceptable approach to estimate the minimum time to reach a limit.
5.2.3 Randomized inputs
The sequential sweep is an interesting approach that explores every possible evolution of
the system, assuming a finite number of control input quantization levels, and a number
of sequential simulation periods. Another approach is to use randomized inputs which can
take any value within the admissible range during a particular segment. The Markov prop-
erty allows the time domain to be split into segments where the control values applied to
each trajectory are drawn from a distribution of possible control values. In this manner, the
trajectory realizations are randomized, and in the limit would again contain every possible
path that can originate at the given initial condition (X and Ẋ are both zero in the example).
In the simplest case shown in Figure 5.12, a single segment is used with uniformly
sampled control input levels. This case differs from the original discrete sweep DOE-style
approach only in the fact that the control inputs are sampled from a continuous range rather
than at pre-determined quantization levels. Compared to the optimal case, the functional
form of the single-segment response is a poor approximation of the response generated with
a continuously variable control input, but the response still contains paths which exceed
the 5m threshold of the limit parameter. Because the functional form of the constant-
input response cannot capture the variability in the optimal path, increasing the number of
quantization levels has little effect on the distance between the closest path and the target
(Figure 5.13), even with 10000 trajectories.
The next case contains 3 segments where the control input is held constant for the
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Figure 5.12: Randomized sweep (10 trajectories, 1 segment)
Figure 5.13: Randomized sweep (10000 trajectories, 1 segment)
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duration of the segment. At each junction,the inputs are resampled and applied to the
ending state of the previous segment. In this manner, randomized realization are generated
which display a much greater variability than the constant input sweep. It is interesting to
note that the optimal path has resulted in a functional form that is approximated very well
when three segments are used. In the case of only 100 trajectory realization, the optimal and
randomized paths are quite close, as can be seen in Figure 5.14. Increasing the number of
trajectories and further segmenting the time domain results in even finer approximation of
the optimal path, though this goal has not been explicitly defined. It is purely a consequence
of the random exploration of the trajectories generated using this approach.
These insights are confirmed by inspecting the variation of the distance between the
optimal path and the closest realization using the randomized control inputs. Figure 5.16
shows the evolution of the approximation as the number of trajectories is varied between
10 and 10000 and the number of segments between 1 and 12. Two important differences
are present in this result compared to the equivalent result in the previous section. The first
that in general, increases in the number of trajectories has a similar effect as increasing the
number of quantization levels in the previous approach. The second is that while higher
numbers of trajectories and segments result in closer approximation of the optimal path,
the trend here is less clear.
The surface has been smoothed for visualization purposes and indicates a potential
optimum near 6 segments, whereas further increases in the number of segments actually
increases the distance between the optimum path and all of the randomized paths. There are
several effects that could potentially be causing this result. One is that the functional form
of the optimum path happens to be approximated well with a certain number of segments.
Another cause is the fact that with finer segmentation, the variability of the generated paths
is reduced. This is related to known results for random walk processes, where the variance
is reduced over longer sampling periods, compared to the maximum and minimum values
that could be achieved given a constant input. Though the random walk result is derived for
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Figure 5.14: Randomized sweep (100 trajectories, 3 segment)
Figure 5.15: Randomized sweep (4000 trajectories, 7 segment)
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Figure 5.16: Randomized input average minimum distance from optimal
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a case where the process jumps to one of two discrete levels, 1 or -1, it is analogous to the
manner in which the sampling of the control inputs occurs in the present approach. A final
potential cause for the optimum may be related to the fact that the number of segments per
unit time is related to the frequency of the input, which would produce the largest responses
closer to the natural frequency of the controlled system.
5.2.4 Summary
This analysis showed two additional approaches which warrant further investigation. The
sequential sweep is limited by computational considerations and the curse of dimension-
ality, but it was demonstrated to explore all possible trajectories within the constraints of
the number of segments and control input quantization levels. It is interesting to note that
given the limit parameter at 5m, the trajectories that reach that threshold the quickest were
those where the control input was held constant. The second approach is an analogue to
the sequential sweep without the scalability concerns of the sequential sweep arising from
splitting each trajectory. Given a computational budget in terms of numbers of samples,
the number of segments can be increased in a manner that is appropriate for the problem
at hand, keeping in mind the insights regarding the optimum number of segments. The
desired frequency of the input, the variance reduction with higher number of segments, and
the functional form of any desired responses should be considered.
Therefore it can be concluded that both alternatives are appropriate from a purely “ex-
ploratory” perspective. However, issues arise if the outcome of the simulations are to be
mapped to the input domain. Specifically, in both the random control approach and the
sequential sweep, mapping the initial condition to the final state after several segments is
not straghtforward, since the controls trajectories overlap and intersect during the simula-
tion. The mapping requirement necessitates a clear relationship between inputs and outputs,
which is possible using a discrete sweep.
The single input sweep approach cannot generally approximate complicated trajecto-
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ries, but is frequently associated with the worst case scenario. Given the ability to directly
map the input values used in the simulation to the risk of the associated response is an
important benefit if the goal is to establish effective detection thresholds in a monitoring
environment.
Additionally, the discrete sweep is identical to the first segment of the sequential sweep
approach. In this regard it could mean that the simulation, once started at a pre-defined
initial condition, can propagate throughout the range of potential outcomes and identify
“all” possible scenarios. However, the rapid rise in the number of simulated trajectories
means that the sequential sweep approach is impractical for longer time horizon predictions
if applied without some means to control the increasing variability. A way to mitigate this
problem, aside from extreme amounts of resources, is to limit the number of redundant
intermediate states that are visited, which in the original sequential sweep approach are
not being tracked. By starting a discrete sweep at a new condition close to the initial
start state, an additional set of solutions can be created in the vicinity of the condition of
interest. After repeated application of the discrete sweep, an ever closer approximation of
the sequential sweep can be achieved, while avoiding the computational explosion of the
original sequential sweep approach. Therefore the discrete sweep is attractive for use in the
dynamic simulations.
The randomized input alternative was shown to also approximate every possible trajec-
tory, but with some additional and important caveats. In the sequential sweep case, increas-
ing the number of segments per unit time results in more variability, whereas the variability
is not monotonically increasing in the same manner for the random inputs case, as was
shown in Figure 5.16. In both the sequential sweep and randomized input cases, however,
increasing the number of trajectories results in increasing exploration of the operational
space. One major drawback of the randomized input approach is that the relationship be-
tween the inputs and outputs is no longer preserved, so a mapping cannot be constructed
directly between the inputs to the simulation and the outcomes. Therefore the answer to
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the hypothesis to RQ4 is that while the randomized input approach is great for exploration,
the repeated application of the discrete sweep at an increasing range of initial conditions
will approximate the solution of the sequential sweep while preserving the mapping abil-
ity - yielding a set of trajectories which can be represented using a supervised learning
technique and implemented as a monitoring boundary.
5.3 2-D and 3-D Tipover analysis
The purpose of this experiment was to determine the feasibility of the overall approach
of using physics based models for the definition and eventual monitoring of hazardous
flight conditions. The main goal is to address the question of whether the models can
be effectively used to describe boundaries, which can be related to a critical parameter
limit which can be objectively defined. The tipover scenario is hazardous because of the
potential for contact with the ground and associated damage. The first part of this section
deals with a condition specific model that was used to establish the basic approach and build
experience with the method’s utility in defining events based on the simulated response of
the vehicle. This model helps answer the question regarding the general framework of
using offline simulations to identify parameter limits for monitoring, and provides some
insight into the type of response that can be achieved so that the appropriate choices for
output representation can be made.
5.3.1 2-D Dynamic Model for Tipover analysis
This section documents a 2-D dynamic model used in an initial demonstration of the basic
concepts within the present methodology. The idea is that if the dynamics can be modeled
faithfully, a simulation approach could be devised that will investigate the accident con-
ditions ahead of time and provide guidance to inform the development of any protective
measures. Specifically, the G-TIGT accident resulted in the implementation of limits on
the combinations of control inputs that correspond with increased risk of rollover. If the
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simulation can reveal if such control inputs exist, and where they occur within the range
of inputs possible for the given rotorcraft, then the potential exits that the knowledge about
the proximity of the hazard would allow an operator to take corrective measures.
A simplified lateral dynamics model similar to those used by Fox[105] and Black-
well[129] is used for the purpose of studying the lateral behavior of a helicopter on the
ground. The model contains a rigid body acted upon by forces through the landing gear
struts as they come in contact with the ground, and two force vectors representing the main
rotor and tail rotor forces. Additionally, a the main rotor force vector can be tilted, which
generates additional moments due to a torsional spring at the “hub”. An overview of the
model and its components is shown in Figure 5.17. The two main landing gears legs are
modeled as oleo struts with flexible ground contact points to simulate tire deflections in the
ground plane. The following development is presented for one of the main gears. The force
in the oleo strut is calculated using Equation 5.8, following a similar development in [129].
Li =
 K1di
2 + C1ḋi (di < do)
K1d0
2 +K2(di − d0)2 + C2ḋi (di ≥ d0)
(5.8)
In Equation 5.8, Li is the force due to compression of the oleo, d is the oleo deflection,
and d0 is the oleo break-point as defined in [133]. The subscript i indicates which landing
gear strut the calculation pertains to. In this 2-D model, there are only 2 landing gear struts,
marked as landing gear a for the left one and b for the one on the right, but helicopters with
three or more landing gear legs exist.
The force on the each strut is generated when the landing gear is in contact with the
ground. The ground contact point is initially determined as the point of intersection be-
tween the ground plane and the vector which originates at the strut attachment point on the
fuselage and is oriented along the fuselage y direction (in 3D this would be the positive z
direction). Following initial contact with the ground, the contact point moves according to











Figure 5.17: Schematic of the 2D tipover model
to deflect, and this deflection is considered using another point which represents the con-
tact patch, the actual point of contact between the “tire” and the ground. The lateral force
depends on the component of tire deflection in the ground plane, and the rate of change of
this deflection, as shown in Equation 5.9.
F tirei = −Kt(x
patch
i − xcontacti )− Ctẋcontacti (5.9)
The location of the contact patch is propagated as a model state when the equations of
motions are integrated in time. The contact patch location does not change when the friction
force is below the static friction limit, and follows the lateral motion of the strut contact
point when the static friction limit is exceeded. The force transmitted to the strut due to the
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i |F tirei | < µFyi
sign(F tirei )µFyi |F tirei | ≥ µFyi
(5.10)
The vertical force at the contact patch Fyi is first calculated for the no-slip condition, and
is modified if slip is detected.
Fyi = cos θLi (5.11)
Pi = cos θFxi (5.12)
The Equations 5.11 and 5.12 yield the forces experienced by the end of the landing gear
strut over the range of interest. The current analysis assumes a critical angle (60deg.) at
which point the simulation is stopped. Summing the contributions and resolving them in
the inertial frame results in the following contribution of the first landing gear strut to the
total force acting on the fuselage of the vehicle, where R is the rotation matrix that rotates






The moment contribution of the ith gear is calculated using 5.14:
Mi = (
−→r contact −−→r cg)× FiLG (5.14)
The main rotor and tail rotor are represented as force vectors with a first-order response to
magnitude commands. Additionally, the main rotor force vector can be tilted by an angle
φ in response to cyclic inputs, which causes a deflection of the rotational spring at the hub.
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The main rotor tilt is also modeled as a first-order response.
F rotors = R
















Table 5.1: 2-D tipover model parameters
Model parameter Value Description
W 3 m fuselage width
H 4 m fuselage height
m 3000 Kg mass
d0 1 m undeflected strut length
I 6.25 103 Kg m2 moment of inertia
K1 1.0 N/m Oleo spring const.
K2 1.4 N/m Oleo spring const.
C1 1.5 N s/m Oleo damping const.
C2 1.8 N s/m Oleo damping const.
Kt 2.2 N/m Lateral tire stiffness
Ct 3.0 N s/m Tire damping const.
τMR 0.7 s Main rotor force time const.
τTR 0.3 s Tail rotor force time const.
τφ 1.3 s Lateral “flapping” time const.
Khub 1.95 104 N m/rad Hub spring stiffness
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Figure 5.18: Result of 2D tipover simulation
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5.3.2 Experimental setup
The test was set up in a the same manner as described later in section 5.5 describing the
FLIGHTLAB implementation of the approach. The lateral cyclic and tail rotor pedal were
varied for a range of input values, with the result being a trajectory of the vehicle states for a
specified length of time. Each of these trajectories is associated with a unique combination
of control inputs. The result is then cast in the form of the first hitting time of the limit
parameter. Note that there were no simulated contacts between the vehicle and the ground
in either of these cases, but rather a critical angle is assumed and the simulation stopped
when this angle is reached. For the 2-D analysis, an angle of 60 degrees was specified. This
is far beyond what would be experienced in practice. For the 3-D model, a lower number
was chosen to take into account the realization that the main rotor would come in contact
with the ground at moderate angles of roll. Figure 5.19 shows the manner in which the roll
angle was tracked and used to determine the first hitting time in both cases.
5.3.3 Analysis
Figure 5.20 shows the output of one such analysis using the 2-D model the main rotor
thrust was set at a moderate setting of about two thirds the vehicle weight, representing
a ground maneuvering case. The lateral cyclic controls the tilt of the main rotor thrust
vector, which in combination with the tail rotor, produces momenta that cause the vehicle
to roll over. The time to reach the critical condition is shown in this figure as a progression
from a safe region in the center of the figure, representing trim values, and achieving the
critical condition in decreasing lengths of time as the control input increases. This initial
result is promising from the standpoint that the analysis was performed without assuming a
form of the boundary determined by the simulation runs, and the output contains the entire
spectrum from perfect safety to very little time to a crash.
Comparisons with the original detection threshold following the G-TIGT accident shows
that there is a discrepancy between this result that stems from the fact that helicopters are
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Figure 5.19: Time to critical roll angle
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Figure 5.20: 2-D model result
asymmetric vehicles, whereas the 2-D test case is a simplified, symmetric conceptual repre-
sentation of the helicopter on the ground. In addition, many other effects are not considered
in this simple case. The procedure was therefore repeated using a 3D dynamic model. The
components of this model were described in the section on nonlinear helicopter modeling.
The components of this model are well established in literature, with the primary differ-
ence being how the ground contact is modeled given the ability of the model to roll on the
ground, as opposed to the simple 2-D model. The mapping shown in Figure 5.21 differs
from the 2-D result in several important areas. One is that the response map is no longer
symmetric about the diagonal, due to the asymmetry of the vehicle. While the absolute
values of the first hitting time seem reasonably close to those obtained with the 2-D model,
there are regions in the corners of the domain which show an unexpected behavior. Though
the inputs are at the extremes of the domain, the time to reach the critical condition is
longer compared to some more moderate inputs. Two primary observations stem from the
experience of modeling tipover with dynamic models. The first is that boundaries can be
objectively defined ahead of time using a structured approach. The second is that to cap-
ture the full complexity of the helicopter response, a 2-D model may not be sufficient and
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Figure 5.21: 3-D model result
a detailed 3-D dynamic simulation is required. The 3-D model used for this test case is of
this type, but the final test case of this work and any real-world application would certainly
use a validated and industry standard simulation such as FLIGHTLAB.
This experiment is a continuation of the work in support of the Hypothesis to RQ3, with
an emphasis on detecting critical conditions prior to their explicit definition by an expert.
Additionally, the results differ between the two model fidelity levels, pointing to the need
to incorporate as many of the known physical phenomena and effects as is practical for any
given problem.
5.3.4 Implementation of dynamic monitoring boundary
The mappings shown in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 can be used directly as guidance to the
operator, but the main benefit is obtained by establishing monitoring limits based on the
time to reach a critical state. In the case of the 2-D analysis, this critical state is a rollover
of the vehicle (taken to be 60 degrees roll angle). This subsection discusses the manner
in which monitoring limits are established with regard to the operator’s preference and
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tolerance for risk, given the output of the dynamic simulation.
After the output is generated and the mapping between input conditions and the time-
based criterion is established, the results are represented using a neural network parametriza-
tion (discussed in section 5.4). This multi-dimensional surface can then be implemented
in a database in order to calculate the time to critical condition given an input vector from
the flight data. Figure 5.22 shows a subset of this parametrization at the nominal roll angle
and medium main rotor thrust (20kN) setting for the 2-D example, demonstrating accurate
representation of the actual surface (on the right) using the neural network (left surface).
This neural network representation of the input-output mapping can then be directly im-
Figure 5.22: NN fit for 2-D example
plemented in an HFDM database, providing an indication of the time to a critical state
given the input data. Individual operators might have a different tolerance for risk and
would prefer to be alerted with different times to the critical condition. The NN repre-
sentation of the input-output map can be used to establish monitoring limits, which when
exceeded by the relevant parameters would trigger an alert in the HFDM system. Figure
5.23 shows an example of how this type of limit would be established given two different
levels of the time based criterion. The neural network fit is sliced using level surfaces at
the operator-determined time. In this figure, two horizontal surfaces are shown at 8s and 3s
on the vertical axis, representing the alerting thresholds that might be set by two different
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operators. The resulting level curves (shown as thick black lines on the NN surface) would
be the typical monitoring threshold on the selected parameters that operators would use in
practice.
Figure 5.23: Establishing monitoring thresholds using a time criterion
The monitoring threshold is thus only used for alerting the operator, while the entire
mapping is available to the HFDM system to determine the extent of the breach. Further-
more, the monitoring thresholds shown by the level curves would normally be implemented
as static boundaries, defined and refined over time, but independent of the instantaneous
flight condition. Using the present approach a range of input conditions can be explored
and the entire set of resulting times to a critical limit to be represented using the neural
network.
As an example, the neural network representation of the time to rollover is developed
for a range of roll angles and thrust settings around the nominal condition. When an op-
erator sets an alerting level (in terms of time), the resulting boundaries resulting from the
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intersection of the mapping with the level curve at that alerting level account for this vari-
ation, and allow the boundary to change dynamically in response to control inputs or the
operating condition (roll angle in this example). Figure 5.24 shows curves set at 3 seconds
to rollover, as they shift in response to the present roll angle. Thus as the vehicle roll angle
increases, the indication of time to the critical boundary changes.
Figure 5.24: Variation of alerting threshold with roll angle
Figure 5.25 shows the variation of the 3 second thresholds with different main rotor
thrust levels. As a result of increased main rotor thrust, the region within the 3 second
boundary is reduced, meaning that smaller control inputs will result in a rollover as the
thrust is increased. This figure only shows 3 settings for clarity, but the entire range between
these values is represented using the neural network, as well as at all other roll angles and
control values represented in the simulated dataset.
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Figure 5.25: Variation of alerting threshold with roll angle
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5.4 Output representation
The output resulting from the dynamic simulation is a set of time histories for each mod-
eled parameter, which are then post-processed to determine the first hitting time for any
parameter of interest. If the inputs are known, and the result associated with each input can
be determined, then a mathematical representation of these relationships can be defined.
In the present investigations, the insight gained from the experimentation in section 5.3)
helped illustrate the type of result that could be expected from a simulation run for a spe-
cific operating condition. Given the response of many parameter and their associated time
histories, the mappings constructed in section 5.3 are the result of plotting any limit param-
eter against the input vector and monitoring the time to reach any one of them, resulting in
highly nonlinear surfaces. The nonlinearity partly arises out of the fact that the helicopter
can leave the ground and come in abrupt contact with it, in addition to all other nonlinear
aspects of the helicopter response.
Based on a review of existing methods, the Multi-Layer Perceptron was chosen as the
baseline neural network architecture to be used for the purpose of representing the simula-
tion result in a monitoring setting. This choice is motivated by the general ability of neural
networks to model complicated nonlinear aspects of the data, and their demonstrated use
in large datasets, some involving aviation data. This section evaluates neural networks as a
potential solution to represent the results of the dynamic simulation studies in a consistent
manner that lends itself to monitoring applications. If the simulation results can be ade-
quately represented by a neural network surrogate, monitoring of the hazards determined
in simulation would be enabled. Additionally, the operator would retain the ability to set a
critical time for monitoring purposes, and the requirements to store data would be reduced,
further increasing the potential benefits from the application of the DEMMoS method.
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5.4.1 Experimental setup
In Figure 5.26, four test surfaces are shown which were used in this evaluation. The sur-
faces were generated to represent the type of characteristics expected in the output data,
while limiting the number of input dimensions to 2 for visualization purposes. Each sur-
face can be described as follows:




exp (−(x1 − .1x2)2/(2σ2)) (5.19)
where σ = 3, and the independent variables x1,x2 were in the range [−15, 15] which
were normalized to [−2, 2] for the purpose of performing the neural network regres-
sion.
2. Smooth ridge with a sinusoidally varying mean as a case of a highly nonlinear sur-




exp (−(x1 − sin(x2))2/(2σ2)) (5.20)
3. Smooth Gaussian peaks for situations when the response is multi-modal.
y(x1, x2) =




where no correlation between the variables was assumed and the standard deviations
were equal at σx1 = σx2 = 3. The means for the two peaks were at [5, 6] and
[−10,−5] before normalization.
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where σx1 = 3, σx2 = 30, and µx1 = sin(x2/2), µx2 = 1. Note that the maximum
response y(x1, x2) was normalized to a maximum of 1.5 before being truncated at
1. The result is a complex surface that contains a sharp edges, a region at the top
with a perfectly flat surface, and a sinusoidal variation. This is typical of the type of
surfaces obtained from post-processing the simulation results.
These expressions were used to generate the training data, so that the different neural
network options investigated can be compared. The data were normalized to the same
[−2, 2] range for both input variables in all four cases. The data created using these surfaces
were used to train different neural network architectures to evaluate their applicability in
modeling the simulation outputs and gain a perspective on the characteristics of the models.
The next step is to select a neural network architecture, number of neurons, and to train
on the data. The network architecture involves several choices, including the activation
function used for the neurons and the number of layout of layers and connections. For
this investigation, a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) was selected due to the nonlinear and
complex nature of the outputs. Of the possible network topologies, a commonly used model
is the single hidden layer (SHL) network, with an input and an output layer connected to
the hidden layer. The layers are fully connected, meaning the nodes in each layer connect
to each node of the adjacent layer, but without any connections within a layer. In addition
to the SHL, multiple hidden layer architectures were also considered due to the increased
flexibility in representing complex surfaces, especially given the presence of edges and
other detailed features in the data.
The activation function is another design choice when creating a neural network. Based
on the problem, a different neural network may be appropriate. For example, in large
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(a) Smooth ridge with skew (b) Smooth ridge with sinusoidal mean
(c) Gaussian peaks (d) Truncated ridge with sinusoidal mean
Figure 5.26: Test surfaces
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networks with many hidden layers and nodes, the rectifier linear function is frequently used
because it offers a great deal of flexibility in representing structures in the data. This has
become especially useful in image analyses and deep learning tasks. For the problem in this
work, the datasets are much smaller and it is desirable to keep the number of neurons to a
low value, though there is no specific requirement. With fewer neurons, it is easier to obtain
smooth approximations using one of the other activation functions, such as the sigmoid or
tanh function. The sigmoid and tanh have a smooth derivative, which is used by training
algorithms such as gradient descent during backpropagation, a typical network training
method. However, the complex interplay between the characteristics of the dataset, the
network architecture and the target variables means that different applications may benefit
from a particular algorithm. This is especially important when there are numerous hidden
layers, as this usually leads to vanishing gradients which can stall the improvement during
network training. In this work, a quasi-Newton algorithm was used, which approximates
the gradient at each layer based on past values. The algorithm handles multiple layers well
in cases with a moderate number of input variables, which is certainly the case here. The
performance of a neural network can be measured using different metrics depending on the
application. In the present case, the intended use is regression, so standard metrics such as
sum of squared errors, mean sum of squared errors, R2 and qualitative plots are applicable.
The mean squared error is defined as:
MSE =
∑n
i=1((ŷi(x1, x2)− yi(x1, x2))2)
n
(5.23)
where ŷ(x1, x2) is the neural network estimate of the response y, and n is the number
of sampled points. The squared sum of errors is also used, which is then dependent on
sample size but is useful in the case where the sample sizes are equal, as is the case here.
It is also quite telling to examine the actual set of responses against the predicted values,
which may indicate properties in the data that could be useful in determining the network
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characteristics.
In summary, the experimental procedure for the evaluation of the neural network re-
gression approach is as follows:
• Step 1: Define test surfaces.
• Step 2: Determine range for the number of hidden nodes.
• Step 3: Perform network training using appropriate algorithm for each network size
(including [2-8-8-2-1]).
• Step 4: Validate fits using separate set of test data.
• Step 5: Analyze fit metrics and visually assess the regression result.
• Step 6: Select best network architecture.
In this analysis, the SHL was evaluated for goodness of fit in the standard bias-variance
trade off. It is reasonable to expect that an optimum number of nodes can be identified.
However, it is clear from the results that the MLP with multiple hidden layers is a superior
candidate to the SHL for regressing complicated surfaces such as those output from the
dynamic simulation and first hitting time estimation.
5.4.2 Analysis of neural network fit characteristics
The first investigation is to compare the ability of a SHL neural network to approximate
the surfaces shown in Figure 5.26. The tanh activation function was used in each case.
The alternatives were also briefly evaluated but it was quickly determined that tanh was
appropriate for the types of surfaces expected as output from the dynamic simulation and
that were created as test cases for this experiment. To perform the experiment, the number
of hidden nodes was varied and the fit metrics were tracked. Each result is visualized to
provide a perspective on the types of surface features that are fit easily by the network,
and to potentially indicate aspects which would require refinement. The number of nodes
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was varied between 1 and 10, along with an additional case with 100 nodes. The goal is
to establish whether the network fit is improving with increasing numbers of nodes, and if
not, then to propose changes that will improve the fit.
Test case 1: Smooth ridge
The first case is a smooth Gaussian ridge with a slight skew in order to make it multivari-
ate. If the mean of the ridge is held at a constant x1 value, the regression would become
one-dimensional, and the goal in this investigation is to evaluate the ability to approximate
multi-dimensional surfaces. The number of nodes was varied and excellent fits were ob-
tained using all test networks. Figure 5.27 shows the original surface in red with points
generated by the fitted neural network. Only five hidden nodes were used, and the resulting
points are almost indistinguishable from the actual surface.
Figure 5.27: Smooth ridge fitted with 5 hidden nodes
In addition to inspection, the prediction can be visualized by looking at the actual-by-
predicted plot, which shows a near-perfect fit. Indeed for the smooth ridge constructed
using a single Gaussian and a linearly varying mean, the SHL neural network provides
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very accurate fits with fewer than 2 nodes or more. The reason for this outcome is that the
activation function can easily approximate some of the features of a ridge, especially since
this particular case is very close to being one-dimensional. A single tanh node cannot
capture the surface, but with two nodes the fit is already close to perfect. This can be
visualized by summing the contributions of two tanh functions, one of which has been
reversed and shifted - which is approximately what is achieved during the training of the
network.
Figure 5.28: Estimated versus actual response with 5 hidden nodes
The training held back 10% of the available data for testing use during the training
of the network. However, the full application of the neural networks will use results from
dynamic simulation using FLIGHTLAB, where the primary data will not contain redundant
data points. Holding back any proportion of points for validation may cause the training
to miss important features of the multi-dimensional surface, especially in the presence of
edges. For the smooth ridge in this first case, this is not a problem, but it was observed to be
an issue in the following cases. A separate dataset validation dataset is therefore generated
over the same range of input variables for testing purposes.
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Figure 5.29: Residuals for smooth ridge with 5 hidden nodes
Figure 5.30: MSE with varying network size
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Figure 5.30 shows the mean squared error of the neural network fit across several net-
work sizes in terms of numbers of hidden nodes. Errors for both training and test datasets
are shown. The graph shows a clear trend toward an optimum at a moderate number of
nodes, but the exact optimum is not shown or calculated during this test due to the fact that
the fits is adequate for essentially any of the tested network sizes. The last data point is for a
network with 100 hidden nodes, which has poorer performance than the smaller networks.
In addition to the range of single hidden networks, a network was trained with three
hidden layers, indicated as a red point and “x” mark on the graph. This is a [2−8−8−2−1]
network, meaning it contains 2 input nodes and a single output node, and three hidden
nodes of size 8,8 and 2. The architecture is the same as the SHL network, with each
layer fully connected to the adjacent layers. It is included in this plot for comparison,
but the reason for its use is based on the experience with the more complicated surfaces
in the other test cases. The smooth ridge test surface is easily approximated using a low
number of nodes, and the additional complexity of the deeper network has not generated
any improvement in the goodness of fit, though the error is still within the range of the
other results and with an objectively small value.
Test case 2: Ridge with sinusoidal mean
This surface contains a sinusoidal variation in the mean of the Gaussian used to construct it,
leading to a “squiggly” ridge which is more complicated than the smooth ridge. The same
argument regarding the ability of two tanh neurons to approximate a smooth Gaussian
ridge points to the need for a much higher number of nodes if the variability of this surface
is to be accurately represented. Therefore the SHL network is expected to yield a poor
approximation of the surface. This is confirmed by inspecting the result of the neural
network training for several hidden layer sizes. Figure 5.31 shows the result of training a
SHL network with 10 nodes. It is evident that the points generated by the neural network
do not capture the variability of the surface in the x2 direction. The neural network output
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resembles the smooth Gaussian ridge of the previous test case, which may be useful if the
features causing the sinusoidal variation were due to noise or were otherwise undesirable.
This is because to capture each of the smaller ridges and valley, the network has to contain
a sufficient number of nodes. The inspection of the surface fitted with a network containing
100 hidden nodes shows that this is not the case, as can be seen in Figure 5.32. The points
generated by the SHL network pass through the actual surface with little improvement over
the 10-node case.
The experience with the SHL of various sizes for this test case points to the need for
either a very large network, or an alternative approach. Based on the fact that the network
reconstructs features by combining the outputs from different neurons, a deeper network
with three hidden layers was investigated. The choice was made based on the ability of
this network to approximate the test case surfaces very well, as well as the insight that a
single layer approximates the average response. In principle, the additional layers operate
on the output from the first hidden layer, which has extracted the “smooth ridge” part of
the response, and each additional layer operates on components from that first processing
of the input data. Another reason for this choice was the observation in several of the test
cases that splitting a network of a certain size into a network with fewer neurons but more
layers had a markedly increased ability to capture complex shapes in the test surface. This
behavior occurs because of the complex features generated by the multiplication of tanh
responses from earlier neurons in consecutive layers.
The comparison of the performance of the SHL neural network of different sizes shows
a similar trend as that of the first test case, though with a much larger error. In the case of
the sinuously varying ridge, there was never a case where the SHL outperformed the MLP
network with additional hidden layers. Additionally, increasing the SHL network size from
10 hidden nodes to 100 hidden nodes did not lead to obvious overfitting as in the case of
the smooth ridge, indicating that a much higher number of neurons is perhaps needed to
obtain adequate goodness of fit using the single layer network.
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Figure 5.31: Sinusoidal ridge with 10 node SHL
Figure 5.32: Sinusoidal ridge with 100 node SHL
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Figure 5.33: Sinusoidal ridge with [2-8-8-2-1] MLP
Figure 5.34: Sinusoidal ridge - MSE of different neural networks
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Test case 3 and 4: Gaussian peak and truncated ridge
The test cases were constructed to approximate the types of surfaces observed as output
from the 2-D dynamic simulation, and are contain many of the features observed in the
initial results. One of these features is the truncation of the surface at the maximum value
of time experienced during the simulation run. This is an arbitrary truncation and several
approaches were considered, such as domain segmentation and smoothing. The flexibility
of the present approach, however, allows this type of surface to be adequately captured
using a neural network with a few hidden layers of a moderate number of nodes. Another
feature seen in initial simulation results is the possibility that an output surface may be
multi-modal, which is approximated by the surface with two Gaussian peaks. If the MLP
network can fit these types of surfaces, then it can be reasonably expected that the final
output from the simulation using FLIGHTLAB can be modeled using a similar approach.
The results of the structured training of SHL networks with increasing number of hid-
den nodes showed a similar result as the other test cases. Using 100 hidden neurons, the
approximation of the truncated ridge still fails to capture the sharp edges at the top of the
ridge, as shown in Figure 5.35. Further investigation was not performed for even higher
number of hidden neurons, though it is certain that at a high enough number the fit will
improve. This is potentially troublesome if the number of training points is considered. As
the number of hidden nodes in a SHL network begins approaching the number of samples
in the training set, the network can “memorize” the training data and fit it perfectly. To
avoid overfitting, the number of hidden neurons must be kept comparatively lower, along
with ensuring proper validation through testing on unobserved validation samples.
Figures 5.36 and 5.37 show the performance of the networks of various size, with both
training error and test error (on a separate validation set) shown on the same graph. In both
cases the trend is toward progressively smaller error with increasing numbers of hidden
nodes in the SHL, suggesting that a higher number of nodes would yield adequate results
in this case. However, in both cases, the [2-8-8-2-1] MLP outperforms the SHL network.
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Figure 5.35: Truncated ridge fitted with 100 neuron SHL network
In addition to the error metrics, it is important to ensure that none of the relevant features
of the original data are omitted in the model.
Figures 5.38 and 5.39 are fitted with the same [2-8-8-2-1] MLP network architecture
that was able to accurately represent the surface in the second test case. It is evident from
the figures that the neural network output contains all pertinent features of the data, includ-
ing the sharp edges of the truncated ridge which are usually very troublesome for other
regression approaches and frequently require segmentation of the input domain.
With the analysis shown in this section, it can be concluded that the MLP provide much
greater flexibility than the SHL in fitting complicated dataset. The goodness of fit metrics
for the 2-8-8-2-1 MLP consistently perform as well or better than the SHL, in some cases
by an order of magnitude or more, as can be seen in the additional performance metric
results contained in Appendix B.
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Figure 5.36: MSE - Truncated surface
Figure 5.37: MSE - Gaussian peak surface
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Figure 5.38: Truncated ridge fitted with [2-8-8-2-1] MLP network
Figure 5.39: Gaussian peaks fitted with [2-8-8-2-1] MLP network
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5.4.3 Summary
It is shown through examples and by consideration of the feature construction mechanism
in a feedforward neural network such as the MLP, that it is very difficult to know ahead of
time what type of network is appropriate for any given data set. The informal guidelines
many practitioners adopt regarding the relationship of the number of input variables to the
appropriate number of hidden neurons is not a valid criterion to select an appropriate net-
work, except to avoid overfitting. The appropriate network is usually problem-specific, and
through the examples in this section it was demonstrated that in addition to the number of
inputs, the features present in the data have a marked effect on the number of hidden nodes
that yield the best fit. Given the ability of the MLP network to perform with similar error
metrics as the best SHL network in the simplest case, and drastically outperform the SHL
in all other test cases, it is concluded that a MLP neural network with at least two hidden
layers will be needed to fit the final dataset output from simulations with FLIGHTLAB, if
these outputs also contain complex features similar to those in the test cases. This analy-
sis gives a partial support to the Hypothesis for research question 5, which will be further
supported if the actual FLIGTHLAB simulations can be similarly well represented using a
neural networks.
5.5 Test case using FLIGHTLAB
The goal for this methodology is to provide a repeatable approach to determining opera-
tional limits based on the physics of the vehicle of interest, so that objective and physically
relevant detection thresholds may be utilized in an HFDM system. The reasoning is that if
the result will be a much closer approximation to the true operational boundary than the cur-
rent style of HFDM events, which are frequently defined on a subset of the relevant param-
eters. This observation is based on a survey of the types of events used in industry, as well
as the particular case of autorotation practice examined using a condition-specific model of
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the vehicle power in steady-state longitudinal flight. By providing a closer approximation
to the true boundary, false alerts can be reduced, especially if additional derived parame-
ters or external data are used in conjunction with the model. Another component of the
model-based approach is the use of dynamic models to develop detection thresholds proac-
tively by virtually operating the vehicle until a failure is experienced. This was shown to
be possible with a simplified dynamic model of the tipover during taxi, where boundaries
were identified and related to the control inputs. If this type of approach is exercised, it
may be possible to observe virtual failures that have not yet been experienced in real-life
operations, and make appropriate modifications to any monitoring system so that flight op-
erations with increased risk of the simulated failures can be detected. In the present state
of practice, these types of events are often missed, usually due to poorly defined or non-
existent detection thresholds. Thus even condition-specific dynamic simulations offer an
advantage over the trial-and-error approach to the definition of traditional HFDM events.
The condition-specific models examined in the previous test cases are only valid for use
at a narrow set of operational conditions, and consider a subset of the full set of parameters
that might affect the operation of the vehicle. While offering an improvement over stan-
dard HFDM events, a condition-specific model results in a simplified detection boundary
that may miss important effects. Whether these effects are operationally significant or not
depends on the condition being investigated, but in the general case a full flight envelope
model would be preferred to a condition-specific model. To fulfill this need and to show-
case the approach on an specific vehicle, the present experiment examines the condition of
tipover during taxi using the nonlinear dynamic simulation FLIGHTLAB.
5.5.1 FLIGHTLAB R© helicopter simulation
FLIGHTLAB R© is an industry-standard rotorcraft simulator used for both piloted and en-
gineering analyses, and has a component library which allows an investigator to choose a
suitable level of fidelity. The rotor rotor is modeled as an articulated rotor with flapping
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and lagging degrees of freedom for each blade. The forces and moments due to the main
rotor are calculated using the blade-element approach. A three-state inflow model is used
for the main rotor, and aerodynamic lookup tables are used for sectional airfoil properties
and fuselage aerodynamics, as well as any other aerodynamic surface. The tail rotor is
modeled with a uniform inflow, which has been shown to be an adequate model for the
low-frequency analyses performed here. The model uses a rigid fuselage, and a simpli-
fied engine model. The present work utilized the included UH-60A model which has been
extensively validated and utilized directly or as a baseline for a variety of flying qualities,
dynamic interface and external load studies. This simulator has been used and validated in
numerous research efforts, particularly with regard to the standard UH-60A model provided
with the software.
Wan[157] used this software as a “black box” simulation to develop an adaptive con-
troller. Bottasso[102, 158, 159] created a simulation environment that interfaces with exter-
nal simulators, such as FLIGHTLAB, and performs maneuvers parametrized using the tar-
get in a cost function of an optimal control problem. These studies used Model-Predictive
Control, where the controller was optimized without direct access to the underlying equa-
tions of the flight simulation model.
[160] performed slung load analyses using FLIGHTLAB and introduced several exten-
sions aimed at accommodating the slung load itself. The vehicle model was of the same
type used in the present work, and the result The FLIGHTLAB model is one of the industry
standard models for analyses where a high level of physical modeling fidelity is required,
such as when the vehicle response is to be predicted without extensive use of flight data.
The model has been shown to yield good agreement with instrumented tests, especially
in the on-axis response. On-axis response is the behavior of a primary degree of freedom
in response to the control input that affects it most directly, such as the roll response to a
lateral stick input. The off-axis response is not always captured with the same degree of
agreement, though extensions such as wake-skew have been shown to improve the corre-
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lation. Further model refinement beyond the standard FLIGHLAB model is beyond the
scope of the present work, and is a prime candidate for future investigation if high-quality
flight data from real-world operations becomes more readily available.
The results of the analysis should clearly indicate the types of operation that would lead
to increased risk - and can readily be used in communication with the operators and flight
crews for training purposes. To fully realize the benefit of the model-based monitoring
scheme, the simulation results would have to be represented within the HFDM system
which operates on flight data from real operations. Because of the more complex nature
of limit boundaries generated with nonlinear simulation, simple parameter thresholds are
usually not adequate for reliable detection. The neural network regression approach to
representing the simulation output in a monitoring system is demonstrated here with the
results of the nonlinear dynamic simulation of ground taxi operations.
5.5.2 Experimental setup
The final test case is used to test the DEMMoS methodology in a more realistic setting using
an industry standard nonlinear flight dynamic model. The steps followed are as described
in the development of DEMMoS:
• Step 1: Determine initial condition and define the input space.
The initial conditions are selected to be in the proximity to the type of behavior
that is under investigation. In this study, ground maneuvering was investigated, so
the starting condition was a steady ground roll at about 10kts forward speed. The
controls were trimmed to maintain this state, and a frozen snapshot of the simulator
state was used to begin each simulation run.
• Step 2: Define model.
This investigation utilized the model provided with the FLIGHTLAB simulator, so
this step is complete at the outset. In a more general case, the process would be-
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gin with the development or acquisition of an adequate model. The only significant
modification to the generic model was the addition of several contact points along
the extremities of the fuselage and the rotor. These were in the form of additional
landing gears which when compressed would indicate a collision with the ground.
A secondary purpose of the additional contact points is to ensure the simulation can
continue running after a contact with the ground has occurred and to allow post-
processing of the entire data set. A more complete description of the exact imple-
mentation can be found in Appendix C.
• Step 3: Generate a range of control input vectors.
The inputs to the simulation are the pilot’s controls, specifically the lateral cyclic, tail
rotor pedal and collective inputs. The longitudinal cyclic has little effect on the actual
rollover, so was initialized at the trim value and was not used as an input variable for
this experiment. The exact values used are in the range [−30, 30] percent for both the
lateral cyclic and tail rotor pedal, and [−10, 5] percent for the collective. Because of
the highly nonlinear nature of the helicopter response, coupled with the derivation of
a time-based risk metric, typical DOE techniques for reducing the number of simula-
tions that need to be run could not be directly applied. Therefore the full set of input
variable combinations were analyzed.
• Step 4: Run simulations using the control inputs determined in Step 3.
MATLAB R© was used to define the individual test cases and to pass the necessary
inputs to FLIGHTLAB. The lateral cyclic and tail rotor pedal were evaluated in 2
percent increments, whereas the collective was evaluated at 5 percent intervals. The
simulation is operated in an open-loop fashion according to the sweep approach, with
each control being fixed for the majority of the simulation. An initial half second
period is common to all cases, so that all control inputs are applied within the duration
of the simulation.
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• Step 5: Analyze the resulting trajectories for ground contact and any other limit
parameter of interest.
The resulting trajectories may contain any number of output states selected by the
analyst. In the present study, the unintended contact with the ground was the primary
consideration, so the additional contact points were the limit parameters of interest.
However, other parameters may be easily investigated, such as the vehicle’s speed,
sideslip, or yaw rate, which are considered to be significant during ground maneu-
vering. Other simulation outputs, like the moments generated by the rotor, flapping
angles, load factor and inflow states are also available and may be useful at other
flight conditions. Each trajectory is post-processed to identify the first hitting time
for the limit parameter, which is then mapped to the simulation inputs. The result
of this step is a multi-dimensional grid with values of the time-to-critical condition
criterion associated with each data point. The expected result is that the vehicle re-
mains safe for moderate control inputs, and that an increase in risk/decrease in time
to critical conditions is identified for more extreme inputs.
• Step 6: Perform regression of the first hitting time map.
The results from the previous steps may be used directly by operators, training per-
sonnel and HFDM analysts as a source of information regarding the operational sce-
nario investigated using the simulation. HFDM-type events could potentially benefit
from having an objective data set available to guide the definition of monitoring
boundaries. However, incorporating the data into a monitoring system requires the
information generated through the simulation and post-processing effort to be tran-
scribed. This step is accomplished using the MLP neural network with several hidden
layers. The network of choice is trained on the full set of multi-dimensional data, and
a separate dataset generated using different settings for the control inputs is used to
validate the fit. Some trial and error may be required to obtain adequate fits if the first
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hitting time response is significantly more complicated than the case used during the
development of the MLP regression approach.
At the conclusion of step 6, the trained network would be ready for use in a monitor-
ing environment. The present test case differs from an industrial-scale application in the
reduced number of input variables considered and the number of operational conditions
analyzed. A successful demonstration of this approach would mean that monitoring levels
may be defined in a fairly accurate manner and potentially ahead of any adverse occurrences
in actual operation. The ability to directly implement the results of such an analysis may
contribute to the improvement of operational safety by allowing more timely and reliable
detection of adverse conditions in helicopter flight operations.
5.5.3 Analysis of tipover risk
A summary of the experimental matrix is shown in Table 5.2, which represents more than
10 hours of operational time originating at the same steady forward taxi condition of 10
kts. Following the initial trimming of the vehicle, the trimmed state is used as an input for
all consequent simulations, where the vehicle is allowed to operate for a specified length of
time in response to the applied control inputs.
Table 5.2: Test cases for tipover simulation
input parameter range no of levels
lateral cyclic [-30, 30] 31




Total flight time 10.68 hours
The model was set at a gross weight of 17000lb for all of the investigations, and the
analysis was performed at sea level. Figure 5.40 shows the cyclic and pedal inputs for
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the simulations. The same cyclic and pedal inputs were simulated with each of the four
different values for the collective input.
Figure 5.40: Cyclic and pedal control inputs
Figures 5.41 and 5.42 are outputs from the nonlinear simulation. In Figure 5.41 the
paths are generated for the lowest collective setting used in this analysis, with the first sub-
set of trajectories showing the normal response. These trajectories are “safe” in the sense
than at no point was the ground contacted by the contact points around the perimeter of
the rotor. We can see a range of possible outcomes, including steady taxi maintaining the
original heading and progressively tighter turns as the control inputs are increased. In this
the second part of the figure, the trajectories which experienced a rollover event are shown.
The black portion of the trajectories represent the path before the failure occurred, with
the post-contact path shown in a light gray line. While the simulation would normally be
stopped at this point, the paths are included to show the much greater spread in final posi-
tions achieved in these cases. While the post-impact simulation cannot be considered valid,
the dispersion is indicative of the increase in velocity when the helicopter tips over without
an appropriate reaction from the pilot. This characteristic is the primary driver behind the
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dynamic rollover, a particular case of rollover events when the vehicle is constrained on the
ground while the main rotor is accelerating the vehicle along the ground.
rollover
spinout
Figure 5.41: Safe and failed ground tracks
The same graphs shows several selected trajectories that are interesting because they
show the three subsets of rollover events experienced during the simulation. The upper and
lower trajectories marked in red are representative of a typical rollover during ground taxi.
Pilots initiate ground taxi maneuvers using a combination of tail rotor and main rotor inputs,
where the yaw is primarily the result of tail rotor application. The purpose of using lateral
cyclic during ground taxi turns is to cancel the moment generated by the tail rotor about
the landing gear contact points with the ground. In cases where inputs are cross-coupled, a
rollover is likely to occur, as shown in the plot. This is not the only hazard, however. The
trajectory in the center of the figure appears to initially follow the original heading, before
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finally heading away. A subset of the trajectories did not immediately develop large roll
angles, but instead generated substantial yaw rates that caused the helicopter to spin out.
This type of response is a potential hazard during ground taxi, especially with collective
settings closer to that required for takeoff.
Figure 5.42: Detection of ground collision
Figure 5.42 shows one of the limit parameters used to determine the safety of a trajec-
tory. In this particular instance, a rollover occurred and the contact point is deflected as
a result. The vertical dashed line indicates the instant in time when the contact occurred.
This detection is performed for all simulation runs and the value is related to the moment
of control input application at t = 0.5s. This time to a critical condition is then used as a
measure of the risk associated with a particular combination of control inputs. The result
of performing the entire set of simulation runs is a set of surfaces where the outcome of
each run is mapped to the control input grid used in the simulation. Figure 5.43 is one such
surface, generated for a collective cyclic setting of -10%. The central part of the surface is
flat, corresponding to the control settings which did not result in contact with the ground.
At this collective setting, this is a rather large portion of the input space. As more extreme
control inputs are applied, the vehicle comes in contact with the ground, with a trend toward
faster rollover as the control input is increased. This is represented by the sharp drop-offs
in the surface from the nominal value (determined by the simulation run time) to values as
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low as 2 seconds for the most extreme inputs. The foreground portion at negative cyclic and
tail rotor inputs correspond to a spinout, which results in contact with the ground but with
a slight delay. As the collective is increased, it is expected that the region of the control
Figure 5.43: Time to ground collision for -10 % collective
input space which results in a rollover is expanded. This is shown in Figure 5.44. The flat
portion of the surface corresponding to safe input values has markedly contracted, and the
overall response is faster as evident by the lower values of time to contact at the extremes of
the control input space. These and two additional surfaces are shown in Appendix A. The
access to this type of result would be beneficial to an operator for the analysis of a potential
hazard as well as for monitoring purposes. The part of the surface where the drop off oc-
curs from safe to progressively riskier control inputs can be used as a basis for establishing
threshold in HFDM safety events. A more complete approach is to collect all simulation
outputs, in the form of these input-output maps, and generate an expression which can be
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Figure 5.44: Time to ground collision for -5 % collective
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evaluated within the monitoring system. An MLP neural network was fitted to the output
data shown in this section. The similarity between the test cases used in the development
regression approach using the MLP and the current results ensured adequate goodness of
fit metrics.
Figure 5.45: 2-8-8-2-1 MLP fit of -10 % collective surface
Figure 5.45 shows reasonable agreement between the original surface on the right and
the modeled surface on the left. All pertinent features are captured, including the flat top
and the three regions with increasing risk of rollover. The mean of the error between the two
surfaces across all settings for the collective is close to zero, at -2.7e-5. The standard error
is within 3% though the presence of isolated outliers is a potential concern. This network
is not the final solution in the sense that it is optimized but it is a clear demonstration of the
potential to readily implemented complex model-based metrics in a monitoring system with
computational requirements similar to what is currently used in practice. Using the method
demonstrated in this experiment, an operator or HFDM system analyst could identify a
condition of interest and perform the requisite simulation to yield a dataset such as the first
hitting time metric. These results can then be directly implemented in a database or used
for communicating information regarding safety hazards or training.
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5.5.4 Summary
This methodology used in this work and this experiment are a showcase of an approach
to use physics-based models in the context of HFDM. Therefore this final experiment is
intended to demonstrate the process that begins with a vehicle model and knowledge about
the region of interest where the investigation would be performed, and results in a set
of analysis results that can be readily implemented in a monitoring environment. The
simulation is expected to detect critical conditions, and determine where in the input space
these conditions occur. Using the time-based metric, risk can then be represented as the
time required to reach the critical condition. Finally, the ability to represent the entire set
of first-hitting-time results, as opposed to a single level curve at a pre-determined time to a
critical condition means that the operator will have the flexibility to determine when their
operation should trigger an alert. The operators would thus retain the ability to fine tune the
detection thresholds based on their own tolerance for risk or the nature of the operation. At
the same time, the analysis done ahead of time would enable the direct comparison of flight
data coming from different operators, which has not been the case when operators have
different HFDM events from other operators. This aspect of the model-based approach is
especially important for large-scale monitoring systems where data from many different





Rotorcraft possess unique flight capabilities which make them well suited for a variety of
challenging missions, including operations in hazardous conditions and under significant
time constraints. Unfortunately, the safety record of helicopter operations is an order of
magnitude worse than that of commercial airlines, which has prompted the rotorcraft in-
dustry to investigate strategies for safety improvement. Among the safety approaches taken
in industry, Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) stands out as an effective means of
identifying and mitigating emerging safety concerns before the trend results in an accident.
Unlike traditional post-accident analyses of flight data, HFDM and similar monitoring sys-
tems operate by accessing, analyzing and acting on flight data recorded during regular
flight operations. By comparing flight data to a set of condition indicators, known as safety
events or exceedances, HFDM systems have demonstrated the ability to alert operators of
unsafe occurrences, and provide objective data in support of mitigation strategies. How-
ever, when safety events are poorly defined or based on incomplete knowledge, the ability
of HFDM systems to detect safety hazards is diminished, with reduced potential to help
prevent avoidable accidents. As a consequence, the condition indicators used in HFDM
require continuous refinement to achieve adequate detection performance. Additionally,
the detection of any adverse condition can only be achieved if pertinent safety events have
been defined beforehand. Mitigating this dependence on pre-defined notions of deteriorat-
ing safety has been the focus of several recent studies on the use of flight data for safety
enhancements in aviation.
The first question answered by this work was what approaches are available to cre-
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ate this enhancement. The answer to this question was obtained through a survey of the
available literature, with a general categorization into purely data-driven and model-driven
methods. Of these the model-driven methods were preferred given the reduced burden on
collecting and analyzing data. In addition, the addition of physics-based models is benefi-
cial for the statistical approaches to enhance the analysis by providing relevant features on
which the statistical approach could operate.
The second question that followed immediately from this first choice was intended
to identify the manner in which a physics-based model can be obtained or created given
the needs and constraints of their intended use in HFDM. Based on a review of types of
conditions which are relevant from a safety standpoint, the two primary approaches used in
literature are system identification and modeling from first-principles. The second method
was selected, again due to the reduced reliance on high-quality flight data and the greater
predictive ability if the models are defined appropriately.
This led to the formulation of the DEMMoS methodology, and the remainder of the
work was concerned with identifying the components of the method along with demon-
strating it on a set of relevant safety hazards. Since the physics-based modeling approach
was chosen, a natural next question was to identify the types of effects and components
of the model which would provide insight into the conditions of interest. This led to the
hypothesis for RQ3 which stated that if the model contains the relevant effects, its appli-
cation within HFDM would enable the definition of safety events with improved detection
performance. It was found through experimentation that even fairly simple models can ap-
proximate the limit boundaries for narrowly defined conditions, and improve the detection
performance over the existing detection thresholds, thus offering support for the hypothesis
associated with RQ3. The DEMMoS method using static models was demonstrated using
simulated and actual flight data in the detection of VRS and for autorotation monitoring.
The primary result, in the case of autorotation monitoring with actual flight data, is that
false alerts and missed detections were mitigated through improved correlation between
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the modified event boundary and the instantaneous flight condition. The method was also
demonstrated with a dynamic model on a ground maneuver that has produced accidents in
the past. Both 2-D and 3-D models were used, leading to the insight that despite the utility
of simpler models, it is desirable to retain as much of the mathematical formulation of the
vehicle physics for all investigations. Modeling with a more general dynamic model using
the dynamic sweep propagation method revealed the ability to identify boundaries through
time-domain simulation, yielding both a value for risk in terms of time to reach the critical
condition as well as its location in the input domain.
In addition to the physics-based modeling, the experiments included an investigation
of several approaches to manipulate the simulation in cases where dynamic simulation is
required. Several approaches were identified based on a survey of the literature and it was
hypothesized that the chosen alternatives can elicit the results of a baseline optimal ap-
proach without pre-specifying the form of the response. This hypothesis is supported with
certain caveats. Specifically, the randomized control input approach was shown to explore
the operational space, visiting every possible trajectory as the number of trajectories in-
crease. However, given the need to map these results to the input conditions and simulation
variables, it was found necessary to use a fixed-input control scheme, which can be thought
of as a single segment from the alternatives investigated during the experiments. When iter-
ated over a range of initial conditions, the discrete sweep allows the operational space to be
investigated while preserving the input-output mapping. Iteration is necessary to build up a
set of training data for the final component of DEMMoS, the mathematical representation
of the simulation outputs in order to enable monitoring within a typical HFDM database.
This investigation provided an answer to the methodological concern of how the simulation
should be propagated to elicit a response without a priori definitions.
The fact that DEMMoS can be executed with static and dynamic models leads to two
different manners in which the outputs are processed. In the case of static and condition
specific models, the output is designed to correspond to the desired detection scheme. In
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case of dynamic simulation, and given the complex nature of the helicopter response and
the similarly nonlinear risk metric results, it was essential to develop an efficient way of
implementing the results in a monitoring framework. It was hypothesized that neural net-
works of the feedforward type with multiple hidden layers would perform well given the
insight into the type of simulation results that can be obtained given a dynamic helicopter
model and a time-based safety criterion. An investigation was performed which offered
support to this hypothesis by obtaining acceptable fits using the proposed neural network
architecture. Specifically, a multiple-hidden-layer network was identified as an acceptable
general model to represent the results in a form which is conducive to implementation in a
monitoring database. After sufficient simulations are completed, this approach would allow
online monitoring of hazards which have been identified in simulation with the potential
to detect adverse flight conditions before they are observed in practice and thus enhancing
operational safety.
Finally, the DEMMoS method was demonstrated using the industry-standard simula-
tion FLIGHTLAB R© for the same condition of a helicopter maneuvering on the ground.
After 10+hrs of simulated operation on the ground, regions of the input domain were iden-
tified where the expected ground rollover occurs. Furthermore, a secondary failure mecha-
nism was observed in the form of a spinout, which was not specified as an a priori target.
The time-domain results were post-processed to relate the time to any of the ground-contact
type failures to the input domain, and a regression was performed using the identified model
from the last experiment. The approach generated adequate fits, which capture the com-
plicated form of the response and allow evaluation at interior points of the input domain,
allowing monitoring of flight conditions contained in the simulation inputs. The method
is envisioned as a support module to a HFDM system in that the simulation component
would be iterated to provide data for conditions with known associated hazards or where
operational data is scarce, eventually covering a large portion of the operational space.
Overall, the ability to define monitoring metrics by observing virtual failures and the
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improved detection enabled through condition-specific models provides an answer to the
primary objective of generating improvement over the current state of practice. The results
provided are not static, but can be generated for a range of conditions while enabling the
operator to set their individual alert levels. Below are some conclusions and recommenda-
tions based on the experience in developing this method. Conclusions:
• Model-based metrics designed to track safety conditions can improve the perfor-
mance of HFDM systems
• Dynamic simulation can be utilized in a structured approach to develop boundaries
on flight parameters for safety monitoring
• Unified representation of risk in terms of time to reach a critical (or undesirable)
condition
• Output is generated for a range of parameters that may be of interest, and the entire
spectrum of results from safe to progressively riskier operation can be obtained
• Reproduced known results and have a methodology in place to perform investigations
throughout the flight envelope
• There is a clear path to extend the method to a more “exploratory” approach provided
sufficient computational resources are available.
6.2 Recommendations and future work
• Parallel computation
The analysis was limited by the number of cases that can be investigated due to the
lack of a parallel computational capability on the host server. To enable parallel exe-
cution of this methodology, specifically of the simulation component, an executable
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version of the flight simulation would have to be generated and then executed as sep-
arate processes. The present implementation uses FLIGHTLAB, which has the func-
tionality to generate a standalone executable, though special licensing is required.
Additionally, the simulation is executed to generate a number of independent trajec-
tories, which could all be executed in parallel. Each trajectory is assembled from
segments simulated for a subset of the overall time horizon, and these would have
to be executed sequentially. The number of individual simulations would rise with
the number of segments in a trajectory, but the duration required to simulate each
segment would be correspondingly reduced.
• Simulation models
The models used in this thesis were wide-ranging in their manner of execution and
purpose. The simpler models were used to illustrate the benefits of using a model-
based approach, and should be utilized in an HFDM setting. The dynamic models
contain the same physical models as the steady state models, though allow the com-
putation of the temporal component which is useful as a unified risk metric.
• System identification revisited
The models used in this thesis were built up component-wise, which places a burden
on the analyst to manually build and validate models. The results should provide
a motivation to enhance recording capability across helicopter fleets, which would
enable automatic identification of model parameters and validation of the resulting
models. Automating this process would provide an advantage to the method pre-
sented in this thesis by improving the modeling capability. This would be especially
useful in capturing the inherent variation of operating rotorcraft at various sizes and
in different missions that may be partly to blame for the detection problems cited in
HFDM literature.
• Neural Network optimization
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The selection of an optimal neural network configuration was beyond the scope of
the present work, but it is a large area of research with promising results to date.
The most common approaches to optimizing (though optimum can hardly be guar-
anteed) is to start with excessively large networks that are pruned, or use a genetic
algorithm to evaluate random mutations of a candidate population. Both of these ap-
proaches would help automate the process of transcribing the simulation results for
implementation purposes.
• Investigate additional known hazards for specific rotorcraft
This work investigated generally known hazards as well as a tipover hazard which
is experienced by helicopters with wheeled landing gear and a high-mounted tail ro-
tor. Operational experience has shown that some types of helicopters exhibit peculiar
flight characteristics which may have been inadequately addressed by standard guid-
ance materials. A well-known example is the case of mast bumping on helicopters
with teetering rotor designs, which has been experienced in significant numbers on
Robinson helicopters. The company flight manuals list several Safety Notices (SNs)
that directly address this occurrence and advise pilots to avoid low-G maneuvering,
flight into turbulent air and low rotor RPM. Proper recovery techniques are now part
of pilot training, but the cause and conditions that could trigger a mast bumping event
are not being monitored extensively, and in most cases the post-accident cause of a
mast-bump is listed as ”undetermined”.
A recent article titled Undetermined Reasons[161] reiterates the continued need for
improved understanding, monitoring and mitigation of the mast-bumping phenomenon,
as evidenced by the occurrence of several accidents of this type in recent years, and






The demonstration using FLIGHTLAB used a range of simulation inputs each with a cor-
responding trajectory. The trajectories were post-processed to determine the presence of
a critical condition, which in this case was contact with the ground with parts of the he-
licopter other than the landing gear, and a relationship between the simulation inputs and
the simulation outcome was established. Thus a value of the time to come in contact with
the ground was established for every input vector. Figures A.1,A.2, A.3 and A.4 show the
mappings between the collective and pedal inputs and the time to come in contact with the
ground starting from the straight and level taxi condition.
Figure A.1: Time to ground collision for -10 % collective
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Figure A.2: Time to ground collision for -5 % collective
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Figure A.3: Time to ground collision for nominal collective
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Figure A.4: Time to ground collision for 5 % collective
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The collective is changed between each of the mappings, and it can be seen that the
region where the end of the simulation time horizon is reached shrinks as the collective
control input is increased. This type of analysis is shown for a small number of conditions
here, and is expected to be expanded over time, enlarging the region where the detection
metric is defined. The detection metric is based on comparing incoming flight data with the
output from the neural-network representation of all such mappings for a given vehicle and
a range of flight conditions, an example of which is shown in Figures A.5 to A.8 below. On
the right side of each figure is the actual data obtained from simulation and post processing
of the flight trajectories, and on the left is the representation of the same data using a neural
network with multiple hidden layers. In each case, the network captures the complicated
nonlinear features of the actual response, allowing the results to be implemented in a mon-
itoring database where quick comparison between incoming data and the simulation output
is required.
Figure A.5: 2-8-8-2-1 MLP fit of -10 % collective surface
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Figure A.6: 2-8-8-2-1 MLP fit of -5 % collective surface
Figure A.7: 2-8-8-2-1 MLP fit of nominal collective response
Figure A.8: 2-8-8-2-1 MLP fit of 5 % collective surface
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APPENDIX B
NN TEST CASE PERFORMANCE RESULTS
The performance of any surrogate modeling or regression technique is measured by the
ability of the fitted model to approximate the original data as well as generate new data
outside the data used to create the model. This is commonly referred to model fit error
(MFE) and model representation error (MRE) and is calculated as the average squared error
between the training and test data, respectively, and the values generated by the model at
the corresponding input settings.
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Figure B.1: Actual by predicted - smooth ridge (case 1)
Figure B.2: Actual by predicted - sinusoidal ridge ridge (case 2)
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Figure B.3: Actual by predicted - truncated ridge ridge (case 3)
Figure B.4: Actual by predicted - Gaussian peaks (case 4)
182
Figure B.5: Error residuals - smooth ridge (case 1)
Figure B.6: Error residuals - sinusoidal ridge ridge (case 2)
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Figure B.7: Error residuals - truncated ridge ridge (case 3)
Figure B.8: Error residuals - Gaussian peaks (case 4)
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Figure B.9: Standard error - smooth ridge (case 1)
Figure B.10: Standard error - sinusoidal ridge ridge (case 2)
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Figure B.11: Standard error - truncated ridge ridge (case 3)





The final demonstration made use of FLIGHTLAB, an industry standard software typically
used for engineering and piloted evaluations. It is a modular simulator with user-selectable
component models of varying fidelity, which the analyst selects based on the needs and
constraints of the intended use. Figure C.1 shows a screenshot of the graphical user in-
terface used to select components and define the properties of the helicopter model which
is later used with the analysis component of Flightlab. The demonstration in this work
utilized the built-in model of the UH-60A helicopter, since this particular model has been
validated and contains all necessary components. If a different helicopter model is needed,
the appropriate modifications to the model structure would have to be made using the edi-
tor shown in Figure C.1, along with modifications to the associated property tables. In the
present investigation, LOC events are of particular interest, and specifically the detection
of rollover during taxi. In this operating condition, pilots use the lateral cyclic and tail
rotor pedal to execute turns with the helicopter, taking care to coordinate these inputs so as
to avoid excessive moments and resultant rolling motion. For this type of conditions it is
beneficial to have a capability of detecting collisions with the ground or otherwise exceed-
ing the physical ability of the vehicle to sustain safe flight. Therfore a modification to the
standard model was made by adding 4 auxiliary contact points, defined as separate landing
gear components (shown in Figure C.2), in order to prevent the model from tipping over
and crossing the ground place during simulation. The compression of any of these landing
gear components is used as a means to detect inappropriate contact with the ground, though
any parameters simulated by the complete model could be used in determining the presence
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Figure C.1: Flightlab model editor
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of an undesirable flight state.
Figure C.2: Added contact points
After a model is defined, the analysis proceeds using the Xanalysis component of
Flightlab. After the model is loaded and initialized in Xanalysis, the user can choose
the type of analysis to be run. There are many choices, including steady and unsteady
simulations in the time domain, frequency response analysis and built in handling quality
evaluations. The user can select any of the parameters contained in the model as outputs of
the simulation, which can be displayed or saved in the proprietary .TAB format for further
processing. Data and simulator configuration can also be loaded from exiting .TAB files.
Figure C.3 shows a sample of the outputs that are available, as displayed by the built-in
Xanalysis graphing utility.
Both the model editor and the analysis components have a graphical interface, but the
software also has a means of scripted interaction with the user through the SCOPE interface
in Xanalysis. Scope is a proprietary language, similar in syntax to MATLAB R©, which
enables the user to generate scripts and automate analyses for which commands exist. The
documentation provided with FLIGHTLAB and the help files should be consulted for a
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Figure C.3: FLIGHTLAB output
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detailed explanation of the various commands and their behavior. This work made use of
these facilities to automate the analysis and execute many evaluations in batch format, with
the set-up and associated source code described next.
C.2 Flightlab set-up
The simulation set-up was hosted on a Linux computed along with a MATLAB instance
which was used to operate the simulation and gather the results. Several files are required
to operate the simulation given a range of inputs automatically. The SCOPE environment
can execute its own scripts, an example of which is provided in a later subsection. This
template is used by the main MATLAB script and modified according to the input for the
specific run and the selection of starting condition and vehicle configuration.
C.2.1 MATLAB files
The primary file used to operate the simulation is the mainFL.m file, which calls additional
routines that modify various FLIGHTLAB files, and eventually runs a SCOPE script that
executes the analysis. The SCOPE script saves the result from each analysis run in a sep-
arate file, which can then be processed further. Below are the input files used to simulate
the ground maneuvering demonstration.
mainFL.m:
1 % Main f u n c t i o n t o run t h e a n a l y s i s u s i n g FLIGHTLAB
2 % I n t e n d e d t o run on Zephram ( Linux )
3
4 c l c
5 c l o s e a l l
6 c l e a r
7 t i c
191
8
9 %s e t t ime of s t e p and i n t e g r a t i o n d u r a t i o n
10 s i m i n . t f i n a l = 1 0 ;
11 s i m i n . t s e g m e n t = 2 ;%<<−−−−−−−− must be l e s s o r e q u a l t o
s i m i n . t f i n a l
12 %s i m i n . t s e g m e n t can be s e t t o be some s m a l l e r i n t e r v a l , a s
long as
13 %i t i s c o n t a i n e d an whole numberr o f t i m e s i n s i m i n . t f i n a l
14
15 s i m i n . t s t e p s t a r t = 0 . 5 ; %t h e s t a r t and s t o p d e f i n e t h e
s t e p r i s e t ime
16 s i m i n . t s t e p s t o p = 0 . 6 ;
17
18 % s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r = ’ t e s t n o v 1 1 ’ ;
19
20 %% d e t e r m i n e whe the r t o run ground or f r e e− f l i g h t c a s e
21 r u n t y p e = ’ ground ’ ; % ’ t r im ’ ’ ground ’
22
23 s w i t c h r u n t y p e
24 c a s e ’ ground ’
25 %someth ing a b o u t mod i fy ing t h e ground run t e m p l a t e
f i l e , which w i l l
26 %be t h e n m o d i f i e d below t o be t h e f l i g h t l a b r u n f i l e
27 % a l m o s t e x a c t l y as r u n f i l e t e m p l a t e , b u t now
groundrun
28 s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r = ’ g r o u n d r u n 1 0 k t −10
c o l l e x t e n d e d t e s t ’ ;
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29 un ix ( [ ’ mkdir ˜ / o u t p u t f i l e s / ’ s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r ] )
30
31 s y s t e m t r i m f i l e = ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / s y s t e m g r o u n d 1 0 k t
−10 c o l l . t a b ’ ;
32
33 f i n = fopen ( ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / r u n f i l e t e m p l a t e . exc ’ ) ;%
l i n u x on ly
34 f o u t = fopen ( ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / g r o u n d r u n t e m p l a t e . exc ’ ,
’w’ ) ; %opened wi th w r i t e p e r m i s s i o n
35 m o d i f y g r o u n d r u n t e m p l a t e ( f i n , f o u t ,
s y s t e m t r i m f i l e ) ;
36 f c l o s e ( f i n ) ; f c l o s e ( f o u t ) ;
37 c a s e ’ t r i m ’
38 %% make n e c e s s a r y m o d i f i c a t i o n t o c o n d i t i o n s i n p u t
f i l e
39 %t h i s i s f o r f r e e− f l i g h t
40 i f s i m i n . t s e g m e n t == s i m i n . t f i n a l
41 s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r = ’ p a r a m e t r i c r u n c o n t i n u o u s ’ ;
42 e l s e
43 s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r = ’ p a r a m e t r i c r u n m u l t i s e g m e n t
’ ;
44 end
45 un ix ( [ ’ mkdir ˜ / o u t p u t f i l e s / ’ s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r ] )
46
47 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d a z v a l = 0 ; %k n o t s
48 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d v v a l = 0 ;
49 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d h v a l = 0 ;
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50 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . g h v a l = 0 ; %h o r i z o n t a l f l i g h t p a t h
a n g l e (+ r i g h t )
51 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . g v v a l = 0 ; % v e r t i c l a f l i g h t p a t h
a n g l e (+ up )
52 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . X va l = 0 ;
53 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . Y va l = 0 ;
54 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . Z v a l = −1000; %i n f e e t
55 s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . v e q v a l = 1 0 ; %i n kno t s , b u t g e t s
r e p o r t e d i n f t / s
56
57 m o d i f y c o n d i t i o n s ( s i m i n ) ;
58 % remove o l d and t r i m t o new f l i g h t c o n d i t i o n
59 un ix ( ’ rm ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / s y s t e m t r i m . t a b ’ ) ;
60 un ix ( ’ ( scope − i ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / t r i m f i l e t e m p l a t e . exc )
e x i t ’ ) ;
61
62 o t h e r w i s e
63 warn ing ( ’ Unexpec ted c a s e . ’ )
64 end
65
66 %d e f i n e v a l u e s f o r s t e p c o n t r o l i n p u t s ( h a n d l e d v i a o d l i i n
f l i g h t l a b )
67 xc = [−10] ; xa = [ −3 0 : 2 : 3 0 ] ; xp = xa ;
68
69 % r e s h a p e i n t o t e s t m a t r i x
70 [ xx , yy ] = meshgr id ( xa , xp ) ;
71 x a t e s t = r e s h a p e ( xx , [ l e n g t h ( xx ) ˆ 2 , 1 ] ) ;
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72 x p t e s t = r e s h a p e ( yy , [ l e n g t h ( yy ) ˆ 2 , 1 ] ) ;
73 t e s t m a t r i x = [ x a t e s t x p t e s t [ 1 : l e n g t h ( x a t e s t ) ] ’ ] ;
74
75 p a r t i c l e I D = 1 ; % i m m e d i a t e l y change a f t e r i n p u t s a r e
r e s h a p e d
76
77 f o r i = 1 : l e n g t h ( x a t e s t )
78
79 % f o r i = 1 : l e n g t h ( xp )
80 % f o r k = 1 : l e n g t h ( xa )
81 f o r j = 1 : f l o o r ( s i m i n . t f i n a l / s i m i n . t s e g m e n t )
82 %s e t t r i m v a l u e s o f c o n t r o l s
83 s i m i n . xb = 8 ; %l o n g i t u d i n a l c o n t r o l ,
p e r c e n t
84 s i m i n . xa = t e s t m a t r i x ( i , 1 ) ;%xa ( i ) ; %l a t e r a l
c o n t r o l , p e r c e n t
85 s i m i n . xc = −10; %c o l l e c t i v e
86 s i m i n . xp = t e s t m a t r i x ( i , 2 ) ;%xp ( i ) ; %t a i l
r o t o r p e d a l
87
88 p a r t i c l e I D = i ;
89
90 %s e t a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r o l components ( add w i t h i n
m o d i f y c o n t r o l s .m)
91 x b i n = 0 ;
92 x a i n = 0 ;
93 x c i n = 0 ;
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94 x p i n = 0 ;
95
96 %−−−> e n s u r e each c o n t r o l i n p u t i s t r e a t e d t h e
same
97 %−−−> e n s u r e I can map c o n t r o l i n p u t s t o c o n t r o l
o u t p u t s ( s ave t e s t c a s e s
98 %i n a f i l e , and a l l o u t p u t f i l e s , f o r l a t e r pos t
−p r o c e s s i n g )
99
100
101 %use p a r t i c l e f l a g t o i n d i c a t e i f i t i s
b e g i n n i n g o f run o r some
102 %i n t e r m e d i a t e p o i n t
103 segmentID = j ; %s e t t h e segment ( can be 1 or a
h i g h e r number )
104 m o d i f y c o n t r o l s ( s imin , segmentID ) %music In White
Rooms − Booka Shade
105
106 %modify p r i m a r y . exc f i l e f o r FLIGHTLAB
107 % open f i l e s f o r r e a d i n g and w r i t i n g
108 % f i n = fopen ( ’ ˜ /
i n p u t f i l e s / X a n a l y s i s t e m p l a t e p a r t i c l e x h .
exc ’ ) ;% l i n u x on ly
109 s w i t c h r u n t y p e %t h i s j u s t changes whe the r t h e
f i r s t l o a d i s from t r i m or from pre−d e f i n e d
s t a t e
110 c a s e ’ t r i m ’
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111 f i n = fopen ( ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s /
r u n f i l e t e m p l a t e . exc ’ ) ;%l i n u x on ly
112 c a s e ’ ground ’
113 f i n = fopen ( ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s /
g r o u n d r u n t e m p l a t e . exc ’ ) ;
114 end
115 f o u t = fopen ( ’ FLIGHTLAB runfile . exc ’ , ’w’ ) ; %
opened wi th w r i t e p e r m i s s i o n
116 % f i n = fopen ( ’ FLIGHTLAB runf i l e t e s t . exc
’ ) ; %opened wi th w r i t e p e r m i s s i o n
117
118 % f i n = fopen ( ’ t e s t o u t p u t f i l e . exc ’ )
119
120 save name = m o d i f y m a i n F L f i l e ( s imin , segmentID ,
f i n , f o u t , p a r t i c l e I D ) ;
121 f c l o s e ( f i n ) ; f c l o s e ( f o u t ) ;
122
123 % unix ( ’ t i m e o u t −k 1m 30 s scope& − i
FLIGHTLAB runfile . exc e x i t ’ ) ;
124 un ix ( ’ ( scope − i FLIGHTLAB runfile . exc e x i t ) &
s l e e p 3 ; k i l l $ ! ’ ) ;
125 % unix ( ’ ( scope − i FLIGHTLAB runfile . exc e x i t ) ’ ) ;
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132 end %t e s t m a t r i x
133 s i m i n . t e s t p a r a m s = { ’ xa ’ , ’ xp ’ , ’ p a r t i c l e I D ’ } ;
134 s i m i n . t e s t m a t r i x = t e s t m a t r i x ;
135 s ave ( [ ’ ˜ / o u t p u t f i l e s / ’ s i m i n . r u n f o l d e r ’ / s i m i n . mat ’ ] , ’
s i m i n ’ )
136
137 r u n t i m e = t o c ;
The main file calls additional scripts to modify template files which are used by FLIGHT-
LAB to execute the analysis. Before a simulation run is executed, the conditions must be
set and the control inputs which will be used throughout the simulation are specified using




2 f u n c t i o n m o d i f y c o n d i t i o n s ( s imin , p a r t i c l e f l a g , ˜ , ˜ , ˜ )
3 % This s c r i p t m o d i f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s t a b l e t h a t c o n t a i n s
t h e i n i t i a l
4 % c o n d i t i o n s used t o t r i m and c o n f i g u r e t h e v e h i c l e . The
same . t a b f i l e i s
5 % used d u r i n g t h e main e x e c u t i o n t o e n s u r e t h e same v e h i c l e
c o n f i g u r a t i o n
6 % i s used , though many v a l u e s a r e o v e r w r i t t e n when t h e end
s t a t e o f t h e
7 % p r i o r t r a j e c t o r y i s l o a d e d .
8 %
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9 %t h i s f u n c t i o n depends on h av i ng t h e c o r r e c t s t r u c t u r e
p r e s e n t i n t h e s i m i n
10 %i n p u t s t r u c t u r e , o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :
11 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d a z v a l = 2 0 ;
12 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d v v a l = 6 0 ;
13 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d h v a l = 5 0 ;
14 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . g h v a l = 4 0 ;
15 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . g v v a l = 3 0 ;
16 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . X va l = 2 0 ;
17 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . Y va l = 2 ;
18 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . Z v a l = −1000;
19 % s i m i n . c o n d i t i o n s . v e q v a l = 1 0 ;
20 %uncomment t h e above rows i f t e s t i n g t h e f u n c t i o n
21
22 f i n = fopen ( ’ c o n d i t i o n s i n p u t m a t l a b . t a b ’ ) ;
23 f o u t = fopen ( ’ c o n d i t i o n s m a t l a b g e n e r a t e d i n p u t . t a b ’ , ’w’ ) ;
24 % d i s p ( [ ’ f i l e n a m e i s open ’ num2s t r ( f o u t ) ] )
25 da ta now = 0 ;
26
27 w h i l e da ta now ˜= − 1
28 % g e t row from f i l e
29 da ta now = f g e t s ( f i n ) ;
30 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ w i n d a z v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d a z v a l ) ) ;
31 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ w i n d v v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d v v a l ) ) ;
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32 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ w i n d h v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . w i n d h v a l ) ) ;
33 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ g h v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . g h v a l ) ) ;
34 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ g v v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . g v v a l ) ) ;
35 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ X va l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . X va l ) ) ;
36 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ Y va l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . Y va l ) ) ;
37 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ Z v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . Z v a l ) ) ;
38 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , ’ v e q v a l ’ , num2s t r ( s i m i n .
c o n d i t i o n s . v e q v a l ) ) ;
39
40 f p r i n t f ( f o u t , ’%s ’ , da ta now ) ; %j u s t p a s s t h e row t o t h e




44 f c l o s e ( f i n ) ;
45 f c l o s e ( f o u t ) ;
46 end
The control inputs are set at pre-determined levels and passed as step inputs if the
simulation is at the first segment, and can be held constant or varied in later segments.
modify_controls.m:
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1 f u n c t i o n m o d i f y c o n t r o l s ( s imin , segmentID , ˜ , ˜ , ˜ )
2 % This s c r i p t m o d i f i e s t h e i n p u t t a b l e t h a t c o n t a i n s t h e
c o n t r o l commands
3 % t h a t a r e e x e c u t e d a t a s p e c i f i e d t ime . Th i s v e r s i o n
g e n e r a t e s s t e p i n p u t s
4 % f o r t h e f i r s t approach , t o r e p l i c a t e t h e o r i g i n a l t i p o v e r
model ing
5 % I n p u t : t f i n a l − how long t o run , s i m i n . t s t e p − t ime of
s t e p a p p l i c a t i o n
6 % xb − l o n g i t u d i n a l
7 % xa − l a t e r a l
8 % xc − c o l l e c t i v e
9 % xp − p e d a l
10
11 % i f n a r g i n ==1
12 % d i s p ( ’ on ly s t r u c t i s i n p u t ’ )
13 % e l s e
14 % r e t u r n
15 % end
16
17 f i n = fopen ( ’ e x a m p l e i n p u t m a t l a b . t a b ’ ) ;
18 f o u t = fopen ( ’ e x a m p l e m a t l a b g e n e r a t e d i n p u t . t a b ’ , ’w’ ) ;
19 % d i s p ( [ ’ f i l e n a m e i s open ’ num2s t r ( f o u t ) ] )
20
21 da ta now = 0 ;
22 mode = 1 ; %s t a r t by s e a r c h i n g f o r t h e c o n t r o l s e q u e n c e
d e f i n i t i o n
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23 w h i l e da ta now ˜= − 1
24 % g e t row from f i l e
25 da ta now = f g e t s ( f i n ) ;
26
27 %i f l e n g t h i s 1 , i t i s an ” empty ” row between two
segments , v a r i a b l e s ,
28 %or v e c t o r s ; depends on incoming f i l e f o r m a t t i n g , works
wi th i n p u t . t a b
29 i f l e n g t h ( da ta now ) == 1
30 mode = 1 ; %back t o s e a r c h mode i f we have an empty
row ( n o t l a s t )
31 end
32
33 i f mode ==1
34 f p r i n t f ( f o u t , ’%s ’ , da ta now ) ; %j u s t p a s s t h e row t o
t h e o u t f i l e
35
36 % hardcoded v a r i a b l e t i t l e row ( ok f o r s m a l l number
o f known
37 % v a r i a b l e s such as t h e c o n t r o l spec f i l e
38 i f i s e q u a l ( data now , s p r i n t f ( ’ ! T Timevec XBin XAin
XCin XPin\n ’ ) )
39 mode =2; % s w i t c h t o m o d i f i c a t i o n mode
40 end
41
42 e l s e i f mode == 2 %i f i n s e a r c h mode , make t h e
m o d i f i c a t i o n s below
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43 nums = s t r2num ( da ta now ) ;
44
45 i f segmentID == 1
46 i f nums ( 1 )>s i m i n . t s t e p s t a r t
47 nums ( 2 ) = s i m i n . xb ; %xb in − l o n g i t u d i n a l ?
48 nums ( 3 ) = s i m i n . xa ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3
c o n t r o l c h a n n e l s
49 nums ( 4 ) = s i m i n . xc ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3
c o n t r o l c h a n n e l s
50 nums ( 5 ) = s i m i n . xp ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3
c o n t r o l c h a n n e l s
51
52 i f nums ( 1 ) ==0.5
53 nums ( 1 ) = s i m i n . t s t e p s t a r t ;
54 end
55 i f nums ( 1 ) ==0.6
56 nums ( 1 ) = s i m i n . t s t e p s t o p ;
57 end
58 i f nums ( 1 ) ==8
59 nums ( 1 ) = s i m i n . t s e g m e n t ;
60 end
61 end
62 e l s e
63 nums ( 2 ) = s i m i n . xb ; %xb in − l o n g i t u d i n a l ?
64 nums ( 3 ) = s i m i n . xa ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3 c o n t r o l
c h a n n e l s
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65 nums ( 4 ) = s i m i n . xc ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3 c o n t r o l
c h a n n e l s
66 nums ( 5 ) = s i m i n . xp ; % modify t h e o t h e r 3 c o n t r o l
c h a n n e l s
67
68 i f nums ( 1 ) ==0.5
69 nums ( 1 ) = s i m i n . t s e g m e n t ∗ 1 / 3 ;
70 end
71 i f nums ( 1 ) ==0.6
72 nums ( 1 ) = s i m i n . t s e g m e n t ∗ 2 / 3 ;
73 end
74 i f nums ( 1 ) ==8




79 da ta now = [ num2s t r ( nums , ’ %g ’ ) ’\n ’ ] ;






86 f c l o s e ( f i n ) ;
87 f c l o s e ( f o u t ) ;
88 end
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In the case of ground runs, the analysis proceeded using a saved trim state, which was
loaded by replacing the typical trim state with the saved ground trim state.
1 f u n c t i o n m o d i f y g r o u n d r u n t e m p l a t e ( f i n , f o u t ,
s y s t e m t r i m f i l e )
2 %C r e a t e d 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 1 6 by Alek G a v r i l o v s k i
3 %
4 % t h i s f u n c t i o n changes t h e o r i g i n a l t e m p l a t e t o use t h e pre
−t r immed ground
5 % c o n d i t i o n s t o s t a r t w i th
6
7 da ta now = 0 ;
8 o r i g i n a l f i l e n a m e = ’ ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / s y s t e m t r i m . t a b ’ ;
9
10 w h i l e da ta now ˜= − 1
11 % g e t row from f i l e
12 da ta now = f g e t s ( f i n ) ;
13 %r e p l a c e o r i g i n a l t r i m f i l e f o r i n p u t wi th t h e ground
run of c h o i c e
14 da ta now = s t r r e p ( data now , o r i g i n a l f i l e n a m e ,
s y s t e m t r i m f i l e ) ;
15 %w r i t e each row back t o o u t p u t f i l e
16 f p r i n t f ( f o u t , ’%s ’ , da ta now ) ; %j u s t p a s s t h e row t o t h e




20 % f c l o s e ( f i n ) ;
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21 % f c l o s e ( f o u t ) ;
22 end
C.2.2 FLIGHTLAB files
The simulation makes use of a file that stores the entire state of the simulator, either as a
result of trimming at the beginning of a simulation run or when segmenting the simulation.
In the case of trim, this is done to avoid small differences due to the tolerance in the trim
algorithm and ensure every run begins at the exact same state. Which file should be used is
specified by modification of the template file via the main MATLAB script used to run the
analysis. The template FLIGHTLAB file is shown below.
Xanalysis_template.exc:
1 / / . Th i s s c r i p t r u n s i n X a n a l y s i s
2 / /
3 / / . a u t h o r : Alek G a v r i l o v s k i
4 / / . l a s t u p d a t e : 2016−11−11
5
6 / / add p a t h t o i n c l u d e f i l e l o c a t i o n s
7 p a t h ( ” ˜ / a l e k m o d e l s ” ) ;
8 p a t h ( ” ˜ ” ) ;
9
10 / / . Load model ( e i t h e r i n X a n a l y s i s o r wi th t h i s command )
11 exec ( ” f lme / models / a r t i c u l a t e d / a r t i −rgd−3iv−qs . d e f ” , 1 ) ;
12
13 / / . Load i n p u t d a t a
14 l o a d t a b ( ” ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / e x a m p l e i n p u t . t a b ” ) ;





19 / / CONFIGURATION
20
21 / / t h e d e f a u l t model and my own m o d i f i c a t i o n have : model ,
c o n t r o l , r o t o r 1 and r o t o r 2 components ( i n e r t i a s , cg
o f f s e t , w e ig h t f o r t h e f u s e l a g e ; c o n t r o l : ana log , d i g i t a l
sas , s t a b i l a t o r ; r o t o r 1 s w a s h p l a t e phase a n g l e [ r a d ] ;
r o t o r 2 f a i l u r e f l a g )
22
23 w o r l d m o d e l c p g c o n f i g p a r v w e i g h t = GW; / / from f i l e
24 w o r l d m o d e l c p g c o n f i g p a r f s c g = FSCG ; / / from f i l e
25
26
27 / / . . . . e t c .
28 exec ( ” x a c o n f i g . exc ” , 1 ) ; / /− s c r i p t s e t t h e c o n f i g
p a r a m e t e r s i n model
29
30 / / TEST
31
32 / / . S e t TEST c o n d i t i o n s ( example : p r e s s u r e a l t , o u t s i d e temp ,
a i r s p e e d )
33 / / ( a l l t e s t c o n d p a r a m e t e r s f o r t h e g u i a r e i n : w o r l d m o d e l
[ component ] c p g t e s t c o n d )
34
35 / / components : model , a i r f r a m e , c o n t r o l , p r o p u l s i o n , r o t o r 1
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36
37 / / s e t t i n g up p o s i t i o n t o c o i n c i d e wi th a l a n d i n g
38 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d p o s x i c = 0 ;
39 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d p o s y i c = 0 ;
40 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d p o s z i c = −1000; / /
make t h i s from f i l e , r i g h t now i t i s meant t o t e s t t h e
l a n d i n g
41
42
43 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d v e q = 10∗ w o r l d d a t a f 2 k
; / / from f i l e ,
44 / / w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d v e q = IAS∗
w o r l d d a t a f 2 k ; / / from f i l e , example u n i t v o n v e r s i o n
45 / / i n model , t h e r e i s ambien t p r e s s u r e / t e m p e r a t u r e
d i s t u r b a n c e
46 w o r l d m o d e l c p g t e s t c o n d h p r e s = HP ;
/ / from f i l e
47 w o r l d m o d e l c p g t e s t c o n d t a m b = OAT;
/ / from f i l e ( t ypo i n o r i g i n a l example
! ! ) t r a n
48 / / . . . . e t c .
49 / / w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d v e q = Vinf ; / /
VEQ s e t t i n g f l i g h t speed , s e e how from from f i l e
50 / / w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d w h e e l h i c = Wheelh ; / /
from f i l e
51
52 / / INSERT TRIM SPECIFICATION FROM PREVIOUS RUN <−−−
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53 / / t h e s e v a l u e s w i l l e i t h e r be ha rdcoded or come from f i l e
54
55 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d p h i i c = −0.0321;
56 w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g t e s t c o n d t h e t a i c = −0.0142;
57 w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l c p g t e s t c o n d x a t r m = 5 1 . 4 7 ;
58 w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l c p g t e s t c o n d x b t r m = 5 3 . 7 ;
59 w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l c p g t e s t c o n d x c t r m = 3 9 . 2 ;
60 w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l c p g t e s t c o n d x p t r m = 3 2 . 7 ;
61
62 exec ( ” x a t e s t c o n d . exc ” , 1 ) ; / /− s c r i p t s e t t h e t e s t
c o n d i t i o n s
63
64 / / . Trim model a t t h e t e s t c o n d i t i o n and wi th t h e s p e c i f i e d
c o n f i g u r a t i o n
65 exec ( ” xamode l t r im . exc ” , 1 ) ;
66
67 / / CREATE A SAVEFILE OR OTHER MEANS OF STORING THE TRIM
STATE (EVERYTHING INCLUDED)
68 pushg / / I use push b e c a u s e I want t o come back t o
t h e group where I have been working u n t i l now
w o r l d m y t e s t
69 group o u t p u t T r i m / / I c r e a t e t h e group wi th a l l t h e
o u t p u t v a r i a b l e s . I t s name i s o u t p u t T r i m
70
71 / / I f t h e v a r i a b l e i s 0 ( no c o n v e r g e n c e ) , i t i s 1 (
a n a l y s i s conve rged )
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72 t r i m S u c c e s s = ! ( w o r l d a n a l y s i s t r i m t e s t i f a i l t r i m ) ; / /
V a r i a b l e t o s e e i f t h e r e has benn c o n v e r g e n c e
73
74
75 / / i f ( t r i m S u c c e s s ==1)
76 / / C o l l e c t t r i m r e s u l t s . O the r p l a c e where you can
g t i n f o r m a t i o n
77 / / s h p t o t a l ( i k i a s ) =
w o r l d a n a l y s i s t r i m t e s t r e s u l t s t r i m o u t ( 1 8 ) ;
78 / / mrpwr ( i k i a s ) =
w o r l d a n a l y s i s t r i m t e s t r e s u l t s t r i m o u t ( 3 4 ) ;
79 / / t r p w r ( i k i a s ) =
w o r l d a n a l y s i s t r i m t e s t r e s u l t s t r i m o u t ( 3 5 ) ;
80 / / p l o s s ( i k i a s ) =
w o r l d a n a l y s i s t r i m t e s t r e s u l t s t r i m o u t ( 8 6 ) ;
81 / / Read t h e o u t p u t s from t h e r o t o r t h a t I am
i n t e r e s t e d i n
82
83 R1CTTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t c t ;
84 R1CQTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t c q ;
85 R1FZTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t h u b f z ;
86 R1CPTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t c p ;
87 R1CMXTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t c m x ;
88 R1CMYTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t c m y ;
89 R1VI0TRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t v i 0
; / / Induced Flow S t a t e Uniform
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90 R1VI1CTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t v i 1 c
; / / Induced Flow S t a t e Cos ine
91 R1VI1STRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t v i 1 s
; / / Induced Flow S t a t e S ine
92 R1WI0TRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t w i 0
; / / Mean i n d u c e d f low
93 R1A1STRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t a 1 s
; / / S w a s h p l a t e L a t e r a l Angle
94 R1B1STRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t b 1 s
; / / S w a s h p l a t e L o n g i t u d i n a l Angle
95 R1THETA0TRIM =
w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t t h e t a 0 ; / /
S w a s h p l a t e C o l l e c t i v e Angle
96 R1MUXYTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t m u x y
; / / Advanced R a t i o
97 R1OMEGA = w o r l d m o d e l r o t o r 1 r o t o r c p g x a o u t o m e g a
; / / Ro to r Speed [ r a d / s e c ]
98 / / Read t h e o u t p u t s from t h e model
99 SPHTOTAL = w o r l d m o d e l p r o p u l s i o n c p g x a o u t s h p t o t a l
; / / T o t a l housepower r e q u i r e d [ hp ]
100 IASFWDXKT = w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t i a s f w d x k t
; / / k n o t s
101 VCLIMB= w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t v c l i m b ; / / [ f t
/ s e c ]
102 / / Read t h e o u t p u t s from t h e model
103 MORHOTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l c p g x a o u t r h o ;
104 MOWINDXTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l c p g x a o u t w i n d x ;
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105 MOWINDYTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l c p g x a o u t w i n d y ;
106 MOWINDZTRIM = w o r l d m o d e l c p g x a o u t w i n d z ;
107 MOTOTVWEIGHT= w o r l d m o d e l c p g x a o u t t o t v w e i g h t ; / /
lbm
108 / / E v e n t u a l l y I can w r i t e o t h e r v a r a i b l e s i s
109
110 / / end / / End t r i m S u c c e s s ==1
111
112 / / S t o r e t h e o u t p u t v a r i a b l e s i n t h e f i l e ”
t r i m A n a l y s i s O u t p u t . d a t ”
113 s ave ( ” ˜ / o u t p u t f i l e s / t r i m A n a l y s i s O u t p u t . d a t ” ) ; / / s ave ( ”
t r i m A n a l y s i s O u t p u t . d a t ” ) ;
114
115 popg ; / / t o go back t o t h e group w o r l d m y t e s t
116
117 / / . S e l e c t i n p u t s ( example : xb , xa , xc , xp )
118 / / ( t h i s f u n c t i o n c r e a t e s a v a r l i s t c a l l e d ” @inputs ” )
119 i n p u t ( [ ] ) ; / / c l e a r v a r l i s t
120 i n p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l d a t a x b ) ;
121 i n p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l d a t a x a ) ;
122 i n p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l d a t a x c ) ;
123 i n p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l c o n t r o l d a t a x p ) ;
124 / / . t y p e : ’who ( @inputs ) ’ t o s e e what i s go ing on
125
126 / / . S e l e c t o u t p u t s ( example : xb , xa , xc , xp )
127 / / ( t h i s f u n c t i o n c r e a t e s a v a r l i s t c a l l e d ” @outputs ” )
128 o u t p u t ( [ ] ) ;
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129 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t v x b ) ; / /
column 1
130 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t v y b ) ;
131 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t v z b ) ;
132 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p ) ;
133 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t q ) ;
134 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t r ) ;
135 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p h i ) ;
136 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t t h e t a ) ; / /
column 8
137 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p s i ) ;
138 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p o s x i ) ;
139 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p o s y i ) ;
140 o u t p u t ( w o r l d m o d e l a i r f r a m e c p g x a o u t p o s z i ) ; / /
141
142
143 / / . t y p e : ’who ( @outputs ) ’ t o s e e what i s go ing on
144
145 / / . G e n e r a t e i n p u t p r o f i l e s ( j u s t a s an example )
146 / / ( l o a d e x t e r n a l i n p u t d a t a )
147 l o a d t a b ( ” ˜ / e x a m p l e m a t l a b g e n e r a t e d i n p u t . t a b ” ) ;
148
149 / / ( example : s t e p i n xb )
150 d t = w o r l d d a t a d t ; / / t ime s t e p
151 t ime = [ 0 : d t : max ( t i m e v e c ) ] ’ ; / / t ime = [ 0 : d t : 8 ] ’ ;
152 / / o u t p u t ( t ime ) ; / / add t ime t o t h e o u t p u t s
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153 xbvec= o d l i ( t ime , t imevec , xb in ) ; / / g e n e r a t i n g i n p u t
p r o f i l e from f i l e d a t a
154 xavec = o d l i ( t ime , t imevec , x a i n ) ; / / g e n e r a t i n g i n p u t
p r o f i l e from f i l e d a t a
155 xcvec = o d l i ( t ime , t imevec , x c i n ) ; / / g e n e r a t i n g i n p u t
p r o f i l e from f i l e d a t a
156 xpvec= o d l i ( t ime , t imevec , xp in ) ; / / g e n e r a t i n g i n p u t
p r o f i l e from f i l e d a t a
157 / / xavec = xbvec ∗ 0 . 0 ; xcvec = xbvec ∗ 0 . 0 ; xpvec = xbvec
∗ 0 . 0 ;
158 / / xavec = xbvec ∗ 0 . 0 ; xcvec = xbvec ∗ 0 . 0 ; xpvec = xbvec
∗ 0 . 0 ;
159
160 you t = nrun ( [ xbvec , xavec , xcvec , xpvec ] ) ; / / t h e same
s e q u e n c e as when d e f i n i n g i n p u t s ! !
161
162 / / . Expand o u t p u t s
163 vxb = you t ( : , 1 ) ;
164 vyb = you t ( : , 2 ) ;
165 vzb = you t ( : , 3 ) ;
166 p = you t ( : , 4 ) ;
167 q = you t ( : , 5 ) ;
168 r = you t ( : , 6 ) ;
169 p h i = you t ( : , 7 ) ;
170 t h e t a = you t ( : , 8 ) ;
171 p s i = you t ( : , 9 ) ;
172 x = you t ( : , 1 0 ) ;
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173 y = you t ( : , 1 1 ) ;
174 z = you t ( : , 1 2 ) ;
175 / / t ime = you t ( : , 1 3 ) ;
176 / / e x a m p l e X a n a l y s i s t r a n s i e n t r e s p o n s e w i t h e x t e r n a l d a t a
. exc
177 / / . P l o t r e s u l t s ( example : p i t c h a t t i t u d e ’ t h e t a ’ − 8 ’ t h
p a r a m e t e r i n o u t p u t s ( . . . ) d e f
178 x p l o t ( ” a l l c l e a r , d a t e =0”) ;
179 x p l o t ( ” x l a b e l =Time [ s e c ] , y l a b e l =Nose DWN << P i t c h A t t [ deg
] >> Nose UP” ) ;
180 x p l o t ( t ime , t h e t a ∗5 7 . 3 ) ;
181
182 / / . Save r e s u l t s i n t o a ASCII f i l e
183 / / s ave f i l e n a m e s p e c i f i c a t i o n i n row below
184 s a v e t a b ( ” ˜ / o u t p u t f i l e s / e x a m p l e r e s u l t s w i t h s a v e s t a t e s .
t a b ” , vxb , vyb , vzb , p , q , r , phi , t h e t a , p s i , x , y , z , t ime ) ;
185
186 / / Save e n t i r e s t a t e a t end of s i m u l a t i o n run so n e x t one
s t a r t s
187 / / p a r t i c l e s t a t e o u t p u t
188 / / s a v e t a b ( ” ˜ / i n p u t f i l e s / p a r t i c l e 1 . t a b ” , x0 ) ;
189
190 / / t h i s i s needed i f t h e f i l e i s run u s i n g ” scope − i
FLIGHTLAB runfile . exc ”
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